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Abstract 
 
This research attempts to understand the evolving relationship between China, the United States, 
and Latin America. Specifically, it explores China’s rapid rise as a formidable geopolitical 
power, the United States’ mixed response to that rise, and efforts by two Latin American 
countries, Ecuador and Argentina, to avoid exploitation by both China and the United States—
and, indeed, to even benefit from this mutating relationship. In all cases, historically constructed 
ideas and strategic interests shape relations among these various actors. Accordingly, this 
research lays out the historical sources for each of these powers’ central ideas. Then, it connects 
those ideas to the current strategies employed by both china and the United States to promote 
their military, economic, political, and cultural power. Meanwhile, this research uses two case 
studies—Ecuador and Argentina—to explore to what extent states have attempted to use 
investment and trade with China through the Belt and Road Initiative to increase economic 
growth and expand political autonomy. Ultimately, this analysis informs our understanding of 
geopolitics, clarifies the role of historic memory in international relations, and lays the 
groundwork for further research related to the BRI’s understudied role in Latin America. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Napoleon Bonaparte once compared China to a “sleeping lion” and observed that “when 
she wakes, she will shake the world.” Now China the lion has awakened, but it is a peaceful, 
amicable and civilized lion.  - Xi Jinping, Chinese President1 
China wants nothing less than to push the United States of America from the Western 
Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies. But they will fail. - Mike 
Pence, American Vice President2  
In this world of ours, a world of powerful centers and subjugated outposts, there is no 
wealth that must not be held in some suspicion. - Eduardo Hughes Galeano, Uruguayan 
Journalist3 
 
In the summer of 2019, while I was conducting research on the Chinese Hukou system in 
Guangzhou, something very strange happened. I had just walked out of the Haixinsha subway 
station into a large public square with my close friend and amateur translator Conner. There, we 
saw this peculiar scene: 
 
1 Xi Jinping, "Speech by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Meeting 
Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of China-France Diplomatic Relations" (2014), Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, at 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1147894.shtml. 
2 Mike Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China” (2018), at The 
White House,  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-
policy-toward-china/ 
3 Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent (London: Profile 
Books, 2009), pp. 267. 
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Pictured here is a family setting up for a photo shoot with the Mexican flag in a public 
square. The scene stood out to me because, up until that point, I had only seen American tourists 
during my time in Guangzhou. I had begun to wonder how common it was for the city to 
receive tourists from outside of Asia and the United States when the photo shoot was 
interrupted by two nearby police officers. Specifically, two 民警 (Mínjǐng) approached the 
family. These are higher level officials than the typical transportation attendants, so I thought 
they might be asking the family for their passports. To my surprise, these officers approached 
the tourists and, in broken English, began requesting they put the flag away. When it became 
clear to Conner and I that neither group spoke English, Mandarin, or Spanish well enough to 
communicate with one another, we approached the group. Then, in a bizarre babel of mediocre 
Spanish, English, and Mandarin, we explained the officers’ message to the family, which was 
that no foreign flags are allowed in a public venue in China. Once the family understood, they 
thanked us for the help and everyone went on with their day. 
That scene stayed with me. There we were, two Americans, a family of Mexican tourists, 
and two Chinese police officers, all trying to navigate a strange situation. Coincidentally (I 
cannot overstate the strangeness of this coincidence), I had just spent a summer researching 
China’s implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America. This unexpected event 
perfectly highlighted the lesser studied connection that is the crux of this research, the evolving 
relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America. 
An Evolving Relationship: The Belt and Road Initiative 
No development better exemplifies this evolving relationship than China’s expansion of 
the Belt and Road Initiative into Latin America. Initiated in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) is one of the primary tenets of Chinese president Xi Jinping's "national revitalization" 
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policy in China.4 The BRI is primarily a global infrastructure project funded by the Chinese 
government. However, President Xi made it clear in his opening remarks at the original 2013 
BRI forum (then called “One Belt One Road”, or OBOR) that the BRI is much more than an 
economic project. Instead, Xi noted that the “New Silk Road,” like the original Silk Road, will 
spread economic openness and mutual cooperation throughout the world. President Xi 
subsequently expanded these goals during the 2017 Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation to include the sharing of technology, culture, and security.5 Importantly, President 
Xi also clarified that the BRI is divided into two main geographic routes. The first is the Silk 
Road Economic Belt, which connects Asia, Africa, and Europe through land-based 
infrastructure development. The second is the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which connects 
Asia, Africa, Europe, and Pacific Island countries through maritime infrastructure development. 
While these are the main routes under development as part of the BRI, other countries “off-
route”  in places like Latin America have received BRI funding.6 Thus, the BRI is a truly global 
project, impacting more than the “Silk Road” misnomer implies.  
The international response to this global project has been mixed. Although President Xi 
claims the purpose of the BRI is to achieve “friendship, shared development, peace, harmony 
and a better future,” many international observers suspect China has less altruistic intentions.7 
Indeed, many argue that the BRI’s purpose is to enhance China’s geopolitical power through 
 
4 Xi Jinping, "Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future" (2013), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, at 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml 
5 Xi Jinping, "Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" 
(2017), Xinhua, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm 
6 Fermín Koop, “Belt and Road: The New Face of China in Latin America,” Dialogo Chino (blog), April 25, 2019, 
https://dialogochino.net/26121-belt-and-road-the-new-face-of-china-in-latin-america/; Kristin Huang, “Xi Signs up 
Senegal for Belt and Road Plan, Pledges Closer Africa Ties,” South China Morning Post, July 22, 2018, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2156327/president-xi-jinping-pledges-closer-africa-
ties-during. 
7 Xi, "Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road."  
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economic opportunism. These arguments conform to a particular interpretation of international 
relations which posits that great powers seek to become more powerful than their rivals by 
expanding their military and economic power. However, other scholars evaluate the evolving 
relationship between China and the United States, as well as their respective relations with Latin 
American countries that receive BRI funding like Ecuador and Argentina, differently. To 
understand the evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America, it is 
vital to evaluate these competing interpretations of China’s rise as a global power and the 
driving forces behind the BRI.  
Competing Interpretations of China’s Rise and the BRI 
Put simply, Realists see China’s outreach to the world as a power move. Realism 
originated with thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes and generally asserts that 
conflict between states is inevitable due to the inherently anarchic state of international 
relations, human nature, or a combination of the two.8 To generalize—there are competing 
theories within realism itself—Realists primarily interpret the BRI as China’s attempt to expand 
its economic power. Following Realist thinking, this economic expansion, when coupled with 
China’s growing military aggression in places like the South China Sea, demonstrate the 
emerging power’s desire to become a global superpower. Realists argue that as rival powers and 
concerned neighbors attempt to preserve their interests and respond to the BRI and China’s rise, 
international conflict becomes inevitable.9   
 
8 W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2018 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/realism-intl-relations/. 
9 John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” The National Interest, October 25, 2014, 
https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing: An 
Alternative U.S. China Policy,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 (2012): 48–58; Stephen Kotkin, “Realist World,” Foreign 
Affairs, December 7, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/realist-world. 
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Meanwhile, Liberal Institutionalists take a more optimistic perspective, envisioning 
China’s rise as compatible with the current liberal international order, which was formed 
following the Second World War. Unlike Realists, Liberal Institutionalists generally see 
cooperation rather than conflict as inevitable. They predict that as China grows in power, it will 
become more integrated into international institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade 
Organization, and the International Monetary Fund. From the perspective of Liberal 
Institutionalists, the Belt and Road Initiative constitutes China’s attempt to contribute to the 
missions of these international institutions, albeit through an alternative channel. Certainly, 
Liberal Institutionalists, like Realists, note that the BRI is meant to promote China’s self-
interest. However, they argue that states can simultaneously pursue their own self-interest and 
cooperate with other states to promote collective interests. From this perspective, in order to 
continue expanding its economic and political power, China must inevitably integrate into 
existing, United States-dominated international institutions.  Liberal Institutionalists argue that 
since other members of the international order will seek to accommodate China’s rise, 
international cooperation is inevitable.10 
Constructivists, on the other hand, do not see conflict or cooperation as inevitable. 
Instead, they see an array of options from which states can choose. For Constructivists, these 
choices are driven by underlying ideas and interests. In this way, Constructivists contradict the 
rationalism that undergirds both Realist and Liberal Institutionalist analyses. As Constructivist 
scholar Alexander Went explained, “self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential 
 
10 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order,” Foreign Affairs 97 (July/August, 
2018): https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world; also see Kori Schake, “Back to 
Basics,” Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/back-basics. 
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features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it.”11 Thus, China’s gravitation towards 
conflict or cooperation is determined by its choices, which are entrenched in constructed ideas 
and interests, not purely rational calculations. Meanwhile, the United States and Latin American 
states respond to China’s rise based on how they perceive China’s intentions. That perception of 
the BRI (and China’s general growing presence on the world stage) is also guided by choice, 
ideas, and interests. This means that the evolving relationship between China, the United States, 
and Latin America is somewhat unpredictable: neither international conflict nor cooperation are 
inevitable, leaving the future uncertain.       
 Which of these arguments best depicts the changing relationship between China, the 
United States, and Latin America? While it would be naive to dismiss any of these arguments in 
their entirety, the Constructivist perspective, with important qualifications, is the most 
compelling for a few reasons. First, arguing for the “inevitability” of any outcome is too 
deterministic and distorts our understanding of this evolving relationship. Even for those 
Realists and Liberal Institutionalists who argue that conflict or cooperation are, if not inevitable, 
at least the international tendency, there are ample historical periods that can be used to “prove” 
either argument and, consequently, “disprove” the opposing argument. For instance, Realists 
invoke the First World War and Liberal Institutionalists refer to the Cold War in an attempt to 
use history to discredit opposing theories of international relations. While it is important to 
analyze these histories in order to understand how states act, they cannot be used as predictive 
models of certainty. In contrast, Constructivists best take into account the only truly inevitable 
variable in international relations: uncertainty.12 By noting that states make choices based on 
 
11 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 395. 
12 Wesley W. Widmaier, “Constructing Foreign Policy Crises: Interpretive Leadership in the Cold War and War on 
Terrorism,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 4 (2007): 782. 
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ideas and interests, Constructivists recognize that states do not always act in a calculating or 
“rational” manner. This makes their actions difficult to predict and exposes the limitations of 
historical analogies. For this reason, Constructivists best capture the incalculable chaos that 
confounds Realist/Liberal Institutionalist predictive models, thereby avoiding determinism.  
Second, beyond recognizing uncertainty, Constructivists correctly identify the drivers of 
decision makers: ideas and interests. While Realists and Liberal Institutionalists certainly take 
these two factors into account, they manifest differently in Constructivist thought. While 
Realists and Liberal Institutionalists assert that ideas emerge from interests, Constructivists 
argue the opposite. For Constructivists, ideas shape interests, and a state’s ideas about 
international relations are entrenched in that state’s historically constructed identity. These ideas 
then inform that state’s understanding both of how to achieve the state’s interests and what 
those interests actually are. Instead of relying on conventional understandings of “reason” and 
“logic” to define a state’s interests like Realists and Liberal Institutionalists do, Constructivists 
rightly consider the role of a state’s historically constructed identity, social relations, and 
collective beliefs in shaping interests and preferences. Because interests and institutions are 
shaped by actors’ shared understandings, expectations, and collective knowledge, state behavior 
is not determined by objective forces but reflects interaction among multiple actors.13 This 
socially and historically based analysis reflects the fact that states are very complex systems—
each with many different political and bureaucratic actors that are influenced by private actors 
and public opinion alike. This understanding avoids the oversimplification of Realists and 
Liberal Institutionalists, who often boil states’ choices down to a few notable leaders (e.g. 
Kissinger).  
 
13 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 398. 
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Adopting a Constructivist perspective should not dismiss compelling arguments made by 
Realists and Liberal Institutionalists. Indeed, Realists are right to note that states often advocate 
for their own interests in ways that invite conflict. Similarly, Liberal Institutionalists correctly 
identify trends which suggest cooperation will win out over conflict internationally. 
Constructivism does not refute either of these points. Instead, it suggests that socially and 
historically constructed ideas and interests (rather than “rational” interests) drive states to act in 
ways that can result in conflict, cooperation, or both simultaneously. Therefore, taking this 
Constructivist perspective allows us to understand the ever-changing relationship between 
China, the United States, and Latin America without haphazardly suggesting that conflict or 
cooperation is the most likely outcome.  
A Constructivist Perspective: Ideas, Interests, and Choices 
Applying the aforementioned Constructivist perspective, this research analyzes the 
complex, evolving relationship between China, the United States, and two Latin American 
countries, Ecuador and Argentina, through the BRI. Specifically, it explores China’s rapid rise as 
a formidable geopolitical power, the United States’ mixed response to that rise, and these two 
Latin American states’ struggle to avoid exploitation and benefit from this evolving relationship. 
In all these cases, states’ socially and historically constructed ideas and interests drive the 
choices made by these international actors. For this research, ideas are defined as collective 
historic memories that have created stable understandings of a particular state’s role and its 
relations with other global actors. State leaders may draw on this sense of shared identity to build 
support for preferred policies. Collective ideas and identities also influence how leaders pursue 
their state’s interests, which may be broadly defined in military, economic, political, and cultural 
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terms.14 While this categorization is imperfect, relating interests to these four axes of power 
clarifies the relationship between these states’ socially and historically constructed ideas and 
their overarching geopolitical goals. This research ultimately establishes these ideas and interests 
in order to analyze each state’s choices, which shape the evolving relationship between China, 
the United States, Ecuador, and Argentina. The BRI serves as a key focal point in this 
relationship and illustrates these complicated decision-making processes.  
In order to analyze these complicated ideas, interests, and choices, this research first lays 
out the historical sources for each of these state’s central ideas. China, the United States, 
Ecuador, and Argentina have complicated historical, political, and social relations that influence 
their choices when navigating this relationship. Exploring these histories and relations helps 
clarify the way in which each state constructs its ideas and interests. To see how collective 
identities are constructed and expressed, this research relies on a wealth of primary and 
secondary sources that highlight the ideological importance of historic memory in the decision-
making process of states. As these historic ideas are highlighted, they are connected to the 
central categories of power listed above in order to illustrate how each state has historically 
defined and pursued its interests. After the sources of these ideas and interests have been 
identified, this research analyzes the choices made by China, the United States, Ecuador, and 
Argentina. These complicated choices are expressed through economic investment, policy 
statements, political forums, editorials, the writings of personal leaders, etc. By aggregating these 
materials and relating them back to each state’s socially and historically constructed ideas and 
interests, this research describes the complicated decision-making process of each state.  
 
14 Alice Lyman Miller, “SJIR: China an Emerging Superpower?,” Stanford Journal of International Relations, May 
4, 2006, https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html.  
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This process looks slightly different for Latin American countries, however. While China 
and the United States are massive geopolitical forces with the ability to exercise extensive 
military, economic, political, and cultural power, Latin American states are comparatively 
weaker. In fact, these states are often described as caught between China and the United States in 
this evolving relationship, operating with a far more limited spectrum of choices. As each great 
power vies for influence in Latin America, Latin American states’ ability to make choices 
unimpaired by either power dwindles. Nevertheless, the choices of Latin American states still 
shape this relationship significantly. Thus, this research frames Latin American states’ choices in 
relation to their ability to pursue greater autonomy and to avoid exploitation at the hands of both 
China and the United States. Ultimately, as with China and the United States, this research 
explores Latin American decision-making processes. Understanding these processes sheds light 
on the evolving relationships between China, the United States, Ecuador, and Argentina and 
helps determine whether these relationships will be mutually beneficial or zero-sum, resulting in 
conflict or cooperation.   
Humiliation, Exceptionalism, and Autonomy  
For China, one of the central, historically constructed ideas that Communist Party leaders 
use to guide and rationalize foreign policy decisions is the need to assuage national humiliation. 
This idea originates in the infamous Century of Humiliation (roughly 1848-1949). During this 
time, China experienced colonial occupation, imperial exploitation, and various bloody conflicts 
that undermined its immense geopolitical power. Importantly, these events also challenged the 
Chinese population’s historic understanding of China as a dominant force in global politics or, 
more precisely, as 中国 (Zhōngguó), “the Middle Kingdom.” Today, China’s leaders see 
restoring this actual and understood power as essential to assuaging national humiliation. 
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Specifically, Chinese leaders see “National Rejuvenation” as key to restoring China’s historic 
status as a superpower and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule as paramount to pursing 
that rejuvenation. Because of this historically constructed desire to assuage national humiliation, 
Chinese leaders attempt to expand China’s military, economic, political, and cultural power 
through the BRI and seek to make China a superpower.   
Meanwhile, for the United States, the historically constructed idea of American 
Exceptionalism continues to have a powerful influence on collective identity and foreign policy 
decision-making. For centuries, American leaders have described the nation as a “city on a hill,” 
a model of civilization. However, American leaders consistently feared that an alternative model 
could undermine the ideal American way of life, which was white, Christian, democratic, and 
capitalist. During the Cold War, this alternative model was Soviet-style Communism, which was 
generally considered the antithesis of American values. The United States lost various battles in 
its struggle against Communism, each leaving scars upon its historic memory (e.g. Vietnam), but 
the loss of China had particular importance. As a massive country with critical geopolitical 
significance, the Communist victory over the United States-backed Nationalists left a scar on the 
historically constructed idea of American exceptionalism. The resulting “Loss of China” 
complex constituted a reminder that America’s “exceptional” model was once beat out by 
another. Accordingly, American leaders attempt to assuage this historically constructed failure 
and prove that China does not represent a viable alternative to America’s model. Indeed, even 
though Communism has been replaced by China’s new model—“market authoritarianism”—
American foreign policy makers still attempt to leverage military, economic, political, and 
cultural power in order to alleviate this historic failure, quash an ostensible threat to the 
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American creed, and defend American hegemony.15 This has led the United States to act 
aggressively within the evolving relationship with China and Latin America, seeking to 
undermine China’s political system and protect its historic “backyard.” 
Lastly, the foreign policies of Latin American countries are likewise driven by historical 
ideas. However, Latin America is unique in this relationship. Unlike China and the United States, 
Latin America is not made up of one central government with a relatively cohesive self-
conceptualization. Instead, it is composed of dozens of countries with individual histories and 
national identities. Nevertheless, there is a shared history between all of these countries which 
has shaped their core understanding of their role in geopolitics: oppression under European 
colonialism and American imperialism. As most Latin American countries began to gain 
independence from European imperial powers in the 19th century, the declaration of the Monroe 
Doctrine—“the American continents… are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future 
colonization by any European powers”—effectively initiated the process through which the 
United States would supplant European powers as the dominant interloper in Latin America.16 
Since then, the United States has continuously infringed upon Latin American countries’ 
autonomy through economic exploitation, the Condor Plan, and modern drug wars. As China 
now begins to make investments in Latin America through the BRI, Latin American leaders must 
reconcile with their own nation’s historically constructed desire to achieve autonomy, which is 
rooted in the legacy of European and American meddling. Thus, after centuries of European 
colonialism and American imperialism, Latin American leaders must now struggle to find 
 
15 Whether “market-authoritarianism” is truly is a model is up for debate. However, there is ample evidence to 
suggest that American foreign policy makers see it that way.  Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: Legitimizing 
Authoritarianism in Our Time (Basic Books, 2012); Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, "What Consensus? Geopolitics and 
Policy Paradigms in China and the United States," International Affairs 91, no. 1 (2015). 
16 James Monroe, “Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th 
Congress (The Monroe Doctrine), 12/02/1823,” Presidential Messages of the 18th Congress, ca. 12/02/1823-ca. 
03/03/1825, Record Group 46, Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990, National Archives, Archives.gov. 
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autonomy between China and the United States in this evolving relationship, either by picking 
between the two powers or pursing a third, alternative path towards self-determination. 
 In summation, China’s rapid rise as a formidable geopolitical power, the United States’ 
mixed response to that rise, and Latin American states’ struggle to avoid exploitation and benefit 
from this evolving relationship are all guided by these central historic ideas. National 
humiliation, American exceptionalism, and the struggle for autonomy shape the interests of these 
states, creating a broad spectrum of choice within which each actor may pursue its goals. Despite 
this array of choices, however, the current state of this relationship and the antagonistic nature of 
these historically constructed ideas suggest that these states are leaning towards policies which 
favor conflict over cooperation. Although this may seem to vindicate Realists, this combative 
outcome is hardly due to the inevitability of conflict, and it is important to note that cooperation 
places a key role in this relationship as well. However, because these historic memories construct 
external actors as dangerous adversaries not to be trusted, the evolving relationship between 
China, the United States, and Latin America has been characterized by antagonism. 
The Belt and Road Initiative: A Cause for War? 
This propensity for conflict does not mean that war is destined, as some scholars suggest. 
In fact, this relationship can even be reoriented towards cooperation. As suggested above, these 
states are choosing conflict, not falling into the inevitable outcome of a fixed struggle for power. 
This means that states within this evolving relationship can also choose cooperation, thereby 
turning geopolitical challenges into international opportunities. Therefore, despite the BRI’s 
appearance as a point of contention, it exists as a powerful example through which each state 
could cooperate to achieve shared goals like the reduction of poverty, protection of the 
environment, or prevention of terrorism. However, this shift in attitude would require a dramatic 
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reconstruction of each state's historic ideas. Such reflection would require powerful 
reinterpretations of the past, national self-reconceptualization, and widespread educational 
reforms. This type of counter-historical reflection is difficult and unlikely. Nevertheless, as the 
Belt and Road Initiative continues to further connect China, the United States, and Latin 
America, such reflection becomes increasingly important. Without this change, this global 
struggle will remain self-defeating for all involved. As China and the United States compete for 
global dominance and Latin American countries are continuously drawn into the conflict, 
international peace is jeopardized, social justice within all of these states is undermined, and the 
environment is ravaged.  
The following work is written with the hope that such crises are still preventable. By 
exploring the complicated history between China, the United States, Ecuador, and Argentina, this 
research applies a Constructivist perspective to the Belt and Road Initiative in order to highlight 
the real dangers of the continuation of this global struggle and interrogate the foundation of 
geopolitical theory. Without understanding these dangers and reevaluating international 
relations, we risk succumbing to, and therefore becoming, history. 
Re-conceptualizing Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 
To end at this point would ignore the important questions and claims of this research. 
One such claim is, despite each power’s best attempts, this global struggle is self-defeating for 
all involved: there are no winners. As China and the United States jockey for global dominance 
and Latin American countries are continuously drawn into the conflict, international peace is 
jeopardized, social justice within all of these states is undermined, and the environment is 
ravaged potentially beyond repair. These are issues exacerbated by conflict that could be 
resolved through cooperation. The advent of the global COVID-19 pandemic has only 
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highlighted this need for cooperation in a world in which crises, and hopefully solutions, 
transcend borders. 
Moreover, this research interrogates the foundation of geopolitical theory, history, and 
international relations by addressing various limitations and conventions within each field. For 
example, our conventional understandings are often limited by language, metaphor, and 
incomplete knowledge. We often describe international relations with problematic or limiting 
language; Civilization, the West, the First, Second, and Third Worlds, and the Global South are 
all terms created to help us better describe the economic and political position of peoples and 
states, but each carries a connotation that generalizes or systematizes bias and prejudice. 
Metaphors likewise misconstrue our understanding of the world. For example, after making the 
remark quoted at the beginning of this work, President Xi faced international backlash that 
capitalized on a rhetorical weakness of his metaphor—“Who has ever seen a peaceful lion?”—
and raised concerns about China’s rise.17 Although unintentional, Xi’s metaphor distorted 
perspectives of China’s foreign policy for the worse. Other famous metaphors—Clash of 
Civilizations, Axis of Evil, Iron Curtain—have similarly distorted perceptions of history and 
international relations through oversimplification. Other rhetorical devices, like historical 
analogies, are no less distorting.18 Even when our understanding of the world is minimally 
distorted, it is always incomplete: unaccounted variables/conditions are inevitable. This means 
that all fields which seek to empirically describe our world—geopolitics, history, international 
relations, even science—are using incomplete observations to make inaccurate descriptions. 
 
17 Interestingly, it is unclear that Napoleon ever even said this. Isaac Stone Fish, “Crouching Tiger, Sleeping Giant,” 
Foreign Policy (blog), accessed July 17, 2019, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/19/china_shakes_the_world_cliche/.  
18 Yuen Foong Khong, “Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: The Malaya and Korea Analogies” in G. John 
Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: Longman, 2002): 506-516. 
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This is not to say that we can make no observations about the world. Instead, it is important to 
keep these limitations in mind to avoid reductionism and recognize the inevitability of our 
somewhat arbitrary epistemological conclusions.  
Recognizing the deficiency of empiricism and impossibility of certainty are especially 
important when approaching the fields of history and international relations since both are 
marred with examples of this reductionism. Scholars are often tempted to over-zealously 
describe a fast-approaching “Clash of Civilizations” or a utopian “End of History,” but these 
metaphors distort our understanding of global history. 19 They are predicated on some 
unbalanced form of pessimism and optimism and are grounded in nonexistent certainty. These 
examples are not hyperbolic either. Similar theatrical rhetoric characterizes the discourse 
surrounding China’s rise in the 21st Century. Whether “Sleeping Giant”, “Dragon in the 
Room”, or “Paper Tiger”, scholars have not hesitated to refer to China as the opponent to the 
United States in the “New Cold War.”20 However eye-catching these titles may be, it is 
important for scholars to distance themselves from rhetorical devices (in this case metaphors 
and historical analogy) in order to more accurately describe the world.  
This research demonstrates an alternative approach to history and international relations 
that takes into account the inevitability of uncertainty and recognizes the reality of choice in 
geopolitics. By analyzing historically constructed ideas and the BRI, it explores China’s rise, 
the America’s balance, and Latin America’s struggle. This research also challenges the belief 
that this evolving relationship will result in conflict. Most importantly, it deconstructs the many 
metaphors that distort our understanding of history, international relations, and geopolitics.  
 
19 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order (London: Simon & 
Schuster, 2002); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 2012). 
20 Robert D. Kaplan, “A New Cold War Has Begun,” Foreign Policy (blog), accessed July 17, 2019, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/. 
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Chapter 2. China’s Rise:  
 National Humiliation and The Sleeping Lion 
 
Is China a superpower? After half a century of establishing a strong international military 
presence, thriving economic growth, domestic/international political authority, and considerable 
cultural “soft power”, China has reemerged as a great power.21 Nevertheless, the question 
remains whether China will become a superpower and what impact this would have on 
international relations. This chapter explores China’s rapid rise over the past 70 years and 
examines whether China will become a superpower capable of matching the United States. 
Furthermore, despite President Xi’s insistence that China is a “peaceful” lion, China’s 
expansionist policies and pursuit of superpower status threaten to antagonize relations with the 
United States, especially if China continues to expand its influence in Latin America. With the 
Belt and Road Initiative especially, China now challenges the once “unipolar” power (the United 
States) in its own historic “backyard” (Latin America) through investment, diplomacy, and 
cultural projection. China’s implementation of the BRI within Latin America is a key 
representation of China’s challenge to the United States and continuing emergence as a 21st-
century superpower. China’s rise does not necessitate conflict but China’s expansionist foreign 
policy raises concerns on the part of the United States and other countries.  
 To explain this expansionist foreign policy making, this research explores China’s 
socially and historically constructed ideas and interests. Illustrating these ideas and interests, this 
research analyzes China’s historic rise since 1949 and assesses the debate surrounding China’s 
superpower status. The chapter analyzes China’s efforts to expand its military, economic, 
 
21 Prior to the Century of Humiliation, China was undoubtedly a global power. Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, "What 
Consensus? Geopolitics and Policy Paradigms in China and the United States," International Affairs 91, no. 1 
(2015), pp. 94. 
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political, and cultural power and connects this to Communist Party leaders’ discourse on the 
need to overcome China’s “Century of Humiliation.” This desire to assuage national humiliation 
is at the core of China’s pursuit of superpower status and explains how Chinese leaders 
understand China’s interests and make foreign policy choices. In this way, this chapter argues 
that China’s rise and the BRI are driven by the historic desire to assuage national humiliation. 
This leads China to strive for superpower status and pursue expansionists policies. This 
combination drives the evolving relationship between China, the United States and Latin 
America largely towards conflict despite ample opportunities for cooperation within this 
relationship.  
What is a Superpower? 
 In order to evaluate the nature of China’s relations with the United States and other 
countries, it is important to clearly define what it means to be a superpower. Competing theories 
of international relations define superpower differently. For instance, realist John J. 
Mearsheimer, a renowned international relations scholar from the University of Chicago, focuses 
on material power. He suggests that states’ levels of power “are determined largely on the basis 
of their relative military capability.”22 Correspondingly, regional hegemony—the military 
domination of a geographic region—belongs to the state that can field the most powerful 
economy and military (the former is necessary to maintain the latter). Mearsheimer argues that 
while there could theoretically be a global hegemon, vast bodies of water inhibit regional 
hegemons from dominating other regions, making global dominance unlikely.23 While 
Mearsheimer makes a convincing argument that material power (i.e. military and economic 
power) is essential for a great power to become a hegemon, his definition of hegemony falls 
 
22 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 5. 
23 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 40-42. 
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short of describing crucial aspects of a superpower. Namely, he minimizes the role of a state’s 
ability to exert political and cultural influence over states outside its region. This ability is 
essential for any superpower. 
Other scholars agree, rejecting the view that a state is powerful merely because of its 
ability to fund and flex military might. Neoliberal institutionalist scholars suggest that a state 
must also exhibit political control over international institutions in order to become a dominant 
power. G. John Ikenberry, neoliberal institutionalist from Princeton University, writes that a 
superpower is a state that “can create and enforce the rules and institutions of a stable global 
order in which to pursue its interests and security.”24 Essentially, leadership positions in 
international financial institutions (IFIs), the United Nations, or various regional security 
organizations like NATO strengthen a state’s ability to both coerce and co-opt other states into 
its political agenda.25 For instance, decision-making within the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), reflects the relative power of its members, giving the United States and leading European 
countries disproportionate influence over the organization’s decisions so that it generally mirrors 
U.S. preferences. Similarly, if a state is a part of a regional security organization like NATO, it 
can potentially co-opt other nations into supporting its military interests. While participation in 
an institution empowers a state, Ikenberry argues that a state can only be a superpower if these 
institutions are in accordance with its own values and ideology.26  
This institutional, political power is not sufficient for a state to become a superpower: a 
state needs to have an international cultural influence too. This cultural influencing is a part of 
 
24 John G. Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs, September 15, 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west. 
25 Brian Schmidt, “Hegemony: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis,” Dialogue of Civilizations Research 
Institute, accessed June 24, 2019, https://doc-research.org/2018/08/hegemony-conceptual-theoretical-analysis/. 
26 Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West.”  
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what American political scientist and former Clinton administration official Joseph S. Nye has 
labeled “Soft Power,” or “getting others to want the outcomes that you want.” Nye goes on to 
break cultural influence down into components, including “the attractiveness of a country’s 
culture, political ideas, and policies” among other state’s and their populations.27 Neoliberal 
institutionalists support a similar view, noting the significance of socialization, which “enables 
the hegemon to get others to acquiesce without the use of coercive power.”28 This definition of 
power pushes beyond Mearsheimer’s material definition and better reflects the complex type of 
influence a state must have to become a superpower. For instance, speaking to political ideas, the 
globalization of American popular culture projects political values and ideas (e.g. democracy) 
that may be enticing to foreign audiences. According to Nye, this dissemination of political 
values gives the superpower more co-opting (rather than coercive) power, allowing it to attract 
other states into supporting its global agenda.29 Convincing leaders and the public that the 
superpower’s way of life is valuable by disseminating cultural practices (i.e. customs) is also a 
source of soft power that can win a state allies. Meanwhile, the foreign and domestic policies of 
a superpower can give it “soft power” as well, and Nye cites cases in which policies have made 
states allies and enemies.30 These components, political ideas, culture, policies, and (as 
mentioned above) institutional influence, comprise the cultural, soft power vital to a superpower. 
Constructivists likewise believe in the importance of cultural power, but they argue 
neoliberal institutionalists wrongly attribute the target of this power. For instance, while 
 
27 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2012), pp. 
x. 
28 Schmidt, “Hegemony: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis.” 
29 Importantly, although a government’s ability to control soft power is limited, “that does not diminish its 
importance”: a state can still encourage or assist the spread of its culture through policy. Nye, Soft Power: The 
Means to Success in World Politics, pp. 8. 
30 For example, American support for human rights in Argentina during the 1980s aided the United States once the 
politically persecuted Peronists came to power. Conversely, African nations criticized American racial segregation 
in the 1950s. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, pp. 13.  
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neoliberal institutionalists do include the public in their considerations, constructivist scholars 
like Ted Hopf argue that neoliberal institutionalists focus too much on the politics of the elite. 
Accordingly, constructivists believe that existing literature fails to take into account “mass public 
common sense, not just elite ideologies.”31 This means that “Soft Power” cannot come solely 
from political elites adopting a foreign ideology or political system (e.g. democracy). Instead, if 
the superpower is to gain cultural power from that state, the broader public must adopt the 
cultural values that support that ideology or political system. Hopf essentially argues that 
“hegemonic power is maximized to the extent that these ideas become taken for granted by the 
dominated population.”32 Noting the role of the public and institutions that disseminate culture 
(even when that effect is auxiliary) better scaffolds the cultural element of being a superpower.  
Whether the school downplays material power or non-material powers, each has its 
faults. For this reason, in order to balance the strengths and weaknesses of each school’s focus, a 
critical definition of a superpower should be synthesized from these competing schools of 
thought. While this means balancing many components, such a synthesis is obtainable. For 
instance, Alice Lyman Miller already argues that “the basic components of superpower stature 
may be measured along four axes of power: military, economic, political, and cultural.”33 This 
simple statement roughly comprises the same power components noted by Realists, Liberal 
Institutionalists, and Constructivists alike. In fact, as I maintain throughout this work, a 
 
31 Ted Hopf, “Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics,” International Organization 67, 
no. 2 (April 2013): 317–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000040. 
32 Hopf, “Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics.” 
33 As shown above in the discussion of the public’s role in cultural power, it is important to note that all of these 
axes have their own quirks and complexities in both measurement and significance. For example, a country’s 
economic power can be measured in relation to its GDP share, its level of industrialization, or even its population 
size, making the term “economic power” relatively vague. Despite the amorphous nature of each axis, they 
nonetheless comprise the basis of a state’s power. Alice Lyman Miller, “SJIR: China an Emerging Superpower?,” 
Stanford Journal of International Relations, accessed May 6, 2019, 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html.  
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superpower is a state that is regionally dominant and globally influential in all four axes of 
power. This definition synthesizes the military, economic, political, and cultural perspectives of 
realists, neoliberal institutionalists, and constructivists. It also retains Mearsheimer’s core realist 
belief that the state must be “so powerful that it dominates all the other states in [its regional] 
system.”34 However, this definition extends Mearsheimer’s concept of a regional hegemon. To 
be a superpower, a dominant regional power must be able to influence external systems not just 
through military and economic power, but also through political and cultural power. This extends 
the superpower definition to include power derived from institutions and “Soft Power,” even if 
that regional hegemon cannot completely dominant the global system. 
Is China a Superpower? 
With this definition in mind, although there is an overwhelming consensus that China’s 
growth over the past half a century has been incredible, there is much debate whether China is on 
its way to becoming a superpower. In hope of better answering this question, the following 
sections attempt to assess whether China is “so powerful that it dominates all the other states in 
[its regional] system” through Miller’s military, economic, political, and cultural axes of power. 
In other words, the following sections assess whether China is emerging as a superpower.35 The 
first section contextualizes China’s historical rise and evaluates to what extent China has 
strengthened each axis of power. The subsequent section explores current scholarship 
surrounding the China-as-superpower debate, which (interestingly) has already self-
compartmentalized into these four categories of power. The final section takes a stance in this 
debate, ultimately arguing that despite the great ambivalence surrounding its rise to power, China 
 
34 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 40. 
35 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 40. 
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is capable of overcoming the existing structural hurdles of each axis of power through the BRI. 
This not only means that China is becoming a superpower, but also that the BRI is essential to 
this transformation. This means that as China continues to exert influence in Latin America 
through the BRI, successfully navigating and cultivating the evolving Pacific relationship at the 
core of this research becomes increasingly important. However, Chinese leaders and private 
actors, guided by the historic desire to assuage national humiliation, focus narrowly on 
maximizing short-term self-interests. This narrow focus inadvertently risks triggering an 
increasingly negative backlash against China’s rise and the BRI that ultimately undermines 
China’s long-term interests. In this way, China paradoxically jeopardizes its rise as a 
superpower. 
China’s Rise  
 While the full history of what Chinese historians call “The Century of Humiliation” 
cannot be described here, it is important to provide some background on the People’s Republic 
of China’s (PRC). Beginning in 1842 with the Opium Wars, the century of humiliation, 1842-
1949 C.E., marks a time when China was subject to repeated military defeats and economic 
exploitation at the hands of European, American, and Japanese forces. Whether committed by 
outsiders—the 1860 destruction of the Summer Palace and the 1938 Nanjing Massacre are 
important examples—or by insiders—Jiang Jieshi’s (Chiang Kai-shek’s) brutality during the 
Chinese Civil War (1946-1949) is well documented—the physical, cultural, social, and economic 
violence of the century plagued China for generations.36 When the Communist Party emerged 
from the “Century of Humiliation” in 1949, the future of the country was uncertain. 
 
36 David Scott, China and the International System, 1840-1949 : Power, Presence, and Perceptions in a Century of 
Humiliation, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), 2008, pp. x. 
http://spectacled.ursinus.edu:3035/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=256905&site=ehost-live. 
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Nevertheless, the fledgling Communist party managed to establish a relatively stable political 
system and regain control over most of the Qing’s former land acquisitions.37 Even more 
impressively, over the course of the following 70 years, the People’s Republic of China emerged 
from this humbled position as one of the most important actors in geopolitics. Despite these 
important victories for the CCP, the traumatic historical memory of the “Century of Humiliation” 
continued to weigh on Chinese politicians, intellectuals, and people. That traumatic legacy 
continues today.38  
This section explores China’s rise to power since 1949. Each sub-section focuses how the 
historic memory of national humiliation guided CCP leaders’ policy choices within one of 
Miller’s four axes of power. China’s historic memory of national humiliation is highlighted in 
this research because of the pivotal role historic memory plays in a state’s construction of foreign 
policy. As Zheng Wang, a professor of international relations at Seton Hall University, writes, 
“historical memory is the prime ‘raw material’ for constructing ethnicity and national identity.”39 
The construction of ethnic and national identity impacts how CCP leaders understand and pursue 
China’s interests.40 As these leaders strengthen China’s axes of power, the historical memory of 
national humiliation has guided their decisions. This has resulted in China’s impressive yet 
qualified rise to international power over the past 70 years.  
Military 
 
37 This is with the large exceptions of modern-day Mongolia and Taiwan. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for 
Modern China, vol. 3 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013), pp. 470.  
38 Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, 
Contemporary Asia in the World (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 221-222. 
39 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, 
Contemporary Asia in the World, pp. xiii. 
40 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, pp. 7. 
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 One source of modern China’s rise is its powerful military, which has its origins in the 
end of the Chinese Civil War. After the near-defeat of the Nationalists (or KMT) in 1949, the 
military leaders of the CCP emerged as battle-hardened veterans tasked with converting the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), a guerrilla force, into a national army. These men, like Peng 
Dehuai, were professional military elites who, although highly integrated with the party, usually 
were focused on strategic rather than political success.41 Accordingly, after emerging from the 
conflict of 1949, the PLA’s primary objectives were to establish a modern, capable military, and 
to restore the territory China lost following the collapse of the Qing dynasty.42 These goals were 
driven by China’s determination to assuage the historic trauma of national humiliation through 
the dramatic strengthening of its military capabilities.43 
  The first goal, modernization, began with the Korean War  (1950-1953). Tactically 
speaking, during the Chinese Civil War, the PLA had relied on waging the “People’s War”. This 
essentially meant the PLA used a combination of guerrilla tactics and overwhelming numbers to 
make up for its dated equipment and limited training.44 While these tactics proved effective in 
driving out the Japanese in the Second World War and the KMT during the Chinese Civil War, 
the warfare of the Korean War—in which Chinese soldiers would confront U.S. and allied on 
unfamiliar, open land—made this type of fighting more difficult. Moreover, the U.S. forces had 
dramatically superior technology compared to the PLA.45 For this reason, although Peng Dehuai 
 
41 Although technically a military leader, Mao was hardly a professional or technically skilled strategist. Dennis J.  
Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," in A Military History of China, edited by Graff David A. 
and Higham Robin, 249-50. University Press of Kentucky, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jcqw6.20.  
42 Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 251; Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 471. 
43 Importantly, attempts to assuage this historical memory “have, at times, served to activate, not assuage, people’s 
historical memory of past humiliation.” Thus, despite leaders’ intentions, policies can revitalize a feeling of national 
humiliation rather than assuage it. Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese 
Politics and Foreign Relations, pp. 11. 
44 Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 250. 
45 This situation was historically familiar to the Chinese. At the outbreak of the Opium War, Lin Zexu, a 
commissioner tasked with quelling the opium trade, described the superiority of British cannons, writing “Our 
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was successful in driving back the UN forces, the Chinese faced massive casualties, potentially 
reaching over a million.46 Although the Korean War can certainly be noted as a victory for 
China—the once “humiliated” nation was able to drive back a coalition of Western powers—
waging such a costly war was not sustainable. Correspondingly, PLA leaders noted the 
imperative need to modernize China’s military.  
To overcome this technological and strategic deficit, the PLA’s leaders turned to the 
Soviet Union for equipment and expertise.47 With an initial loan of around $300 million, the 
PLA adopted Soviet military structures, trained with Soviet weapons and vehicles, and 
established domestic military factories.48 These developments fueled the modernization of 
Chinese conventional military power. Even after CCP paramount leader Mao Zedong initiated a 
demobilization of millions of PLA troops, the PLA remained an over-two-million-strong fighting 
force trained with Soviet weaponry.49 Post-world-war modernization meant more than advanced 
conventional troops, however. The Korean War had only ended in the face of President 
Eisenhower’s nuclear “diplomacy” in 1953, causing the Chinese government to recognize that 
nuclear weapons had changed the face of warfare. CCP leaders also realized that any nation 
seeking a modern military that could ward off invading powers needed a nuclear weapon.50 
 
technology was backward. Many of our generals and soldiers were experienced servicemen, but a battle like this in 
which the two sides engaged in a war without seeing each other, that was what they have never experienced before.” 
Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 251; Jiang Tingfu, Zhongguo jinsaishi [Modern 
History of China]. (Changsha: Shangwu) 1938, Reprint, Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2001, pp. 17. 
46 While the PRC’s estimate was never released, some suggest that loses reached nearly a million. More 
conservative estimates favor 600,000. Regardless, the war was costly. Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 
475-476.  
47 Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 251. 
48 Prior to this the Chinese navy and airforce had been made out of stolen and salvaged Japanese fighters and 
Nationalist warships. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 2nd Edition: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First 
Century. Vol. 2nd ed. (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press) 2010, pp. 8.  
49 Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 500. 
50 Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 475, 494.  
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These lessons only became clearer as Eisenhower continued to use nuclear threats during the 
ensuing Taiwan crises in 1954 and 1958.51  
Consequently, again with the aid of Soviet technology, training, and scientists, the PRC 
began pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon. While development of an atomic weapon 
was delayed during the Sino-Soviet split, China nonetheless entered the “Nuclear Club” in 1964 
after its first successful detonation. This development is crucial in China’s military history not 
only because it reflects the PLA’s general shift towards modernization, but also because it marks 
China’s growing desire to be independent of both Soviet and American influence. Nuclear 
technology continued to advance in the following decades, and China proceeded to develop 
hydrogen bombs, nuclear submarines, and nuclear warheads.52  
This modernization was driven by the need to assuage the historic memory of national 
humiliation, a sentiment which is well reflected in statements by the leaders of the PLA. The 
words of Lin Biao, for instance, appeared in The People’s Daily in 1965, praising the glory of the 
“People’s War” and its victory over Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Lin 
argued that international politics was characterized by a “fierce struggle between the people of 
the world on one side and U.S. imperialism and its lackeys on the other.”53 The underlying belief 
in Lin Biao’s writing is imperialists, especially the United States, will always attempt to 
humiliate weaker states. Although the era of “ping-pong” diplomacy and Nixon’s visit to China 
would improve relations, the United States remained the primary imperial antagonist in the eyes 
of the Chinese public. This remained true even after border conflicts with India and the Soviet 
Union ensued. This was reflected not just by the rhetoric of elites, but also in the choices of 
 
51 Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 252. 
52 Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 252-254. 
53 Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!,” accessed July 8, 2019, 
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everyday Chinese people during the Cultural Revolution. Americans remaining in the country 
during the Cultural Revolution were detained as spies, effigies of Uncle Sam were burned in the 
streets, and students attacked Chinese officials who had any previous connection with the United 
States.54 Such cultural rejections carried on into the 1990s, when Chinese intellectuals 
vehemently responded to American intellectuals such as Samuel Huntington who painted China 
as a threat to America. Books like China Can Say No reflected the persistent urge to reject 
American authority and culture.55  
While this popular rejection of all things American may seem tangentially related to 
military action, the connection is strong. This is because “historical memory often serves as a 
major motivating factor in international conflict, especially when the confrontation is perceived 
by the Chinese as an assault on the nation’s fundamental identity.”56 Running through just a few 
examples, this connection becomes clearer. During the Korean War, the PLA’s high demand for 
grain, meat, and cotton drew resources away the general Chinese population, which was still 
reeling from the destruction of the Second World and Civil War.57 In order to maintain popular 
support for the war despite this burden on the public, the CCP launched massive anti-American 
propaganda campaigns. These campaigns focused on the need to ward off American imperialism 
and avoid the same humiliation from which China had just escaped.58  Similarly, during the 
chaos of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government used America as a scapegoat to justify 
 
54 David L. Shambaugh, “Anti-Americanism in China” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
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the CCP’s violent, militant suppression of the population.59 Lastly, in the 1990s, surges of 
nationalism that rejected American media portrayal of China most likely influenced the 
government's decision to lay claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.60 These popular nationalist 
movements, like the government-driven campaigns before them, had the goal of emboldening 
and justifying military action in the name of avenging the nation’s previous suffering. Each of 
these movements demanded greater military action, which, in turn, demanded modernization. 
Therefore, the modernization of China’s military was framed as necessary in order to shake off 
the “Century of Humiliation.” 
As with modernization, national humiliation drove the PLA’s campaign to restore various 
territories lost during the Qing dynasty. These territories originally included Tibet, Taiwan, 
Mongolia, and various islands and waterways in the East and South China Seas. While China 
was able to obtain control over some of these territories and waterways, the United States 
continually thwarted important acquisitions. This further established the United States as the 
main antagonist for the PRC and kept the memory of national humiliation fresh in the minds of 
CCP leaders. In Tibet, for example, the PLA had subdued most local resistance by 1950, but the 
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) continued to train Tibetan rebels to resist PRC 
authority until 1959.61 In Tibet’s case, the United States only managed to make China’s 
territorial authority less stable. Meanwhile, the United States completely negated the PRC’s 
attempt to retake Taiwan from Nationalists by sending its Seventh Fleet to patrol the Strait of 
Formosa in 1950.62 Additionally, the United States planted “nuclear-capable Matador surface-to-
surface missiles on Taiwan,” putting American nuclear weapons on China’s doorstep and 
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rendering an assault on the island strategically impossible.63 Other territories remained outside of 
China’s grasp for other reasons. The most important example of this is Mongolia, which became 
an independent republic in the 1950s. Although Mao had made numerous claims that Mongolia 
would once again become a part of China, the Soviet Union ensured Mongolia would retain its 
independence (within the Soviet sphere of influence).64 
In relation to maritime territory, the PRC was able to periodically retake many of the 
islands controlled by the Nationalists off the coast of Taiwan. Reclaiming disputed territories in 
the East and South China Seas proved far more challenging.65 In the East China Sea, China 
looked to regain the Diaoyu/Senkakus islands, and, in the South China Sea, the Prata and Spratly 
Islands, all of which had been lost to Japan in either the Sino-Japonese war (Diaoyu/Senkakus) 
or Second World War (Prata and Spratly). Reclaiming these islands and all other islands bound 
between the “nine dash line”—an arbitrary line drawn around the South China Sea by the 
Nationalists and later adopted by the PRC—became a clear policy goal in 1953. Nevertheless, 
the PRC took little action in relation to these islands until 1970 (conveniently the year after it 
was reported that there was most likely large deposits of oil in the South China Sea), when it 
began to make claims on the Diaoyu Islands and forcibly occupied the Paracel Islands, the latter 
of which were owned by Vietnam.66 Conflict over these islands would continue to escalate, and 
China continues to make claims over the area bound within the “nine dash line” today.  
As with the PRC’s desire to restore the Qing’s continental territory, the desire to restore 
maritime control was similarly driven by the need to assuage national humiliation. Hong Kong is 
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perhaps the most well-known example of this desire. In 1997, the Chinese Government’s formal 
acquisition of Hong Kong—a crucial maritime port and symbol of national humiliation—marked 
another point in which the Chinese leaders believed they were “wiping out the century-old 
humiliation caused by its occupation.”67 This fierce battle over Hong Kong as a point of 
assuaging national humiliation continues today. As pro-democratic protests erupted in Hong 
Kong in 2019, government officials once again pointed to the legacy of national humiliation. 
Specifically, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang denounced Britain, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan and, the United States for meddling in Hong Kong’s affairs. These 
criticisms have focused on the United States, using the threat of foreign interference to justify the 
violent suppression of protesters.68 Thus, as China expands its military power into the South 
China Sea and over Hong Kong, it continues to invoke the rhetoric of national humiliation. 
How have these historical developments strengthened China’s military axis of power?  
From a modernization standpoint, China’s transformation has been dramatic: the PLA began as a 
guerrilla army in the 1930s and 1940s and emerged as a nuclear power with advanced weaponry 
and tactics by the turn of the century. In relation to territorial acquisitions, China’s forceful 
occupation of various lands has facilitated numerous success—easier access to oil in the South 
China Sea, more comprehensive trade routes through western China, etc. Even the background 
presence of the need to push against humiliation has strengthened China’s military power, 
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enabling its aggressive, outright rejections of American authority. With these historical 
developments in mind, China’s military rise is evident.  
Economy 
 Running parallel and intertwined with military strengthening is China’s international rise 
as a formidable economic force. While many people suffered horribly under Maoist economic 
reforms—20 million people are estimated to have died as a result of a famine caused by the 
Great Leap Forward—many of his earlier reforms kick-started the transition from an agrarian to 
an industrial economy.69 By both extending and revising Mao’s policies, the PRC leaders that 
came to power following his death brought extensive changes to the structure of the Chinese 
economy. Deng Xiaoping, in particular, championed the economic reforms that laid the 
groundwork for China’s rapid economic growth and its continuing economic problems. Both 
China’s opening as a global market and its transition to an industrial economy facilitated rapid 
growth. Meanwhile, demographic imbalances and environmental degradation proved to be 
persistent hurdles to China’s economic independence and stability. Importantly, similar to its 
impressive military growth, China’s economic miracle was driven by a desire to leave its 
“backwardness” (a source of its national humiliation) in the past.  
Speaking first to China’s shift to an industrial economy, it was actually the economic 
reforms under Mao Zedong, not Deng Xiaoping, that pulled China’s agrarian workers into an 
industrial labor force. During Mao’s reign over the PRC (1949-1976), industrial output increased 
more than 30-fold, the urban proletariat grew from three million to 18 million, and China slowly 
began to produce heavy tractors, railway locomotives, and other important infrastructure 
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technology.70 While this industrial revolution came at a heavy price (namely in human lives) and 
had uneven success (“backyard” furnaces produced extremely low quality steel), the push for 
industry under Mao kicked-off China’s mission to become the world’s factory. For Mao, these 
reforms were meant “to make [their] economically and culturally backward country a prosperous 
and powerful one” (Emphasis added).71 Although Mao saw China as a great nation with the 
ability to become powerful, he believed that China’s economy needed to modernize and 
industrialize before that could happen. The historic memory of national humiliation makes an 
appearance through the word “backwards” in Mao’s language. Mao, like the Qing scholars of the 
“Self-Strengthening” movement, believed that China succumbed to imperial powers because of 
its antiquated economic practices (basically, agrarianism) and that only through economic 
modernization could China escape humiliation.72  
After the economic disaster of the Great Leap Forward, Deng Xiaoping introduced a new 
economic policy once he gained control over the CCP in 1978, calling for “Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics.”73 From a pragmatic perspective, this merely meant that China needed 
“to pursue the policy of opening up to the outside world” economically and pursue free-market 
reforms. However, due to the persisting euphoria surrounding Maoism, Deng reaffirmed that 
such reforms would fit within the framework of Marxist-Leninist teleology: China would 
“advocate communism” but operate at “the socialist stage… to develop the productive forces” of 
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the economy. Ultimately, Deng’s goal was to figure out “how China, which is still backward, is 
to develop the productive forces and improve the people’s living standard.”74  
To do this, Deng and the leaders of the CCP continued the transition to an industrial 
economy and opened up China to international investors. For instance, industrial reforms carried 
out in urban centers from 1979-1980 decentralized capital and increased productivity. One way 
in which this was done was through incentivizing light industry, since Maoist reforms had 
created an imbalance of heavy industry. This allowed for more efficient production and higher 
quality products since Chinese capital was more capable of producing light goods than products 
like heavy steal.75 Additionally, the CCP turned to breaking the “iron rice bowl,” a Mao-era job-
security program that was deemed to create inefficiency and paternalistic dependence by the 
party: “If a man does not come to work, cross his name off the payroll!”.76 This led reformers to 
empower industrial bosses with the ability to punish or fire workers they found to be 
underperforming.77 This empowering of individual enterprises was matched at the national level, 
and factory managers increasingly gained the ability to operate in accordance with market (rather 
than government) demands.78 Such reforms had limited success in urban centers, but rural 
industry responded much more favorably to reforms, especially once township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) were established. These small industrial conglomerates were owned mostly 
by private owners or local governments, and their rapid success lead to further deregulation and 
decollectivization in urban industry by 1984.79 Importantly, these reforms carried on after Deng 
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Xiaoping. During the 1990s, a stronger environment of healthy economic competition grew in 
Chinese industrial centers, the hukou system (which restricted Chinese citizens from migrating 
within the country) was relaxed to facilitate better movements of labor force, and tax reform 
strengthened the central government’s profit from domestic industry.80 Subsequently, the 
extensive infrastructure projects of the 2000s better integrated the TVEs into China’s economy, 
furthering China’s successful transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy.81  
This transition was made possible by extensive external investments, which were an 
outcome of China’s opening to foreign markets. These reforms are based framed in the words of 
the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978: the CCP was now 
“actively expanding economic cooperation on terms of equality and mutual benefit with other 
countries on the basis of self-reliance.”82 Essentially, the leaders of the reform movement 
recognized the importance of Chinese integration with the global economy to avoid 
“backwardness”, and Deng’s own rhetoric expresses the lingering historic memory of national 
humiliation. In a speech to the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 
1982, Deng said:  
No foreign Country can expect China to be its vassal, nor can it expect China to accept 
anything harmful to China’s interests. [China] will unswervingly follow a policy of 
opening to the outside world and actively increase exchanges with foreign countries on 
the basis of equality and mutual benefit.83 
 
This sentiment runs parallel with a desire to assuage national humiliation and has driven China’s 
cautious opening to investments and the global economy. 
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To balance this process of opening and independence, rather than open all of China to 
foreign investment, reformers created the Special Economic Zones (SEZs).84 These four zones, 
which were designated in parts of Guangdong and Fujian provinces in 1979, mimicked roles of 
Canton and Macao during the Qing dynasty. Like those cities, each SEZ was a deregulated zone 
in which domestic and foreign investment can flow relatively freely, functioning as controlled 
enclaves in which China could participate in global trade. Importantly, unlike their predecessors, 
these zones followed Chinese law, were managed by Chinese officials, and greatly benefited the 
Chinese economy.85 In fact, the SEZs were so successful that were later complemented by the 
CCP’s sweeping Coastal Development Strategy (CDS) in 1988, which further opened up China’s 
industrial bases to foreign capital and investment.86 The SEZ in Shenzhen was perhaps the most 
striking example of this success: its GDP increased from 4 million U.S. dollars in 1980 to 114.7 
billion U.S. dollars in 2008.87 
 These “opening” reforms of the 1980s would carry into the 1990s, and reformers doubled 
down on transitioning to a market economy. Much of this involved making investing in China 
easier. For instance, China’s confusing dual-currency rate—one for foreigners and one for 
Chinese companies—was reformed to create a more hospitable trading system. The two rates 
were set at essentially equal levels, resulting in a devaluation of China's currency and a massive 
uptick in foreign investments and exports.88 Similarly, in order to qualify as a member of the 
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World Trade Organization (which would greatly facilitate international China’s trade), state-
owned enterprises and wages were reformed to increase productivity.89 When China became a 
WTO member in 2001, it further opened to investment, but there are important limitations to this 
“opening”. First, China has often been criticized for not following all the WTO’s rules and 
regulations. This has prevented China’s designation as a market economy, which would allow 
China to continue to sell its low-cost goods without the threat of foreign protectionism. This 
status would also make it far more difficult for other WTO countries to formally accuse China of 
manipulating its currency, which China has come under fire for recently.90 Additionally, China 
has required companies that want to do business within its borders to relinquish business secrets 
and advanced technology to Chinese companies.91 While this casts doubt on the idea that China 
is “open” in the sense of a free-market, it certainly has aided the growth of Chinese companies 
like Huawei, Alibaba, and Baidu.92 This historical opening at a measured pace is likely to 
continue under President Xi Jinping, who claimed at The Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation in 2017, “opening up brings progress while isolation results in backwardness.”93   
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China’s economic growth was not painless. Such rapid expansion brought new 
demographic pressures and environmental degradation. As China grew tremendously in 
population and dramatically reshaped its economic structure, the demographic imbalances 
between rural and urban populations increased. This is largely due to the CCP’s official 
reinstatement of the hukou system in 1958. The hukou system was a household registration 
system that divided China’s urban and rural workers by region that had existed in China for 
centuries and indeed is still used today.94 While this system has helped China’s economy in 
many ways—namely it allowed the government to control the flow of labor and guarantee a 
mixed agricultural/industrial economy—the inequality created by the hukou system has started to 
take its toll on China’s economy. Large, extremely underpaid migrant populations are revolting 
more frequently in urban centers, and rural populations are likewise protesting as their land is 
seized by local authorities in the name of urbanization.95 Worse yet, unemployment is a growing 
concern for the country, which often relies on “bridge to nowhere” infrastructure projects to 
create employment and maintain growth.96 While Chinese leaders are aware of this growing 
danger to social stability, their attempts to remedy the issue have had limited success. In reality, 
the options of China’s leaders are limited: simple repeal of the hukou system would likely result 
in a flood of migrants in coastal and urban zones, overwhelming infrastructure, sanitation, and 
general order.97  
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Another self-invented demographic imbalance is gendered. Perhaps one of the CCP’s 
most internationally infamous policies of the 20th century was the one-child policy, in which the 
government limited Chinese families to having one child per parental couple (with limited 
exceptions).98 Initiated in 1980 with “the goal of holding the total population in [the] country 
under 1.2 billion by the end of the century,” the policy led to a dramatic imbalance between 
Chinese men and women, with the sex ratio, defined as the proportion of male live births to 
female live births, reaching as high as 1.17 in 2001.99 Compared to industrialized countries, 
which typically have a ratio of 1.03-1.07, this is a severe imbalance.100 This is largely a result of 
the cultural devaluation of women, who are seen as less financially beneficial than sons. Indeed, 
mothers in China were often fearful of bearing daughters due to the intense social stigma 
surrounding having a daughter instead of a son, especially in rural communities.101 Beyond 
compounding an already deteriorating situation for women in China—who were rapidly being 
moved from classrooms to factories102—the overbalance of men presented (and continues to 
present) a social challenge to China. This is because the increasing population of young, 
unmarried Chinese men are more likely to act violently, commit crimes, and be generally 
unlawful. While the Chinese government has recognized this issue and announced plans to 
normalize the birth-sex ratio by 2010, it is unlikely that these reforms could reverse the 
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imbalance created by over thirty years of anti-daughter birthing practices.103 Although the social 
issues created by rural and urban/gender imbalances may seem tangential to economic stability, 
the two are closely related. As China’s demographic structure continues to promote domestic 
unrest, the government will have to further divert funds towards damage control and investors 
will become increasingly uncertain.  
China also has experienced rapid environmental degradation, water contamination, and 
air pollution over the course of its industrialization, all of which further sap China’s economic 
progress and persist as sizable economic hurdles. Many of these problems are in no way new to 
China—China’s unsustainable agricultural practices were taking a toll on the environment as 
early as the Han Dynasty—but China’s miraculous growth over the past seventy years have put 
destructive processes into overdrive. For example, in relation to land degradation, the policies of 
the Great Leap Forward, which focused almost entirely on industrialization and the exclusive 
agricultural production of grain, irreparably damaged China’s soils and forests.104 Reforms in the 
1980s introduced more sustainable farming and industrial techniques to combat land degradation, 
but it is impossible to undo the damage done by the rapid industrialization of the 1950s. The 
infrastructure projects of the 21st century have also limited historic flooding and energy 
shortages in an attempt to slow land degradation. However, mass urbanization has severely 
damaged China’s potable water supply. In fact, the World Bank noted in 2002 that China had 
just a quarter of the global average for freshwater per capita due to the excess amounts of sewage 
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and industrial dumping.105 Beyond water, perhaps the most visible environmental problem for 
China is smog: carcinogens cause up to 1.6 million deaths in China every year, 17 percent of the 
mortality rate.106 Combined, these pollutants siphon significant growth from the Chinese 
economy—air pollutants alone cost China’s economy US $38 billion a year—and threaten to 
destabilize the “output legitimacy” the CCP relies on.107  
Do these historical developments reflect China’s status as a superpower? As mentioned 
before, demographic imbalances and environmental degradation proved to be persistent hurdles 
to China’s economic independence and stability. Thus, in contrast with its military rise, the 
strengthening of China’s economic axis of power has had mixed success. However, while 
demographic imbalances and environmental degradation are clear troubles for China, for the 
time being, its transformation into the “world’s factory” and opening to global investment have 
enabled its economic axis to become far stronger. China’s survival of the 2008 global financial 
crisis via massive stimulus spending reflects this strength, especially when compared to other 
world powers caught up in the crisis.108 Nevertheless, China’s growth is not preordained. 
Whether China’s economic axis will continue to become more powerful depends largely on the 
CCP’s ability to evolve to address the complicated economic challenges of the 21st century. 
Since the 11th Five-Year Plan (2016-2021) specifically aims to address those challenges, it 
seems like China can overcome the hurdles which restrain its growth. Regardless of the outcome, 
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the choices made by CCP leaders will certainly be driven by a desire to assuage national 
humiliation and escape so-called “backwardness.”   
Politics 
 Although military empowerment and economic growth were at the forefront of Chinese 
policymakers’ minds, China’s political axis of power still changed dramatically during China’s 
rise. In fact, China’s transformation into a major player in international politics has been 
facilitated not just by economic and military growth, but by its entry into international 
institutions. These institutions have paradoxically facilitated the empowerment of China’s 
political axis of power through the formal allocation of voting rights (e.g. the United Nations 
Security Council) and, concurrently, limited its political axis by pushing China to conform to 
Western practices (e.g. the World Trade Organization). Consequently, when Western institutions 
proved too hostile, China has been willing to participate in alternative international initiatives 
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This mixed approach to international 
integration is driven by China’s desire to avoid the same choices which caused the Century of 
Humiliation: instead of attempting isolation and over relying on the outside world economically, 
China would practice “self-reliance” and (cautious) integration.   
 While China did not practice isolation during the 1950s and 1960s—it held and 
participated in various regional conferences like the Bandung Conference and the Asia-Pacific 
Regional Meeting of the World Peace Council—China’s integration into international 
institutions formally began with the United Nations in 1971.109 Since the end of the World War 
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II, the government in Taiwan, not mainland China, held one of the five permanent seats on the 
United Nations Security Council. Accordingly, the PRC advocated relentlessly for a position on 
the UNSC by rallying other nonaligned voting nations. This process began in 1950 at the 
recommendation of Soviet advisors, and, despite strong resistance from the United States, China 
eventually replaced Taiwan as the fifth permanent member of the Security Council via a two-
thirds vote in the General Assembly.110  
This was a pivotal change for two reasons. First, China was able to win over veto power 
in the Security Council, which was supplied to each permanent member of the UNSC. While 
China’s use of the veto has been historically limited, that institutional power has strengthened 
China’s political axis greatly, allowing it to punish countries that oppose its mission or 
sovereignty, as it did in 1999 against Macedonia for refusing to recognize Beijing as the capital 
of China (as opposed to Taipei).111 Second, China’s ascension to the UNSC marked China’s first 
entrance into institutions created by great powers as an equal. China’s ability to rise to this level 
was credited to its successful “self-reliance” by domestic and foreign observers alike. 
Domestically, the Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China stated that China was now actively establishing “cooperation 
on terms of equality and mutual benefit with other countries on the basis of self-reliance.”112 
Those terms, of course, stand in juxtaposition to the “cooperation” forced upon China during the 
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Opium War. In this way, “self-reliance” is closely linked with the historic memory of national 
humiliation.  
Foreign observers likewise recognized China’s self-reliance. In 1981, the UN Secretary-
General made a toast to the Chinese Vice-Premier, stating: “Considering the formidable 
difficulties which China has to face in this endeavour, the self-reliance which it has shown is a 
source of inspiration to all.”113 Of course, it is likely that the Secretary-General picked the term 
“self-reliance” very diplomatically, but that nonetheless reflects the importance of the phrase to 
his Chinese audience. At that point in 1981, it seemed as though China would be able to balance 
self-reliance with the cautious integration that scaffolded its international political goals. 
As China became more entangled with international institutions and the global economy, 
this balance became more difficult. This is best encapsulated by China’s struggles to become 
admitted to and win market economy status within the World Trade Organization (WTO). Unlike 
the United Nations, admission into the WTO requires a state to make significant policy changes. 
In China’s case, this meant developing economic liberalism and stepping away from its 
trademark command economy. Initially, this was not much of a problem for China. The country 
under Deng Xiaoping had already begun economic liberalization and become a member of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund when, in 1986, CCP announced its intent to 
rejoin the Generally Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the precursor to the WTO).  
However, as existing GATT members debated whether to admit a nation that barely met 
the economic liberalization criteria, the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 brought 
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international condemnation upon the Chinese government and slowed negotiations.114 
Consequently, it quickly became clear that China’s admission would be more difficult than 
anticipated. Even after the GATT was scraped and converted into the WTO in 1995, China was 
unable to establish itself as a founding member. The following years in which China attempted to 
join the WTO involved grueling negotiations with the United States—which could de facto veto 
any nation’s admittance into the WTO—amid consistently deteriorating political relations 
between the two nations.115 Nevertheless, China was eventually admitted to the WTO in 2001. 
This was only possible because China made various concessions and reforms in order to conform 
to the Western, liberalized economic structure of the WTO and, in effect, the United States.  
While this lengthy process undoubtedly frustrated Chinese leaders (Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji attempted to resign three times during the process), they were determined to reap the 
maximum benefits of joining the WTO. This would be done, according to Chinese WTO 
representative Shi Guangsheng, only if the WTO was “fully reflecting the interests and 
requirements of all parties, including developing countries.”116 Jiang Zemin likewise emphasized 
in a 2001 speech in Hong Kong:  
Following its entry into the [WTO], China will steadily expand its opening-up program in 
terms of commodity and services trade, create a level playing field for a fair and 
transparent competition between Chinese and overseas enterprises, establish and improve 
a foreign trade regime that is consistent with international practice and that suits China's 
own national conditions, and provide the overseas enterprises with more and stable 
access to the Chinese market so as to facilitate economic cooperation and trade between 
China and other countries.  
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This rhetoric highlights China’s desire to “expand its opening-up” while maintaining “a level 
playing field” so as to avoid the disasters that occurred during the Century of Humiliation. 
Importantly, this would all be done using the nation’s “strong sense of self- esteem, self-
confidence, self-reliance and self-improvement” (Emphasis added).117 Therefore, although China 
had to bend to extensive reforms in order to join the WTO, it would not allow those reforms to 
subject it to a position of submission. China’s on-going battles with the WTO over its market 
economy status reflect this unwillingness to fully yield to Western economic liberalism.118 Thus, 
while China seems willing to make concessions in order to strengthen its political axis of power, 
it limits the influence of Western liberalization when possible. 
 Accordingly, China has often circumvented the bias of Western institutions like the WTO 
by creating its own. These Chinese spearheaded institutions have empowered China politically as 
a global leader and a regional hegemon. For instance, the New Development Bank (NDB) and 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both founded in 2014, are two Chinese-
dominated financial institutions created outside the sphere of Western influence (both have their 
headquarters in China and the AIIB was conceived in China).119 These financial institutions, 
which fund various global infrastructure projects and initiatives through loans, were created, 
according to President Xi Jinping, to “help make the global economic governance system more 
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just, equitable and effective.”120 Clearly, by saying the AIIB and NDB would make the system 
more just, President Xi necessarily implies that the current global economic governance system 
as it stands is unjust. Both the NDB and AIIB have facilitated multilateral negotiations benefiting 
China without requiring the extensive reforms mandated by the WTO or IMF.  
Currently, it seems increasingly possible that China will be able to reform the long-
standing U.S. dominated financial institutions from the inside. One example is the World Bank, 
where Chinese economist Justin Yifu Lin appointed chief economist from the years 2008-2012 
and had extensive control over the bank’s mission.121 Similarly, although the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has pushed back on China’s manipulation of the renminbi, China’s voting 
share has increased beyond six percent in the past twenty years, giving it a major voice in all 
decisions.122 While these development do not necessarily mean China is on its way to 
supplanting institutions like the World Bank or IMF, China’s ability to champion financial 
institutions outside the American system has certainly strengthened its political axis of power. 
Whether this system counts as the “self-reliance” for which China’s leaders advocate is up for 
debate. Regardless, by joining existing institutions, whether skewed in favor of Western powers 
or not, China has become a major player in the international political arena: as nations continue 
to join the AIIB and NDB, this power is only likely to grow.                                                                              
Culture 
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In many ways, as China became more connected with the world politically and 
economically, it developed channels through which it could broadcast its cultural influence. 
Tracing this cultural projection is difficult, however. Much of China’s culture has been in flux 
since 1949, resulting in inconsistent cultural messaging to the international community. Indeed, 
recalling the components of cultural power Nye defines, which are “the attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideas, and policies,” China’s cultural axis has undergone extensive 
changes in the past seventy years.123 Correspondingly, this section traces the historical evolution 
of China’s culture, political ideas, and policies. In addition, this section subsequently analyzes 
how these three elements of cultural power have been received by the international community 
and briefly previews the existing barriers to China’s cultural power.  
In terms of political ideas, China went to great lengths under Mao to export Communism. 
In contrast, China after Mao put comparatively less effort into exporting its central political 
ideas, namely market authoritarianism (although the economy’s success has done much to sell 
itself). In terms of policies, China’s history of human rights violations has wrought critique, and 
its restrictions on personal freedoms have not made it any allies abroad. Lastly, China has done 
very little to export that which is traditionally considered culture—“(a) observable artifacts, (b) 
values, and (c) basic underlying assumptions,”—until recently in the 21st century; however, the 
little it has done has been relatively successful.124 Like military, economic, and political power, 
the (limited) rise of China’s culture power operated through the lens of national humiliation. 
After the success of the Communist Revolution in 1949, the political ideas disseminated 
by China were entrenched in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist rhetoric. Chinese leaders, especially Mao, 
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advocated for other proletariat populations around the world to rise up and overthrow the 
oppressive bourgeoisie and imperialist establishment. Mao’s famous “little red book” was read 
not just all over in China, but all over the world, and quotations like “imperialism and all 
reactionaries… must be seen for what they are - paper tigers” quickly became famous.125 In fact, 
Mao’s writing quickly became popular in a variety of countries, ranging from Peru to Tanzania 
to India.126 While it is easy to note the popularity of Mao’s writing, this popularity does not 
necessarily translate into the direct exportation of China’s political ideas. After all, Communism 
had been around for over a century, and China was not its only champion; the Soviet Union had 
laid claim to that mantle since 1917.  
Between 1949 and the death of Mao in 1976, China was far more focused inward than 
outward, and China did relatively little to advocate its political model other than advocate for 
revolution in other developing countries. This does come with the exception of the Bandung 
Conference of 1955, in which Zhou Enlai, China’s foreign minister, worked with a coalition of 
nations—India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Ceylon—to highlight the United States as the 
main enemy of the continental coalition.127 Beyond assisting in the globalization of anti-
Americanism, China worked to reaffirm the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” enshrined 
in the Panchsheel Treaty of 1955: “(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.”128 China’s affirmation of 
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these principles served a dual purpose. First, Chinese leaders wanted to assure their neighbors 
that their struggle against the First and Second world was unified and that China stood firmly as 
a member of the Third World determined to advocate for the end of imperialism. Second, it 
internationally broadcasted the very issues that characterized China’s historic memory. Mostly, 
“non-interference in each other's internal affairs” speaks directly to China’s concerns of foreign 
nations meddling in China’s domestic realm as European powers had during the Century of 
Humiliation. Nevertheless, beyond the Bandung Conference, China was largely focused inward, 
and the crisis of the Great Leap Forward would only further divert China’s attention from 
advocating for its political ideas abroad. 
After the death of Mao, the turn inward quickly became a turn outward. As discussed 
above, this “turning-out” was primarily an economic opening to global markets. With economic 
opening, however, comes the spread of ideas, and the China of the late 1970s onwards was 
advertising something very different from Maoism. China’s new model, often branded by foreign 
observers as “market authoritarianism” was now the selling point of China’s political ideas. This 
market authoritarianism was defined by “the new alternative of ‘going capitalist and staying 
autocratic,” and “Beijing has provided the world’s most compelling, high-speed demonstration 
of how to liberalize economically without surrendering to liberal politics.”129 Essentially, China 
represented an economic and political model that could rival that of the United States, a point 
which had major “implications for China’s sense of identity and of national pride as policy-
makers and populace alike [sought] to expunge the stain of humiliation.”130  
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China would go on to find its largest audience in Africa in the 1970s. This is largely due 
to African dissatisfaction with Western economic and political systems, which had all but failed 
the many African nations that had turned to liberalism during decolonization. Nonetheless, 
although Africa seemed to be in an ideal position to adopt the Chinese “model,” very few 
countries did. Moreover, the countries that did attempt to emulate China’s political ideas 
(Tanzania and Mali) quickly failed. This failure was caused firstly by a general lack of interest 
on the part of African peoples in the Chinese model and secondly by a lack of interest on the part 
of Chinese leaders in helping African countries implement that model. Although China had 
opened up to the world and its ideas received more attention, economic concerns overrode any 
desire to spread political ideas.131  
As China’s attempts to broadcast its political ideas floundered, its domestic policies only 
further diminished China’s fledging international cultural presence. The most infamous of these 
policies was its hard crackdown on student protesters during the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 
1989. These protests had manifested for a culmination of reasons—economic slowdown, 
demands for greater freedoms, etc.—and, while the aims of the protesters were at times 
ambiguous, the response of the government was not. After weeks of demonstrations and hunger 
strikes, the CCP would have no more of the protests. Soldiers were sent to the square on June 3rd 
with permission to fire, and by the next day hundreds were dead and thousands were injured.132 
This slaughter brought immediate condemnation from the international community, and 
international audiences were bombarded with violent images captured by Western reporters.133 
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This delegitimized both China and Communism in the eyes of many international observers.134 
While no incident has been as serious as this grotesque violation of human rights, China’s 
policies of the 21st century have fumbled its reputation in other ways. Whether through foreign 
labor exploitation, the crackdown of artists like Ai Wei Wei, or the mistreatment of minorities, 
namely Tibetans and Uighurs in China’s western provinces, China has repeatedly sacrificed its 
international reputation for domestic security.135 
In terms of China’s ability to spread what is colloquially referred to as culture—“(a) 
observable artifacts, (b) values, and (c) basic underlying assumptions,”—China has been for the 
most part successful.136 It is, of course, difficult (if not foolish) to attribute this success directly 
to the efforts of China’s leaders. Chinese migrants have set up various communities all over the 
globe, Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, all major influencers of Chinese cultural values 
and underlying assumptions, have spread internationally, and historic symbols of Chinese 
civilization (e.g. the Great Wall) are well-known. None of these developments can be attributed 
to CCP leaders, so China’s cultural standing in this stance is relatively divorced from the PRC’s 
control.  
However, Chinese leaders have found ways to reinforce or create these cultural ties 
through the widespread promotion of Confucian Institutes. With its first location established in 
Uzbekistan in 2004, the Confucius Institute was created with a rather nebulous mission of 
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spreading Chinese language and culture. Each institution is generously funded by the Chinese 
government and holds Chinese language courses for local populations. These courses, while 
mainly language instruction, preach pro-CCP views and introduce general topics of Chinese 
diaspora to students. When assessing these institutes' ability to win over local populations, they 
appear to be effective. Empirical studies suggest a positive correlation between the presence of 
one of these institutes and local media’s positive portrayal of Chinese politics, meaning China’s 
cultural projection programs have tangible results.137 It is important to note that the Confucius 
Institutes are often associated with Xi Jinping’s conception of the Chinese Dream, which is 
vaguely defined as “national prosperity, the revitalization of the nation and people’s happiness.” 
This association reflects the CCP’s belief that winning over foreign populations culturally is 
important to achieving the goals of the Chinese Dream, which are described in “the light of the 
miseries brought to China by Western powers during the Century of Humiliation.”138 
When compared to its other axes of power, the growth of China’s cultural axis of power 
seems rather limited. It would be incorrect, however, to suggest China has not grown in cultural 
power since 1949. China has made waves with its introduction of a potentially viable alternative 
to the American model, even if no other country has successfully adopted the Chinese model yet. 
Furthermore, China’s cultural broadcasting has made Chinese culture more visible in 
international communities, garnering the PRC some favor among local populations. Whether 
these limited successes will be able to outweigh the historic devaluation of China’s reputation is 
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yet to be seen. If China cannot successfully ward off neocolonialist labels (discussed in greater 
length below), this is unlikely.  
The Current Debate 
As shown above, China’s military, economic, political, and cultural axes have clearly 
become stronger since 1949. However, the culmination of these historical developments has left 
China in an ambiguous position, and its status as a superpower is still unclear. As was the case 
during Japan’s economic rise in the 1980s, scholars continue to debate the current state of 
China’s power. Can China’s economy continue to legitimize the government? Will China 
integrate into global institutions or continue to invent its own? To contextualize these questions, 
the following section explores current scholarship surrounding the China-as-superpower debate. 
Ultimately, the current debate surrounding China’s future as a superpower reinforces the 
historical assessment of China’s rise above; although Chinese military, economic, political, and 
cultural power may be rising, China still must overcome existing structural hurdles within each 
axis before it can become a superpower.  
Economy 
While all four axes are essential to a superpower, current debates surrounding China’s 
rise tend to focus on China’s economic power. For example, in his article, The Inevitable 
Superpower: Why China's Dominance Is a Sure Thing, Indian economist Arvind Subramanian 
argues that China’s economy will surpass that of the United States as early as 2030. Subramanian 
suggests that China’s strong economic growth, its positive balance of trade, and its status as a 
“net creditor to the rest of the world” allow China to leverage political benefits out of its 
numerous debtors.139 Meanwhile, economic scholars like Derek Scissors reject such unqualified 
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confidence in China’s rise. In fact, Scissors marks China’s status as a net creditor as a creation of 
“its weaknesses, not its strengths.”140 Following Scissors’ logic, China’s closed economic system 
prevents the state from importing capital, which would speed its domestic development.141 
Overall, Scissors seems to doubt Subramanian’s prediction of nearly indefinite growth for the 
Chinese economy.  
In reality, this debate reflects the deeper uncertainty that surrounds the future of China’s 
economy. China’s growth has been spectacular, but scholars from the Institute for International 
Economics and the Center for International and Strategic Studies take a more measured 
perspective on China’s success. In their joint publication, China: The Balance Sheet, these policy 
analysts note five sources of China’s economic power—“the embrace of market forces, the 
opening of the economy to trade and inward direct investment, high levels of savings and 
investment, the structural transformation of the labor force, and investments in primary 
education”—and three hurdles to economic growth—reforming state-owned enterprises, 
developing a more efficient capital allocation, and moderating market fluctuations.142 Moreover, 
these are only some of the hurdles the economy faces. In the coming decades, China will have to 
deal with demographic implications of the one-child policy, the environmental toll of rampant 
pollution, and the challenge of switching from a savings country to a consumer country.143 While 
these obstacles are surmountable, they suggest China’s economic rise is not preordained, and 
mounting economic pressures lead CCP leaders to prioritize short-term economic stability as a 
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means of securing their “output legitimacy.” In this way, CCP’s short-term economic policies 
meant to ensure Communist rule paradoxically frustrate China’s rise as a superpower. 
Although economics are understandably at the forefront of this debate, excluding any 
discussion of China’s military capabilities, its political influence, and its cultural power leaves a 
large gap in the China-as-superpower discussion. International scholars like Rosemary Foot and 
Andrew Walter provide a fuller description of the sources of China's growing international 
power by noting China’s military and political power along with its economic power. 
Contextualizing their analysis in the larger scholarly debate shows that while Chinese military 
and economic power are essential to China’s rise, political and cultural power are also vital to 
China’s rise as a superpower.  
Military 
Starting with China’s military, Foot and Walter describe China’s impressive military 
growth over the past decades. China is “a nuclear weapons state” with a rapidly growing army 
and navy. In fact, while its defense budget is still dwarfed by that of the United States, “over the 
period 1998–2007, China’s military spending in real terms has been estimated to have increased 
by 202 percent.”144 More recent statistics show that this trend has continued as China has 
increased military spending by 83% between 2009 and 2018, with a planned rise of 7.5% in 
military expenditures for 2019.145 This dramatic increase in military spending has led to the 
expansion and advancement of China’s military. While all of the People’s Liberation Army’s 
developments cannot be noted here, their development of aircraft carriers, satellite-weaponry, 
 
144 Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp. 18 and 43.  
145 David Tweed, “China Defense Spending Set to Rise 7.5% as Xi Builds Up Military,” Bloomberg, March 5, 
2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-05/china-s-military-spending-slows-as-economy-cools; 
“Xi Jinping Wants China’s Armed Forces to Be ‘World-Class’ by 2050,” The Economist, June 27, 2019, 
https://www.economist.com/china/2019/06/27/xi-jinping-wants-chinas-armed-forces-to-be-world-class-by-2050. 
Bullock 60 
and cyber warfare techniques are notable measures of the PLA’s technological growth.146 
Considerable advancements to the military structure initiated by Xi Jinping in 2015, and 
described in detail by a report from the Department of Defense similarly suggest a dramatic 
increase in China’s military power.147  
Moreover, China has increasingly shown a willingness to use its military power 
aggressively. For example, the Chinese government continues to threaten its neighbors into 
giving up strategically and politically advantageous positions in the South China Sea like the 
Spratly Islands. It does this through the construction of military facilities (and the islands beneath 
those facilities), the encirclement of opposing states’ islands, and threats to fishing boats.148 Even 
in the face of American opposition, China has asserted its military authority over the South 
China Sea, highlighting its growing military power and its willingness to use that power.149 
Although these developments are impressive, other scholars argue that it is rash to 
suggest China’s military is on its way to becoming the most powerful in the world. John G. 
Ikenberry, for example, notes that when compared the combined military strength of the United 
States and its allies, China’s defense budget is relatively small. Ikenberry includes the sum of the 
OECD's military expenditure because he sees the West’s highly integrated military alliances as 
China’s collective military opposition. Even when compared to just the United States, the 
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Chinese military is limited in both its technology and spending power.150 Such a comparison is 
crucial since, if China is to achieve some of its long proclaimed goals of reclaiming Taiwan, it 
will have to challenge the military authority of the United States (notwithstanding an unlikely 
abandonment of Taiwan on the part of the United States). Nevertheless, as the landscape of 
military technology evolves, cutting-edge cyber warfare, anti-satellite weaponry, and advanced 
cloaking mechanism complicated this imbalance. Therefore, while China’s military is in no way 
comparable to that of the United States or its allies, 21st century technological advancement 
suggest that writing off China’s military power as insignificant would be premature. 
Politics 
In relation to political power, Foot and Walter note that China “has permanent UN 
Security Council membership and a growing development aid budget.”151 These factors have 
greatly contributed to China’s political power within international politics, allowing the PRC 
much greater leverage over the UN’s mission as well as the allocation of development funds.152 
Beyond the United Nations, as mentioned above, China’s ascension to the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 has brought China greater economic protections and influence in global 
markets.153 Some scholars like G. John Ikenberry and Darren J. Lim, international relations 
analysists writing in the Project on International Order and Strategy for the Brookings Institute, 
suggest that China stands a chance at supplanting America’s long-standing seat at the top of the 
international order. As a matter of fact, these scholars argue that China’s chances at overtaking 
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the existing international political order either through existing institutions or new institutions are 
only improved by the Trump administration’s unwillingness to maintain international order 
through institutional commitment.154 
While these scholars are right to note China’s growing institutional power, their 
assessments may be overblown. For instance, although China contributes significantly to 
international financial institutions like the WTO, it is yet to be determined whether such 
multilateral participation will significantly elevate China’s political power.155 Recent 
developments have undermined China’s authority in the WTO, and the issue of intellectual 
property rights will most likely remain a point of contention between China and other WTO 
members. These developments are not merely a political hiccup either. The WTO’s repeated 
denial of China’s ascension to market-economy status has created hurdles for China’s economy. 
This is primarily because market status would force the United States and other countries to 
lower anti-dumping fees levied against Chinese goods. While the exact impact of the “Trade 
War” is still difficult to determine, early reports indicated that the Chinese economy would suffer 
far more than American economy (except for the American soy market).156 For this reason, 
China’s status within the WTO, and in many international political institutions, is far from 
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trivial. While Foot and Walter gloss over this issue, Ikenberry and Lim describe the daunting 
task China faces in more realistic terms. They write: 
China’s ability to wield new institutions as “instruments” of its political and economic 
goals has limits. Moreover, as the existing institutional order has rules and institutions 
that China can use to pursue and defend its interests (particularly those relating to 
sovereignty norms), China’s struggle to gain advantage and voice may draw it further 
into the existing system.157 
 
Essentially, China is in an awkward position. The more it may attempt to assert itself into the 
global order, the more it may be drawn into that system and changed by its rules, rather than 
changing the rules themselves. Although China is certainly in a position to gain political power, 
the deep institutionalization of the existing order may be too stable to topple.  
Culture 
Although Foot and Walter discuss military, economic, and political power at length, they 
leave China’s cultural axis of power out of the discussion. Does China have the cultural “soft 
power” of a superpower? In The Beijing Consensus: Legitimizing Authoritarianism in Our Time, 
American foreign policy scholar Stefan Halper claims that “China is the protagonist in a clash of 
values, governance, and two versions of modernity in the twenty-first century.”158 While this is 
vaguely reminiscent of a Huntington-esque “Clash of Civilizations” argument, Halper zeroes in 
on the two ideational models the United States and China represent: liberal democracy and 
market authoritarianism. While liberal democracy is a merger of free-market capitalism and 
representative government, “market authoritarianism,” is made of “a liberal economic policy that 
opens the economy” and “the persistence of authoritarian rule, which allows the ruling party to 
keep a firm grip on government, the courts, the military, and the flow of information.”159 
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Although, as Jeffery Legro suggests, China is not explicitly pushing this governing system on 
other nations the way the United States does, it is certainly trying to garner support for this 
political system through extensive propaganda and cultural outreach programs.160 For example, 
“Beijing invested $6.8 billion in 2010 to create a global network with daily news and 
commentary in fifty-six languages on television, on radio, and in print,” with the purpose “to 
frame developing stories in a China-friendly way.”161 Such advertising campaigns are bolstered 
by comprehensive language and culture programs like the Confucius Institute, which, as 
mentioned above, are sites charged with the general purpose of spreading Chinese language and 
culture. Consequently, Confucius Institutes have become one of the many ways in which the 
PRC attempts to extend its cultural component of “soft power”.162  
Other scholars approach claims of a “Beijing Consensus” more cautiously. Mark Beeson 
and Fujian Li challenge the notion of China’s growing ideational power in their piece What 
Consensus? Geopolitics and Policy Paradigms in China and the United States. Beeson and Li 
argue that despite China’s impressive growth, it is overzealous to claim China offers a model for 
other developing nations to emulate.163 This is because the “Sino-Capitalist” model lacks “a 
clearly articulated set of core principles” which “has given it significantly less traction as a 
distinct discourse or policy paradigm” compared to America’s ten, clearly outlined economic 
principles enshrined in the Washington Consensus.164 This essentially means that despite the 
active cultural programs Halper notes, China will continue to struggle to export its market-
authoritarian “model” to other states, thereby limiting its global ideational power. Such a barrier 
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is only compounded by the negative reputation the PRC is accumulating abroad through its 
strategic and economic maneuvers. For instance, as China funds ambitious economic projects in 
countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America, “China is continually 
having to fend off accusations of ‘neo-colonialism’.”165 Whether this animosity comes from 
evidence of corruption and poor planning, dangerous working conditions and racist Chinese 
managers, or predatory lending practices, China’s economic ambition abroad has certainly 
engendered negative feelings among foreign populations, if not foreign leaders.166 Additionally, 
China’s exceptionally aggressive behavior in the South China Sea has only undermined the 
PRC’s claims of non-interference, thus pushing its neighbors closer into the sphere of American 
influence.167 Clearly, in relation to cultural power, China has difficult ideational and reputational 
hurdles to overcome. When joining these cultural observations with Foot and Walter’s analysis, 
existing scholarship suggests that if China is on its way to becoming a superpower, it certainly 
has numerous hurdles to overcome before that happens.  
If anything, this scholarship illustrates the unpredictable position in which China finds 
itself in the 21st century. While China’s growth over the past seventy years has been incredible, 
economic hurdles (e.g. demographic imbalances) persist and siphon economic productivity. 
Similarly, China’s modernized military is a formidable force, but its combat capacity is still 
overshadowed by the U.S. military capabilities. Politically, China continues to struggle to gain 
the full benefit of important international institutions like the WTO, but it now has access to 
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those institutions. Lastly, China’s cultural projection has seen some success abroad, but its 
prioritization of economic security has often upended its reputation and, consequently, its soft 
power. With the advent of the COVID-19 crisis, the future of each of China’s axes of power has 
only become further shrouded in uncertainty. Nevertheless, it is clear that China has sought to 
overcome these deficits in its axes of power, and, although China is not yet a superpower, it 
intends to overcome these structural hurdles with the BRI.  
The Belt and Road Initiative: Overcoming the Hurdles  
Especially in relation to economics, the Belt and Road Initiative seems to be China’s 
primary solution to its various structural hurdles. For example, by exporting Chinese labor and 
construction, the BRI offers an important pressure valve for both social and economic issues in 
China. However, although China’s implementation of the BRI has the potential to ensure the 
country’s continued growth, its often predatory nature and haphazard implementation—as 
discussed more fully in the case study of Ecuador—threatens to undermine much of China’s 
political and cultural power abroad.  
As mentioned in the introduction of this research, the BRI is a massive infrastructure 
project that seeks to revitalize the historic Silk Road and extend Chinese influence throughout 
the world. The BRI was formally announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 during a visit to 
Kazakhstan. Xi proclaimed the Chinese government would “build the Belt and Road into a road 
of opening up” not just on the Asian continent, but to all the world.168 Although Xi relies 
rhetorically on the long history of the Silk Road, the BRI is hardly restricted to the Silk Road’s 
original trade routes. In fact, Xi notes that “all countries, from either Asia, Europe, Africa or the 
Americas, can be international cooperation partners of the Belt and Road Initiative.” This is 
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important to note since an overwhelming majority of the maps depicting the Belt and Road 
Initiative only trace paths between Eurasia and Africa.169 Since its conception in 2013, the BRI 
has funded enormous infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, and Ethiopia, to 
name just a few. Importantly, these funds are said to come without the reforms that an 
organization like the IMF would request in return, such as economic liberalization.  
Despite these claims, nations participating in the BRI have quickly become aware of the 
informal strings attached to inviting the construction of a BRI project: the projects are built and 
overwhelmingly employed by Chinese workers, not local workers, and states that default on their 
loans either relinquish the project to Chinese control (Sri Lanka signed away its massive port in 
Hambantota for 99 years) or are cornered into making special payment deals (such as allowing 
payment in oil, which China desperately needs).170 While these reputational hurdles have slowed 
the BRI, countries continue to take on Chinese investment despite stories of predatory loans.171 
Not all projects end in catastrophe either. In fact, as demonstrated in the case study of Argentina 
 
169 While some would suggest that any connections beyond the Eurasian and African continents are a part of the 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the Maritime Silk Road is actually a part of the BRI. As evidence, in 2017, 
President Xi said: “I proposed the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road, which I call the Belt and Road Initiative” (i.e., two parts of the BRI). Xi Jinping, “Work Together to Build the 
Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” (2017) at 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm. A few examples of maps that incorrectly portray 
the BRI can be found here: “Belt and Road Initiative,” World Bank, accessed July 19, 2019, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative; “China Faces Resistance to a 
Cherished Theme of Its Foreign Policy,” The Economist, May 4, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/china/2017/05/04/china-faces-resistance-to-a-cherished-theme-of-its-foreign-policy; 
“China’s Belt And Road Initiative Opens Up Unprecedented Opportunities,” Forbes, accessed July 19, 2019, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/09/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-opens-up-unprecedented-
opportunities/#4641f10a3e9a. 
170 “Let’s Talk About China,” The New York Times, September 21, 2018, sec. Reader Center, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/admin/100000006119100.embedded.html?; “Ecuador Faces a Huge 
Budget Deficit Because of Loans It Received from China,” Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2018, 
https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-ecuador-loans-china-20181210-story.html. 
171 Christopher Balding, “Why Democracies Are Turning Against Belt and Road,” Foreign Affairs, October 24, 
2018 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-24/why-democracies-are-turning-against-belt-and-road. 
Bullock 68 
below, various projects have benefited the host nation’s economy as well as the Chinese 
economy.  
Regardless, in most countries China has clearly used the BRI to prioritize economic 
security over projecting political or cultural power. This is unsurprising due to important 
domestic concerns within China. Namely, the CCP’s heavy dependence on economic growth for 
stability, which is often labeled “output legitimacy,” takes priority over any foreign 
consideration.172 When China loses cultural or political authority through hostile BRI practices, 
the CCP certainly is jeopardizing China’s long-term claim to superpower status. However, the 
short-term risk of an economic crisis that could delegitimize the CCP is far more dangerous in 
the eyes of the CCP. For this reason, China has used the BRI as a means of tackling its largest 
economic concerns of the 21st century—energy, food dependency, and unemployment—despite 
the damage the BRI’s impact has on China’s political and cultural power.173 Amidst the global 
economic crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic, it is unlikely that China’s prioritization of 
securing economic stability will change in the near future. 
Conclusion 
  By exploring China’s historically constructed ideas and interests in the context of 
China’s rise since 1949, this chapter established the relevancy of China’s historic memory of 
national humiliation in foreign policy making. Moreover, assessing the debate surrounding 
China’s superpower status, this chapter has illustrated why China has attempted to cultivate all 
four axes of power and to what extent it has succeeded. As illustrated by this chapter, because 
China’s leaders perceive the United States as an obstacle to assuaging national humiliation, it has 
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pursued an aggressive, confrontation policy towards issues like the South China Sea. Similarly, 
as China seeks to find economic security in the BRI, the BRI’s predatory nature sours relations 
with other Latin American states and jeopardizes China’s ability to expand such projects. 
Ultimately, Chinese leaders have sought to increase China’s economic, military, political, and 
cultural  power in order to overcome the historic legacy of national humiliation and reestablish 
china as a world power. As the next chapter illustrates, China’s monumental rise and 
expansionist foreign policy have elicited a similarly hostile response from the United States as it 
attempts to defend its title as sole superpower. 
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Chapter 3. America’s Balance:  
American Exceptionalism and the Thucydides Trap 
Since the times of ancient Greek historian Thucydides, the rise of a powerful challenger 
to a dominant power has generally led to war. While Thucydides originally noted this tendency 
in The History of the Peloponnesian War—as Athens rose, Sparta lashed out against it in fear—
others have applied his theory to various other power transitions. For instance, Graham Allison, a 
former Harvard professor of International affairs, analyzes sixteen cases in which a rising power 
usurped a dominant power, and, out of all of these cases, only four did not lead to war.174 
Importantly, Allison writes this work in relation to China and the United States, exploring a 
foreign policy question with growing importance: are the US and China destined to clash?  
In the context of the evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin 
America, there are two main sources of conflict between China and the United States that 
suggest that a clash may be possible. The first is the crisis in the South China Sea, where China 
has made an extensive claim to this maritime territory through what is known as “the Nine-Dash 
Line.” For China, the area bound within this line—virtually the entire South China Sea—is 
unequivocally China’s because of its historic claims to this massive body of water. Meanwhile, 
the United States has condemned China’s actions as a violation of international law and a threat 
to stability in Southeast Asia. As China continues to build islands in the South China Sea and the 
United States positions its navy in order to deter Chinese expansion, a clash on this front seems 
increasingly possible. Importantly, U.S. officials are concerned with China’s expansionist 
policies in the South China Sea not only because it threatens to jeopardize U.S. authority within 
that region but also because China’s overall rise raises anxiety among U.S. foreign policy 
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makers. For these officials, China’s rise is a direct threat to U.S. hegemony and, correspondingly, 
the American way of life.  
Similarly, U.S. foreign policy makers have become increasingly concerned with China’s 
growing presence in Latin America through the BRI. For over a century, U.S. leaders have 
treated the Western Hemisphere as a zone which the United States should have exclusive access 
to as a global power. Frequently referring to this part of the world as America’s “backyard,” the 
United States has shown great concern for warming relations between China and Latin America. 
A recent example of this accumulating concern is former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s 
comments about Chinese involvement in Latin America, where he argues that “Our region must 
be diligent to guard against far-away powers that do not reflect the fundamental values shared in 
this region” (emphasis added).175 Tillerson describes the threat of China as a conflict of 
“fundamental values,” which is reflective of a century-old understanding among U.S. foreign 
policy makers that U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere should not be solely economic or 
military. It must also be ideological, and officials have correspondingly pushed to keep 
ideologies that contradict American Liberalism out of the hemisphere. Thus, as China cultivate 
military, economic, political, and cultural ties within Latin America, U.S. foreign policy makers 
sound alarms and attempt to balance the rising power’s influence in the Western Hemisphere, 
potentially signalling a clash between China and the United States.  
As these conflicts escalate and China continues to rise as a superpower potentially 
capable of challenging the United States, it may seem like the Thucydides Trap will be realized 
and the United States will lash out at the rising power. However, applying this historical analogy 
erases the nuance that exists within the evolving relationship between China, the United States, 
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and Latin America. As Allison demonstrated in his case studies, war is not destined to occur. 
There were four peaceful transitions of power where the Thucydides Trap was “escaped,” and 
his ultimate argument is that China and the United States can also avoid the Thucydides Trap: 
“war is not inevitable.”176 When China and the United States clash or escalate conflict, they are 
choosing conflict, not falling into the inevitable outcome of a fixed struggle for power. This 
means that in both cases concerning the South China Sea and the BRI, China and the United 
States can also choose cooperation and convert geopolitical challenges into international 
opportunities.  
Focusing on U.S. foreign policy perspectives and decisions, this chapter explores the 
growing tension between China and the United States in the South China Sea and the Western 
Hemisphere. Similar to China’s socially and historically constructed memory of national 
humiliation, U.S. responses to China in both these regions are guided by the historically 
constructed understanding of American exceptionalism. This idea rests on the fundamental belief 
that “Americans are special, exceptional, because they are charged with saving the world from 
itself” and need to defend the fundamental U.S. values to which Tillerson alludes—namely 
democracy and capitalism.177 Although in some instances claims of American exceptionalism are 
certainly an over-embellished rhetorical tool used to galvanize the public, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that American exceptionalism has substantively shaped the interpretations of 
U.S. foreign policy interests for centuries. Consequently, U.S. decision makers choose policies 
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which they believe will achieve these interests. As this chapter demonstrates, because of 
American exceptionalism’s close connection with a fear of an alternative model undermining 
core U.S. values, U.S. foreign policy makers choose policies that invite conflict with China, 
leading the United States to act aggressively towards China in the South China Sea and Latin 
America. Ultimately, this aggression shapes the evolving relationship between China, the United 
States, and Latin America, escalating the potential for conflict to emerge despite the potential the 
relationship has for cooperation.    
In order to demonstrate the crucial impact American exceptionalism has on the evolving 
relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America, this chapter first lays out the 
historical origins of American exceptionalism and traces its implementation in U.S. foreign 
policy throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Then, this chapter explores the conflict in the 
South China Sea and highlights the role American exceptionalism plays in U.S. escalation of this 
conflict. Specifically, the “Loss of China” complex, an outgrowth of American exceptionalism, 
pushes U.S. foreign policy makers to undermine China’s rise as a superpower and, consequently, 
the apparent viability of China’s political system. Subsequently, this chapter summarizes the 
ways in which American exceptionalism shapes U.S. foreign policy makers’approach to China’s 
presence in Latin America. However, although this chapter highlights the ways in which 
American exceptionalism generally shapes U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, the specific 
ways in which the United States responds to the BRI are detailed through the Ecuador and 
Argentina case studies in the following chapter. Lastly, this chapter addresses the concerns that 
China and the United States may go to war and notes the vital role American exceptionalism 
plays in potential conflict. 
American Exceptionalism 
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Secretary Tillerson’s comments on China and Latin America capture an important fear 
among U.S. leaders that has persisted since and even before the Cold War. For centuries, U.S. 
foreign policy makers have feared that an alternative model could undermine the “fundamental 
values” championed by American exceptionalism. The earliest manifestation of American 
exceptionalism can be traced back before the United States was an independent nation. Colonists 
arriving in the Americas described the society that they sought to construct as a “City upon a 
Hill,” which the rest of the world would look to as an example. This original understanding of 
America as an exceptional land was inherently Christian, and that distinction was quickly used to 
justify the violent seizure and colonization of indigenous lands.178 While this religious 
connotation has been inextricably linked to American exceptionalism for centuries, secular 
iterations of the concept existed in tandem. For example, after the American Revolution, 
Benjamin Franklin described American exceptionalism in more secular terms, suggesting that the 
democratic governing system of the United States would be the example which European nations 
would seek to emulate.179 This is just one of the ways in which the concept of American 
exceptionalism is amorphous, allowing for a variety of interpretations as to how the United 
States may serve as an example for the rest of the world. However, while American 
exceptionalism is not strictly religious or racial, the necessarily Christian and white origins of the 
concept have ensured American exceptionalism implies fundamental religious and racial 
understandings of what is American.    
This religious and racial understanding is best highlighted by the infamous expression 
used to justify Westward Expansion and indigenous genocide: “Manifest Destiny.” In 1845, 
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during the thrall of Euro-Americans’ colonial expansion across the continent, columnist and 
soon-to-be politician John Louis O'Sullivan wrote that Americans had the “manifest destiny to 
overspread the continent allotted by Providence.”180 Importantly, although American 
exceptionalism has been used by indigenous and enslaved peoples to challenge practices and 
institutions like settler colonialism and slavery, the racial and religious exclusion of non-white 
groups from American exceptionalism facilitated the violent oppression of these peoples.181 In 
this way, the contradictions of American exceptionalism—championing freedom while refusing 
to abolish slavery—coexisted with the foreign policies of presidents like Andrew Jackson and 
Thomas Jefferson.  
This use of American exceptionalism to justify racial and religious injustice in the name 
of democracy and capitalism was not confined to foreign relations with indigenous tribes or 
enslaved African peoples either. By the 20th century, America’s emergence from a period of 
isolationism led prominent American historians and politicians to extend the application of 
American exceptionalism to the rest of the world. For instance, by the turn of the century U.S. 
leaders like Senator Albert J. Beveridge began to believe that “it is destiny that the world shall be 
rescued from its natural wilderness and from savage men… in this great work the American 
people must have their part.” This even meant annexing other nations, since “the sovereignty of 
the Stars and Stripes can be nothing but a blessing to any people and any land.”182 For context, 
when Beveridge made this comment in 1900, the United States had just defeated the Spanish and 
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acquired the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and, de facto, Cuba.183 By defeating the Spanish 
and acquiring these territories, the United States not only showed it had the ability to enforce the 
Monroe Doctrine—“the American continents… are henceforth not to be considered as subjects 
for future colonization by any European powers”—it also demonstrated that it was willing to 
apply American exceptionalism to justify the acquisition of lands outside the continental United 
States.184 Thus, for the first half of the history of the United States, American exceptionalism 
served primarily as a rationalization and justification of the extension of the borders of the 
United States and its genocidal practices. 
By the end of the First World War, however, American exceptionalism’s primary impact 
on U.S. foreign policy makers was to stoke their fears of an alternative model to American 
Liberalism undermining the so-called American way of life. Leaders in the United States, like 
those of many European countries, had perceived Communism as an inherent threat to order, 
stability, and the American way of life for decades before the Russian Revolution. However, the 
emergence of a large Communist nation in Europe triggered an anti-Communist movement in the 
United States far beyond the scope of previous repression, during which the U.S. government 
violently suppressed actual or suspected Communist sympathizers. This “Red Scare” peaked 
from 1919-1920, but this current of anti-Communism would carry on throughout the 1930s and 
throughout the Cold War. American domestic leaders responded so harshly to Communism 
because it was seen as a threat to the American way of life, which, as stipulated by the dogma of 
American exceptionalism, was Christian, capitalist, and freedom-loving. Communism, on the 
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other hand, was an atheistic, anti-materialist, equality-oriented ideology that contradicted the 
American creed.  
 This fear of an external model undermining American democracy was only exacerbated 
by fascism’s rise in the 1930s, and the United States began to take even more serious steps 
towards repressing these alternative models to American Liberalism. Specifically, the House Un-
American Activities Committee, formed in 1938, investigated fascist and Communist groups in 
the United States, using their authority to challenge what they saw as ideologies that “[attack] the 
form of government guaranteed by our Constitutions.” This committee would subpoena and 
interrogate suspected insurgents and, if witnesses refused to name sympathizers, were held in 
contempt of Congress and arrested. Those who invoked the 5th Amendment were branded “5th 
Amendment Communists.”185 The fall of Nazi Germany and the end of World War II did little to 
soften this Crusade-like hunt for “un-American activities” like Communism. In fact, perhaps the 
most infamous anti-Communist of U.S. history, Senator Joseph S. McCarthy, waged a televised 
scorched-earth campaign against possible Communists from 1950-1954.186 During this time, 
widespread fear of the Soviet Union facilitated anti-Communist pandemonium, aptly labeled 
“McCarrthyism” after the soon-to-be disgraced senator. This widespread domestic fear that an 
alternative model could come to the United States was inextricably tied with the underlying 
belief that the American way of life was exceptional. U.S. leaders made sure to quash any 
challenges to that historic idea with great haste.   
Throughout this time, the American exceptionalism had certainly guided U.S. foreign 
policy making, but the emergence of the Cold War marked the height of insecurity and fear that 
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Communism could threaten democracy and capitalism within the United States. This era is 
littered with public political statements and U.S. military endeavors which reflected the U.S. 
policy of containment. Enshrined in George Kennan’s Long Telegram in 1946, the policy of 
containment had surprising continuity across several presidencies, and each administration acted 
in accordance with Kennan’s articulation of the necessity of combating communism. To Kennan, 
the “[American] traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of [the United 
States] be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.”187 Again, it is clear that Communism was 
seen as a threat to American values and, correspondingly, U.S. global hegemony.  
The ensuing geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union resulted in dozens of proxy 
conflicts across the globe. During this “Cold War,” American exceptionalism guided the choices 
of U.S. foreign policy makers, leading them to see the defeat of Communism, an ideological 
threat, as synonymous with preserving U.S. hegemony. Accordingly, in these various proxy 
conflicts, the Soviet Union would assist Communist forces while the United States would assist 
anti-Communist forces. Korea, Germany, Greece, Iran, Vietnam, and Afghanistan are just a few 
of the countries in which the United States and Soviet Union intervened in regional conflicts in 
order to suppress or support Communism, respectively. It is important to note that in many of 
these conflicts that the United States did not always choose to support democratic forces. Despite 
the early proclamations of American exceptionalism that argued that the United States should 
spread American values throughout the world, the Cold War clarified the role American 
exceptionalism had in U.S. foreign policy. Specifically, the fear that an alternative model could 
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undermine American Liberalism within the United States led U.S. foreign policy makers to 
ignore the anti-democratic practices of leaders they chose to support, so long as those leaders 
were anti-Communist. This is best highlighted by the conflict in Vietnam. Fearing that 
Vietnam’s fall to Communism would have a “domino effect” and cause the rest of Southeast 
Asia to fall to Communism, the United States propped up the violently repressive—yet anti-
Communist and Christian—Ngo Dinh Diem regime.188 In this way, U.S. intervention in Vietnam 
highlights a crucial aspect of American exceptionalism, namely that protecting U.S. interests 
abroad and preserving the American way of life at home takes priority over spreading democracy 
across the globe.  
Despite defeat in various conflicts in the Cold War, the Soviet Union would eventually 
collapse in the early 1990s. For American foreign policy leaders, this ostensibly successful 
struggle with Communism only vindicated American exceptionalism and, as President Ronald 
Reagan articulated, proved that the United States was “still…a shining city on a hill.”189 After 
the Cold War, it seemed to many as though there was no longer an alternative model which could 
legitimately challenge U.S. values or hegemony. In fact, some argued that the end of the Cold 
War had largely led to “the end of history” and global international conflict.190 Conflict on a 
global scale was far from over, however, and the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001 ignited a fervent response from American foreign policy 
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makers. The very next day, President George W. Bush declared war on terrorism, effectively 
naming the newest existential threat to the American way of life in the 21st century.  
Importantly, President Bush later clarified in his State of the Union address that the War 
on Terrorism was not merely a crusade against global terrorism. Instead, the war presented the 
United States“a great opportunity… to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting 
peace.” Here, President Bush uses the language of American exceptionalism to imply that by 
spreading “values that will bring lasting peace,” (i.e. American values), the United States was 
waging a just global war. Ultimately, terrorism—as the concept itself implies—stoked fear 
among U.S. policy makers that insurgent groups could use violent tactics to undermine U.S. 
hegemony and the American way of life. Accordingly, as put by US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, that “when [the United States had] dealt with bin Laden and his network [it would] then 
broaden the campaign to go after other terrorists all around the world.”191 In this way, the war on 
terror marked a new chapter in American exceptionalism’s shaping of U.S. foreign policy 
making. 
Today, American exceptionalism lives on in the rhetoric and foreign policy of U.S. 
political leaders. In fact, the rhetoric of President Donald J. Trump have revived American 
exceptionalism in its more original form by using direct and obvious racialized language and 
policies. For example,  For example, President Trump has shown little hesitation to make 
unsavory, hateful comments about foreign, predominantly nonwhite nations, showing his 
rhetorical willingness to suggest that the United States is racially superior to other nations.192 
Furthermore, President Trump’s travel ban on Muslim countries points out the strong religious 
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impact American exceptionalism has on U.S. foreign policy.193 While both of these cases may 
seem like exaggerated expressions of the understanding that the United States is/should be both 
white and Christian, President Trump’s directness merely casts light on a long-standing 
component of American foreign policy making. In reality, American exceptionalism maintained 
its racial and religious connotation throughout the history of the United States, and President 
Trump’s foreign policies are in line with this historic understanding of American exceptionalism. 
Before concluding, it is important to note the very dichotomous way in which U.S. 
foreign policy makers depict the world to the American public. For instance, at the core of the 
Truman doctrine was the belief that “nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways 
of life.” Similarly, after 9/11, President Bush laid out very clearly that “every nation in every 
region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”194 
These comments illustrate the ways in which President Truman and President Bush depicted the 
ideological threats to the American way of life as simply evil. Whether the Soviet Union’s “Evil 
Empire” or Iran, Iraq, and North Korea’s “Axis of Evil,” U.S. presidents attempted to establish 
foreign challenges to American values as evil. This political crusade against challenges to 
American Liberalism are rooted in the historically constructed belief in American 
exceptionalism. Furthermore, in a speech in 2018, Vice President Mike Pence made it clear that 
China’s alternative model to American Liberalism, market authoritarianism, and China’s rise 
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will not gain traction in the United States: “our message to China’s rulers is this... the American 
people will not be swayed.”195  
This history has detailed the ways in which U.S. foreign policy makers constructed the 
historic belief in American exceptionalism and how that belief has impacted foreign policy 
implementation for over two centuries. It is now clear that this historically constructed belief that 
America is exceptional generates a fear among U.S. foreign policy makers that an alternative 
model like Communism may threaten the American way of life—typically understood as 
democratic, capitalist, white, and Christian—and must therefore be defeated. Furthermore, this 
history has noted the hypocrisy of American exceptionalism, since it has simultaneously been 
used to promote equality, justify genocide, champion the spread of democracy, and support 
undemocratic governments across the world. In the end, the historically constructed belief in 
American exceptionalism has guided U.S. foreign policy makers to favor expansionism, 
containment, and unilateral counter terrorism efforts. Overall, American exceptionalism has 
pushed U.S. foreign policy towards conflict-oriented approaches. The case of China is no 
different. The following section continues this examination of the historically constructed belief 
in American exceptionalism’s impact on U.S. foreign policy towards China specifically.         
The “Loss of China” Complex 
 As mentioned above, The United States lost various battles in its struggle against 
Communism during the Cold War. For each of these defeats, when Communist forces triumphed 
over U.S.-backed forces, a blow was dealt to American exceptionalism. The defeat in Vietnam 
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was particularly troubling for U.S. foreign policy makers, and massive domestic rejections of the 
war in Vietnam only solidified the fear that failures abroad could undermine the American way 
of life at home. While Vietnam is perhaps the most well-known example of this increasing 
insecurity, the fall of China to Communist forces has particular importance to U.S. foreign policy 
makers in the context of the evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin 
America. As a massive country with critical geopolitical significance, the Communist victory 
over the United States-backed Nationalists left a scar on the historically constructed idea of 
American exceptionalism. The resulting “Loss of China” complex constituted a reminder that 
America’s “exceptional” model was once beat out by another, alternative model.  
Accordingly, U.S. foreign policy makers attempt to assuage their nation’s historically 
constructed failure, optimized in the “Loss of China” complex, by thwarting Chinese global 
expansion proving that China does not represent a viable alternative to American values. Indeed, 
even though Communism has been replaced by China’s new model—“market 
authoritarianism”—American foreign policy makers still attempt to balance China’s rise in order 
to alleviate this historic failure, quash an ostensible threat to the American creed, and defend 
American hegemony. This has led the United States to act aggressively within the evolving 
relationship with China and Latin America, specifically towards China’s military expansion into 
the South China Sea and the extension of the BRI into Latin America. Ultimately, as U.S. foreign 
policy makers attempt to balance China’s rise in these two regions, they increase the chances that 
the United States and China may clash. The following explores how the “Loss of China” 
complex leads U.S. foreign policy makers to make these conflict-oriented choices despite the 
potential for cooperation in this evolving relationship.     
The South China Sea Crisis 
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Conflict between China and the United States is in no way an isolated incident, and there 
is a long antagonistic history between the two countries. Lin Biao, one of the Chinese 
Communist Party leaders during the 1960s, illustrated this antagonism well when he argued that 
international politics was characterized by a “fierce struggle between the people of the world on 
one side and U.S. imperialism and its lackeys on the other.”196 The underlying belief in Lin 
Biao’s writing is imperialists, especially the United States, will always attempt to humiliate 
weaker states, which is indicative of the historically constructed memory of national humiliation 
in chapter two. As China approached the United States with skepticism, the United States, as 
mentioned above, viewed China’s fall to the Communists as an embarrassing defeat that 
undermined American exceptionalism and, accordingly, had to be undone. In this way, opposing 
historically constructed ideas made it appear as though these states would inevitably at odds with 
one another.  
However, the era of “ping-pong” diplomacy and Nixon’s visit to China would cool this 
relationship, and the United States and China began to cooperate much more frequently despite 
these differences. Nevertheless, the United States remained the primary imperial antagonist in 
the eyes of the Chinese public, and anti-American sentiment remained strong throughout the 20th 
century.197 This low opinion of the United States was only further degraded after the U.S. 
bombing of a Chinese embassy in Kosovo in 1999, which some Chinese officials believed was 
an intentional attack.198 Today, although the rhetoric of Chinese leaders has comparatively 
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cooled off in recent years, there is ample evidence to suggest that Chinese leaders still view the 
United States in this antagonistic lens, such as their actions in the South China Sea.  
Yet in the context of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy makers were far more 
preoccupied with the Soviet Union. It was only in the years before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union that the United States began to view China as a primary antagonist. This distrust of the 
Chinese quickly became apparent after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. After the CCP 
violently murdered a unclear number of student protesters, the United States, along with 
numerous European powers, openly condemned the Deng regime for its action. This official 
condemnation was matched with public demonstrations, and massive protests criticizing the 
Chinse broke out within the United States. For instance, on June 4th, 1989,  many students 
gathered in New York City and “raised Chinese flags that had been spray-painted with Nazi 
swastikas” to show their disgust with the Chinese regime’s actions.199 American opinion of 
China was further degraded in 2001 after the Hainan Island Incident, in which a U.S. 
reconnaissance plane collided with a Chinese fighter. The pilot then was forced to make an 
emergency landing on the Hainan Island, where they were detained by Chinese officials. The 
Chinese government then held the crew members for weeks during negotiations with the United 
States, ultimately souring relations between diplomats and further upsetting the American 
public.200 Clearly, despite periods of cooperation, conflict is not a new aspect of Sino-American 
relations. 
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Within the context of this antagonistic conflict, China has attempted to expand into the 
South China Sea, and the United States has taken dramatic steps to reject Chinese claims to the 
South China Sea. As mentioned in chapter two, China has made aggressive moves in the South 
China Sea, even going as far as building artificial islands on coral reefs in the Spratly Islands. 
The United States, in turn, has taken a tough military stance. For example, in relation to sheer 
number of U.S. Navy ships the United States has in Asian waters, the Trump administration has 
increased the number of deployable U.S. ships from 273 to 287.201 This increased military 
capacity has been matched with an increased military presence; the U.S. Navy has conducted no 
less than ten freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. This Naval escalation has 
been matched by increased air presence. Operating under the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command 
(INDOPACOM), American warplanes, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and long-range 
bombers have been upgraded and reorganized to ensure improved reconnaissance performance 
and inter-aircraft communications.202 Clearly, U.S. foreign policy makers have shown a 
willingness to flex U.S. military might in an attempt to balance China’s expansion into the South 
China Sea. 
As the United States has responded aggressively against China’s actions in the South 
China Sea by increasing its military presence and capabilities in the region, U.S. foreign policy 
makers have simultaneously pushed for political pressure against China.203 For instance, the 
United States has strengthened ties with government of Australia, which has voiced concern over 
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China’s aggressive behavior in recent decades. The two nations now routinely run joint-military 
exercises in the Pacific, marking the determination of the United States to build coalitions 
against China’s rise.204 In addition, the United States has turned to external political institutions 
to delegitimize China. In 2019, the U.S. government supported the Hague’s decision to reject 
China’s “Nine-Dash Line” claim to the South China Sea. At the same time, U.S. foreign policy 
officially encouraged peaceful, diplomatic solutions to the crisis.205 This diplomatic pressure is 
crucial to note because complicates the U.S. response to the South China Sea crisis. Although the 
United States has greatly increased its military presence in the South China Sea and cultivated 
military alliances with nations like Australia, the United States has simultaneously attempted to 
pressure China to conform to international norms that are in line with core U.S. values.  
The U.S. stance on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization is a key example of 
this engagement strategy. Essentially, the United States has historically supported China’s entry 
into existing institutions like the WTO, as President Clinton did in 2000. Specifically, President 
Clinton suggested that a deal allowing China into the WTO would “clearly increase the benefits 
of cooperation and the costs of confrontation.”206 Even though the United States has since taken 
a harsher stance on issues related to China’s involvement in the WTO, it has in no way seriously 
recommended China be excluded from the organization (although President Trump has recently 
challenged that institution’s very existence).207 Instead, American foreign policy has encouraged 
Chinese reform so that it may actually elevate its status in that organization to a country with 
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“market economy” privileges: “If China wishes for its producers’ or exporters’ prices or costs to 
be used in anti-dumping comparisons, it should complete its economic transition and ensure that 
market economy conditions prevail in its economy.”208 In this way, the United States has used 
both aggressive military buildup and diplomatic pressure to encourage China to relinquish 
territory in the South China Sea and, more importantly, reform in ways that coincide with U.S. 
values and reduce China’s commitment to market authoritarianism.   
 Whether military or diplomatic, the response of the United States to China’s rise and the 
South China Sea crisis is rooted in the “Loss of China” complex and American exceptionalism. 
This sentiment is captured perfectly by American Vice President Mike Pence’s speech in 2018 
on the subject of China. Although Pence begins his speech focusing on all the positive 
relationships China and the United States have held over the centuries, he specifically changes 
tone at 1949. Indeed, he argues that “soon after it took power in 1949, the Chinese Communist 
Party began to pursue authoritarian expansionism.” Consequently, China began to become less 
democratic and less worthy of America’s trust. He then urges that “under President Trump’s 
leadership, the United States of America has been defending our interests with renewed 
American strength” by “making the strongest military in the history of the world stronger still.” 
Here, the connection between the “Loss of China” and America’s military response is clear. 
Pence lays out the “good” history China had, focusing on how there was a strong hope that China 
would become democratic and not Communist, thereby validating American exceptionalism. In 
this way, Pence highlights the role that American exceptionalism and the “Loss of China” 
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complex play in the military response of the United States to China’s rise and the South China 
Sea crisis. 
At the same time, however, Vice President Pence identifies various ways in which the 
American government has pushed for democratic reforms in China. Similar to President 
Clinton’s encouragement of Chinese economic reforms, Pence notes that the United States has 
repeatedly encouraged economic liberalization and democratic reform within China, effectively 
pushing China to step away from its market-authoritarian practices and towards American 
Liberalism.209 As with U.S. military balancing in the South China Sea, these gestures are 
ultimately rooted in the “Loss of China” complex, and U.S. officials like Vice President Pence 
try to push China towards democracy as a means to assuage the failure of 1949. Moreover, U.S. 
foreign policy makers use this encouragement as an attempt to thwart the alternative economic 
model that market authoritarianism represents, thereby highlighting the insecurity American 
exceptionalism creates. However, unlike the U.S. military response, this encouragement of 
reform within China suggests that U.S. foreign policy-makers can push to cooperate on 
democratization and liberalization rather than just attempt to prevent China’s rise to power. 
Regardless, whether promoting military buildup or diplomatic pressure, American leaders still 
cling to the hope that China can be “won back” to the side of democracy. This hope influences 
U.S. foreign policy choices and marks the relationship between the “Loss of China” complex, 
American exceptionalism, and the U.S. response to the South China Sea crisis. 
The Belt and Road Initiative and Latin America 
 
209 Mike Pence, "Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China" (2018), The 
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Another important region of contention between China and the United States is Latin 
America, where American exceptionalism plays a vital role in the U.S. response to China’s 
growing presence in Latin America. While this section will highlight the important ideas behind 
this response, the detailed response of the United States to the BRI specifically is reserved for the 
following chapter on Ecuador and Argentina. Nevertheless, from this brief analysis it is clear that 
the historically constructed belief in American exceptionalism impacts the evolving relationship 
between China, the United States, and Latin America.  
As mentioned above, although officials in the United States profess a strong desire to 
spread democracy across the world, the fear created by American exceptionalism encourages 
U.S. foreign policy makers to prioritize keeping an alternative model away from the United 
States, even if that means promoting undemocratic regimes. Importantly, the closer that 
alternative model comes to the Western Hemisphere, or, worse yet, the United States itself, the 
stronger the response of officials. For instance, the United States has fought long battles against 
Communists in Cuba and Colombia in an attempt to keep Communism away from the United 
States. These unilateral actions are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine, and as China proceeds to 
increase investment in Latin American nations, the U.S. officials grow increasing concerned that 
neighboring countries may turn towards market authoritarianism.  
This alarm is best captured by U.S. foreign officials growing concern about surveillance 
systems built by Chinese companies for Latin American countries, such as in Ecuador. Since 
these surveillance systems show the potential for increasing authoritarian tendencies within Latin 
America and, correspondingly, the likelihood that market authoritarianism will gain traction in 
America’s “backyard,” U.S. officials have been open about rejecting these nations adopting a 
Chinese model of development. As former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson argued, “China’s 
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state-led model of development is reminiscent of the past. It doesn’t have to be this hemisphere’s 
future.”210 Clearly, U.S. foreign policy makers do not want a foreign “model” to undermine 
American values within the Western Hemisphere. Regardless whether that model is Communism 
or market authoritarianism, American exceptionalism and the fear it creates drives U.S. foreign 
policy. Chapter four highlights this response in greater detail, focusing specifically on Ecuador 
and Argentina. 
Conclusion 
As shown here, China and the United States have great potential to collide due to the fact 
that China’s determination to reverse its national humiliation challenges America’s desire to 
preserve its exceptional role in the world. As noted in the beginning of the chapter, peaceful 
power transitions are historically rare. Nonetheless, peaceful shifts in global power have 
occurred. If China and the United States are to peacefully navigate the shift to a more equitable 
distribution of power, they must learn how to accommodate one another rather than working to 
create exclusive spheres of influence.  
Whether this accommodation will occur is a popular debate among scholars, but it is 
important to note, as Allison’s case studies demonstrate, war between China and the United 
States is not inevitable. However, Allison notes that conflict can only through the establishment 
of “a depth of mutual understanding not seen since the Henry Kissinger-Zhou Enlai 
conversations in the 1970s” and “radical changes in attitudes and actions, by leaders and publics 
alike, than anyone has yet imagined.”211 Put another way, Allison sees a restructuring of ideas, 
among both leaders and the public, as essential for China and America to understand their 
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interests in ways that lead to cooperation rather than conflict. This restructuring would certainly 
be arduous given, but, as this chapter has shown, more recent incidences—like the near collision 
of an American Navy ship and Chinese destroyer in the South China Sea—reveal that conflict, 
induced by accident or otherwise, remains a real possibility without some form of critical 
reflection from both China and the United States.212  
In fact, Henry Kissinger himself, the architect of decades of American foreign policy, 
agrees. Writing in his piece “The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations: Conflict is a Choice, not a 
necessity,” Kissinger argues that “the U.S.-Chinese relationship should not be considered a zero-
sum game, nor can the emergence of a prosperous and powerful China be assumed in itself to be 
an American strategic defeat.”213 These conclusions wrongfully drive China and the United 
States towards a disastrous, avoidable conflict since they assume China’s role as an enemy rather 
than a partner.  Instead, Kissinger recommends that China and the United States revision their 
relationship as a “Pacific Community” in order “to commit themselves to genuine cooperation 
and find a way to communicate and relate their visions to each other and the world.”214  
Currently, each nation’s historically constructed ideas—national humiliation and 
American exceptionalism—drive their leaders’ interpretation of how best to achieve the military 
and economic interests of the nation. Although neither of these historically constructed ideas 
lend themselves towards cooperation, China and the United States must learn how to 
accommodate one another rather than working to create exclusive spheres of influence in order 
to avoid conflict. Not only is this critical in the South China Sea, it is also vitally important in 
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other parts of the world. Therefore, this research turns to Latin America, where the United States 
has enjoyed hegemonic influence yet China’s influence has grown. By doing so, the following 
chapter expands this analysis to include the role of socially and historically constructed ideas and 
interests on the foreign policies of Ecuador and Argentina, showing how these shape each 
country’s relations with the United States and China. 
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Chapter 4. Latin America’s Struggle:  
Finding Autonomy Between Scylla and Charybdis 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, metaphors and historical analogies distort our 
understanding of global history and are predicated on some unbalanced form of pessimism or 
optimism. For Latin American states specifically, when put in the context of the evolving 
relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America, these comparisons are often 
rooted in pessimism.215 This is unsurprising for a few reasons.  
First, Latin American states’ long history under European colonialism and American 
imperialism defines their modern struggle for autonomy.216 Centuries of European and American 
domination have led to stunted political development within Latin America. Although this 
foreign meddling has never completely dictated the outcome of political events in Latin America, 
influence from countries like the United States and the United Kingdom has had a significant 
impact on domestic politics. Even today, as meddling from American intervention has 
comparatively decreased in the 21st century, there are still ample examples of the United States 
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intervening in the domestic politics of Latin American countries. Because of this historic legacy 
of external intervention, prospects for the development of Latin America’s political autonomy 
would seem to be bleak.217 
Second, as a consequence of this historic and ongoing subjugation, persistent economic 
exploitation has likewise crippled Latin American economies, forcing many Latin American 
states to rely on external bodies like the IMF for loans and bailouts, therefore also forcing them 
to adopt the guidelines for economic restructuring mandated by these external actors. Although 
the 1980s and 1990s saw some short-term success from some of these reforms, few Latin 
American economies have seen many long-lasting benefits from economic restructuring in 
accordance with the Washington Consensus. This inability to redefine Latin American global 
economic relations stems from persistent structural barriers to autonomous economic 
development within most Latin American economies. As of 2016, the IMF has characterized 
some of these barriers as “(i) shortcomings in the quality of education; (ii) low export diversity 
and complexity; (iii) lower commodity prices for commodity exporters; and (iv) inadequate 
infrastructure.”218 Infrastructure, in particular, continues to serve as a structural deficit that 
restrains Latin America’s growth, despite recent improvements.219 Because of this history of 
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economic exploitation and persistent structural hurdles, assessments of the future of Latin 
America’s economic growth are often dismal.220  
Third, and most relevant for this research, Latin America appears to many analysts to 
have limited options for financial and political relief. Some Latin American states have relied on 
international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank for decades, while others have 
gone right to creditors like the United States. Although those options have been expanded by 
China’s introduction of BRI funding into Latin America, the general skepticism that surrounds 
China’s BRI likewise drives pessimistic evaluations of Latin America’s future.221   
For all these reasons, it is, again, unsurprising that many assessments of Latin America’s 
future are pessimistic. Indeed, although not a specifically employed analogy, it is useful to 
characterize the way most scholars understand Latin America with an equally limited metaphor: 
Scylla and Charybdis. To the many scholars describing Latin America’s geopolitical position, the 
dilemma seems relatively clear. Latin America is caught between China and the United States 
much the same way Odysseus was caught between Scylla and Charybdis. As Latin America 
attempts to develop politically and economically, it can either chart the familiar route by sticking 
with the United States and making significant but predictable sacrifices (Scylla), or it can chart a 
new, unknown course with greater risks and rewards by siding with China (Charybdis).222  
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These scholars, however, allow a seemingly dichotomous, desperate situation to distort 
their analyses. It is absurd to imagine Latin American states’ only option is to choose between 
China and the United States and Washington Consensus institutions. Indeed, Eduardo Galeano, a 
renowned Uruguayan journalist, historian, and political activist, provided a clear answer to 
whether Latin America only must choose between exploitative powers at a democracy rally in 
Chile in 1988: “We Say No.” For Galeano, “the powerful opinion-makers treat [Latin 
Americans] as though [they] do not exist, or as though [they] are silly shadows,” but Latin 
American states have real agency beyond accepting exploitation by the United States or China.223  
Conceivably, Latin American states can achieve self-determination, the ability to exercise 
political and economic autonomy without external compulsion, by pursuing a third way.224 This 
option has deep historical precedents from the movement for Latin American independence, 
symbolized by Simón Bolívar, to the protests of authors and activists like Eduardo Galeano. 
Thus, although existing structural hurdles limit the choices available to Latin American states, 
history suggests that Latin American states are not limited to choosing between the lesser of two 
evils and that there may be a more optimistic way to interpret their dilemma. In fact, as this 
research demonstrates, it is possible for Latin American states to take advantage of the ongoing 
competition between China and the United States through the BRI and create a third way.  
To illustrate this point, this research analyzes two Latin American states’ interaction with 
the Belt and Road Initiative, namely Ecuador and Argentina. In recent decades, both of these 
states have looked to China for markets and investment, hoping to improve economic growth, 
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build infrastructure, and gain access to China’s burgeoning market. Both countries have also 
been part of the so-called pink tide in Latin America, which was a turn toward left-wing 
governments in Latin America in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These governments rejected 
neoliberal economics, criticized the United States and Washington Consensus institutions, and in 
some cases, called upon indigenous traditions as a form of national pride.225 In addition, both 
countries experienced a return to more conservative governments that were more supportive of 
the United States and liberal economic policies shortly after.  
Yet despite these similarities, these countries’ relations with China have differed in terms 
elevating autonomy and improving the economy. For Ecuador, the turn towards China has only 
resulted in further exploitation, not greater autonomy. Under the leftist government of Rafael 
Correa (2007-2017), Ecuador sought to diversify its economy, turning to China to cultivate 
Ecuador’s access to natural resources like minerals, petroleum, and hydropower. While Ecuador 
has attracted considerable Chinese investment, that investment did not diversify Ecuador’s 
economy or resolve key issues like inconsistent energy access in rural communities. In fact, this 
turn to China has contributed to Ecuador’s huge debt and created a new dependency on Chinese 
loans. Overall, critics have argued that Chinese-financed projects have brought more damage 
than development. This damage led Correa’s successor, Lenín Moreno, to turn back to the IMF 
for economic assistance. Thus, despite widespread criticism of the neoliberal economic policies 
championed by the United States and international financial institutions, U.S. economic 
influence remained significant and under the current administration of Lenín Moreno. 
Throughout this time, Ecuadorian leaders, to a limited extent, pursued a third way as an 
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alternative to Chinese and U.S. financing by attempting to strengthen regional alliances with 
like-minded Latin American countries. However, as Ecuador struggled to navigate this evolving 
relationship, it became far more difficult for the state’s leaders to commit to these alternatives, 
leaving Ecuador’s attempt at finding autonomy via a third way largely unsuccessful.  
Meanwhile, Argentina seems to be at a point in which it may benefit from the BRI. 
Argentina is a larger and wealthier country than Ecuador, with a more diversified economy. In 
2017, Argentina’s GDP based on purchasing power parity was estimated at $911.5 billion. With 
a population of 52.8 million, this translated into GDP per capita of $20,700. In contrast, Ecuador, 
with a population of 17.6 million, had a GDP estimated at $188.5 billion and GDP per capita of 
$11,200.226 This is not to say Argentina’s economy is strong or stable, however. Although 
Argentina was one of the world's wealthiest countries 100 years ago, it has been plagued by 
recurring economic crises, high inflation, and mounting external debt. The worst of these crises 
came in 2001, when runaway inflation and unemployment crashed the economy, leading the 
government to default on its foreign debt. The economy rebounded over the next several years 
under President Néstor Kirchner’s (2003-2007) expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Years 
later during the administration of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015), this growth, 
combined with a decline in exports, generated rising inflation, leading the government to expand 
state intervention in the economy and to seek increased trade and investment with China.  
Similar to Ecuador, this growing interconnectedness brought BRI infrastructure 
investments, but, of the various BRI projects within Argentina, none have had the catastrophic 
consequences that they had in Ecuador. In fact, many of these projects may actually prove to 
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bolster the nation’s economy. The subsequent return to more conservative economic policy 
under the government of Mauricio Macri (2015-2019) initially made it seem as though Argentina 
would be turning away from China. However, Argentina has continued to seek deeper economic 
ties with China, demonstrating that the government still sees China as a critical partner and 
investor. With this more positive relationship, Argentina has had more success in pursuing a 
third way through Mercosur, a common market organization in South America. While Mercosur 
has its own troubles, Argentina’s continued commitment to the institutions reflects the viability 
of Argentina’s pursuit of autonomy via an alternative to Chinese and U.S. influence.  
Regardless of the case, like China and the United States, the choices Latin American 
states make are guided by their historically-constructed ideas and interests, namely the legacy of 
colonialism, American imperialism, and a desire for autonomy. This research highlights both the 
limits and the potential for Latin American autonomy by focusing on the ways in which Ecuador 
and Argentina have sought to enhance autonomous growth by turning to China. Although 
Ecuador’s experience suggests that the BRI can severely limit autonomous growth, the Argentine 
case illustrates how the BRI could present Latin America with a real opportunity to develop 
mutually beneficial economic relations with China, thereby enabling Latin American states to 
pursue alternative sources of economic growth and autonomy. The key difference between these 
cases is the extent to which each state provided oversight over BRI projects. In Ecuador, high 
levels of corruption and desperate financial needs led to under-regulated, slipshod projects that 
ultimately plunged Ecuador further into debt and generated greater foreign dependency. In 
Argentina, complex domestic political barriers and strong anti-Chinese sentiment (or 
Sinophobia) led the government to apply greater scrutiny to each project, resulting in less 
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calamitous outcomes and greater autonomy. Nevertheless, in both cases, Ecuador and Argentina 
continue to struggle to preserve/increase autonomy while navigating this evolving relationship.   
The Struggle for Autonomy 
Before approaching each case study individually, it is essential to cover their shared 
history as Latin American states. Specifically, Ecuador and Argentina have had their core 
understanding of their role in geopolitics dramatically shaped by the history of American 
imperialism. Right as most Latin American states finally began to gain independence from 
European imperial powers in the 19th century, the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine signaled 
that the United States was determined to prevent European powers from dominating the 
hemisphere “the American continents… are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for 
future colonization by any European powers.”227 President Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to 
the Monroe Doctrine formalized America’s self-proclaimed right to intervene in Latin American 
nations to preserve order and protect property rights, effectively solidifying American dominance 
over the Western Hemisphere.228 In the decades that followed, whether through the establishment 
of banana republics, supporting the infamous Condor Plan, or, most recently, waging modern 
drug wars, the United States has frequently infringed upon Latin American states’ autonomy.  
This historic infringement has led many (but not all) Latin American states and leaders to 
attempt to escape or at least diminish American influence in recent decades. For example, some 
Latin American states have turned to China’s BRI as an alternative avenue to alleviating 
economic duress. In fact, although not all of China’s investments are officially listed under the 
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BRI, as of 2016, Latin America was the number one recipient of China’s outward foreign direct 
investment in the world.229 This staggering amount of investment has been encouraged by Latin 
American leaders and often manifests in massive infrastructure projects, often related to energy. 
Some stand out energy projects funded mainly by the Chinese government include the Coca 
Codo Sinclair Dam in Ecuador and two nuclear power plants in Argentina (one in Patagonia and 
one in Córdoba), and the Pimental dam at Belo Monte, Brazil. Latin American states have turned 
to China for more than energy assistance, however, and Chinese investment has contributed to 
expansions of the Panama Canal, the establishment of a complex surveillance network in 
Ecuador, and the development of a space station in Argentina’s Patagonia, to name a few. While 
other projects have tapered off or become suspended indefinitely like the Mexico City–Querétaro 
High-Speed Railway or the Nicaragua Canal, Latin American states have increasingly turned 
towards China for trade, loans, and investments, raising concerns among some U.S. officials that 
China is turning Latin America away from the United States. 
Nevertheless, Latin American states have far from severed ties with the United States. 
Indeed, some leaders have actually doubled down on their commitments to international 
financial institutions and the Washington consensus. Argentina’s President Macri, for example, 
turned to the IMF once again for a massive bail out from the IMF in 2019 in a last ditch attempt 
to salvage the crashing Argentina peso and recessed economy.230 Meanwhile, Ecuador’s 
President Lenín Moreno met with Vice President Mike Pence in 2019 to discuss growing ties 
between the two countries, including the transfer of military technology, the extradition of 
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Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, and affirm his  “commitment to refresh the relationship 
between Ecuador and the United States,” which had soured during the term of his predecessor, 
Rafael Correa.231 Overall, although Latin American states have increased ties with China in the 
past decades, their economic and diplomatic relations with the United States remain firm.  
Not all Latin American policies, however, only take the side of China or the United 
States. Indeed, some of these nations have pursued a third way, seeking to affirm Latin American 
autonomy and self-determination through regional blocs. As each of the case studies contained 
within this research show, Latin American states supplement their cooperation with the United 
States and China with the creation of regional institutions that seek to enhance their own 
autonomy, namely the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' Trade 
Treaty (ALBA-TCP), a regional bloc of countries that was created to resist U.S. domination and 
promote radical revolutionary processes, the Pacific Alliance, and the Common Market of the 
South (Mercosur), which was created with the hope of establishing common external tariffs and 
the free movement of goods, services, currency, and people among member states. Although the 
legacies of these organizations are complicated, their historic origins reflect the deep-seated 
ideas their founders have about Latin America’s role in the world. More often than not, these 
ideas are entrenched in attempts to reject American imperialism, to exploit the evolving 
relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America, and, ultimately, to champion 
Latin American autonomy.   
Accordingly, the following sections explore the extent to which the Republic of Ecuador 
and the Argentine Republic align themselves with China, the United States, or some alternative 
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third way. Regardless of each state’s balancing of these alignments, each choice is informed by 
the leaders of that state’s understanding of how to best achieve greater autonomy. However, 
Argentina has seen far more success in this respect that Ecuador. Again, the key difference here 
is the extent to which each state provided oversight over BRI projects. In Ecuador, high levels of 
corruption and desperate financial needs led to haphazard BRI projects that ultimately increased 
Ecuador’s debt and generated greater foreign dependency. In Argentina, domestic political 
barriers and Sinophobia led the government to apply greater scrutiny to each project, leading to 
higher quality BRI projects and Argentina’s increased ability to participate in regional 
institutions. Both Ecuador and Argentina continue to struggle to increase their autonomy while 
navigating this evolving relationship. By analyzing the differences in how each state interacts 
with the BRI, it becomes clear that heightened levels of domestic scrutiny, for whatever reason, 
allow Latin American states to benefit more from this evolving relationship.   
The Republic of Ecuador 
Ecuador is an important example of the challenges that the evolving relationship between 
China, the United States, and Latin America can present a state. Various aspects of Ecuador’s 
history and modern politics have prevented it from achieving its desired autonomy, but foreign 
debt and corruption are by far Ecuador’s greatest hurdles. The following explores the history of 
Ecuador before the BRI in order to introduce its historically constructed desire for autonomy and 
some hurdles it faces as it navigates this evolving relationship. Then, this research highlights the 
ways in which Ecuador has turned to China, the United States, and the ALBA-TCP in an attempt 
to obtain greater autonomy. Ultimately, Ecuador’s high levels of corruption and desperate 
financial needs have made it difficult for the nation to pursue a third-way and reduce dependence 
on foreign countries and corporations, and their corresponding international financial institutions 
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and multinational corporations. Ecuador’s autonomous development has also been compromised 
by the government’s neglect of indigenous peoples and social movements, whose concerns over 
foreign investment and loans have often gone unheeded. 
Ecuador before the BRI 
Like its South American neighbors, Ecuador has long struggled to establish stable 
political and economic infrastructure. Politically, 20th century Ecuador was governed mostly by 
caudillos, or strong-men. These semi-authoritarianian leaders held precarious positions of power, 
despite their strong labels. In fact, none served for more than four years, a complete presidential 
term, between 1924 and 1972.232 Because of this political instability, Ecuador failed to develop 
strong political institutions capable of establishing order and promoting general prosperity. This 
allowed for high levels of corruption, the exclusion of the general population from political 
affairs, and decades of economic exploitation from American companies like the United Fruit 
Company. This political instability culminated in two military dictatorships between 1972 and 
1979, which held divergent legacies in respect to pushing for the cultivation of Ecuador’s 
autonomy.  
The first military junta was led by General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, whose government 
boldly claimed its nationalist character and championed economic modernization.233 In fact, 
during Lara’s years in power, the military government implemented mildly progressive reforms 
like the regulation of foreign capital and limited agrarian redistribution. As a result of this 
nationalist push and increase in regulation, Ecuador experienced a significant increase in 
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domestic manufacturing between 1972 and 1975.234 The increase of an industrial base in Ecuador 
is important to note because, as discussed below, Ecuador has spent most of its economic history 
as an exporter of primary goods. In this way, Ecuador began to move towards a political 
economy less dependent on purchasing finished products from the United States and more 
towards establishing an industrial base to supplement its agricultural trade and growing 
petroleum industry. Importantly, however, marginal gains in economic freedom did not equate to 
the expansion of personal freedoms among the populations, and Lara’s regime was politically 
repressive and excluded most of the public from participating in the decision-making process of 
elites.235 
Meanwhile, in contrast with these nationalist tendencies, the second military dictatorship 
in Ecuador, led by a triumvirate of leaders of Ecuador’s military branches, was more 
conservative in nature. In fact, rather than focusing on Ecuador’s national pride and moving 
towards independence from the U.S. sphere of influence, they participated in the CIA backed 
Operation Condor. Essentially, Ecuador turned towards the United States for clandestine 
support.236 Operation Condor was “a secret intelligence and operations system” in South 
America that served as “a secret component of a larger, U.S.-led counterinsurgency strategy.” 
Organized under Operation Condor, Ecuadorian military personnel “seized, tortured, and 
executed” supposed political dissidents.237 Although this second military government came 
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peacefully to an end in 1979 with the massive, million vote election of Jaime Roldós Aguilera, 
the suspicious circumstances of Roldós death in a plane crash two years later and subsequent 
personal testimonies have led some scholars to believe that the CIA continued to meddle in 
Ecuador’s politics after the military dictatorship.238  
In this way, Ecuador’s government emerged from an era of caudillos and dictatorships 
into one of democracy. However, Ecuador’s transition to a constitutional democracy has been far 
from perfect, and challenges to the government’s authority in recent decades have highlighted 
the fragility of Ecuador’s constitutional regime.239 Moreover, major problems continue to plague 
the Ecuadorian government to this day, most notably corruption and human rights challenges, 
weak institutions, and disregard for local and indigenous rights. President Moreno’s declaration 
of a national state of emergency in October 2019 further marked the extent of the government’s 
lack of control. Military personnel and police units applied deadly force in response to urban and 
rural workers challenging Moreno’s reduction of fuel subsidies in mass protests.240 Even more 
recently, as of April 2020, Ecuador’s former President Correa has been formally charged with 
corruption and sentenced to eight years in prison, further polarizing a divided political system.241 
With such an unstable political history, Ecuadorian leaders struggle to navigate the politically 
complex pressures of the evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin 
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America. Corruption, especially, has complicated Ecuador’s negotiations with China, as 
discussed below. 
Turning to Ecuador’s economic history, Ecuador’s economic development has likewise 
been stunted by years of instability. For instance, Ecuador has struggled under the weight of 
foreign debt for about a century. This debt has been distributed between the United States, 
European nations, and the IMF, exacting a significant toll on Ecuador’s economy and society. As 
an illustration of just how large Ecuador’s debt was in comparison to its economic production, in 
2000, Ecuador’s debt was equivalent to a staggering 70 percent of the nation’s GDP. The debt 
decreased as a percentage of GDP over the next several years, declining to 28.5% in 2007. 
Nonetheless, “in 2007, the Ecuadorian government paid $1.75 billion in debt service, more than 
it spent on health care, social services, the environment, and housing and urban development 
combined.”242 This means that much of the wealth spent on financing Ecuador’s debt could have 
been spent on public goods or economic modernization. Having campaigned on a populist 
platform of fighting poverty rather than paying the country’s external debt, President Rafael 
Correa took the bold step of declaring most of the nation’s remaining debt “odious”—an 
illegitimate debt accrued by a previous, typically dictatorial and highly corrupt government—and 
stopped payment on Ecuador’s foreign debt, even though it had sufficient reserves to meet its 
debt obligations. As a consequence, Ecuador’s credit rating was downgraded, making it difficult 
for the government and Ecuadorian companies to get credit from Western banks and institutions. 
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With these observations in mind, the legacy of foreign debt and its pressure on the Ecuadorian 
economy is clear.243  
Debt is not the only structural issue facing Ecuador’s economy; single commodity 
dependency has similarly plagued Ecuador’s history. A few decades after the introduction of the 
United Fruit Company into Ecuador, for instance, bananas became the major export of the 
country. Indeed, by the 1950s, Ecuador was the largest banana exporter in the world. Despite this 
burgeoning agribusiness’s dominance over Ecuador’s economy, most of the population did not 
get to partake in the material wealth created by banana exports, exacerbating inequality while 
maintaining Ecuador’s dependency on an American company. As the United Fruit Company 
refocused its production into Central America in the mid-1960s, Ecuador struggled to diversify 
its economy away from single export dependency.244 In fact, it never did. Beginning in the 1970s 
in accordance with the oil boom, Ecuador came to rely heavily on its petroleum exports to 
modernize its economy.245 Despite Ecuador’s temporary membership in OPEC and limited 
prosperity, the nation’s subsequent dependency on oil created economic vulnerability. In fact, 
Ecuador’s economy has regularly plunged into recession when global oil prices have fallen and 
when natural disasters such as earthquakes and flooding have disrupted production. 
Today, Ecuador continues to rely on oil as its main export and debt continues to plague 
the Ecuadorian economy. When combined with Ecuador’s political instability, it is difficult to 
see Ecuador in a strong position to negotiate favorable trade and investment terms with China 
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and the United States. Nevertheless, the geopolitical competition between these two powers has 
created unique opportunities for Ecuadorian leaders to address persistent economic and political 
concerns, even if those are not necessarily the nation’s central issues. 
Ecuador and China 
Ecuador’s relationship with China is relatively new. The nations established diplomatic 
relations in 1980 under Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping. However, significant economic 
relations did not start until decades later. Since these economic relations were restricted to a 
small group of elites, it is more appropriate to mark 2008 as a key turning point in economic 
relations between Ecuador and China. Because of Ecuador’s aforementioned sovereign defaults 
during the 2008 financial crisis, Ecuador was internationally branded as a high-risk debtor, so 
few investors in the world were looking to continue financing projects and development in 
Ecuador. China, however, was the exception. In fact, by 2011, “China’s loans to Ecuador 
exceed[ed] $6 billion,” which is a massive investment considering the size of Ecuador’s 
economy.246 Much of this money went towards petroleum extraction and telecommunications 
infrastructure. The most notable of these investments, however, went towards the Coca Codo 
Sinclair Dam, informally a part of China’s BRI.247 
Located in the Eastern Andes in proximity to the Reventador Volcano, the Coca Codo 
Sinclair Dam is a massive hydroelectric project intended to “supply about 75% of the country’s 
energy needs.”248 After President Correa briefly suspended negotiations surrounding the dam’s 
construction in 2007, plans quickly resumed and, by November 2016, the dam had been built. 
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Ecuador began the construction of this massive undertaking with hopes that hydroelectricity 
would produce cleaner, cheaper energy and bolster the nation's economy. In addition, by 
reducing the domestic demand for petroleum, Ecuador would be increasing the amount of 
petroleum it would be able to sell internationally.249 In accordance with Ecuador's general shift 
towards China and the reluctance of the rest of the international community to loan money to 
Ecuador, the funds for this project came exclusively from China's Export-Import Bank in the 
form of a nearly $1.7 billion loan.250  
However, by 2018, it became clear that the dam had created more problems than it had 
solved. For starters, the dam underperformed in energy output immensely. When compared to 
original projections, which set the dam’s regular production at 1500 megawatts, the dam operates 
at half capacity. This underproduction stems from a variety of issues. For starters, Sinohydro, a 
large Chinese state-owned hydropower engineering and construction company, had a complete 
monopoly over the dam's construction. This not only meant that the production of the dam would 
create fewer jobs in Ecuador, it also meant that the dam depended on the safety and quality 
standards of Sinohydro, which were low. For instance, by 2018, over 7000 cracks had formed in 
the dam’s equipment and infrastructure, resulting in hazardous working conditions and 
underproduction. Furthermore, despite warnings from independent environmental experts, the 
Ecuadorian government built the dam on a water supply which had not been studied for nearly 
30 years. Consequently, government officials were unprepared for the massive build-up of silt 
that began to quickly clog the dam during and after production.251 These ongoing troubles are 
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compounded by looming, future disasters; the dam is built next to the Reventador Volcano, 
which is active, and in an area where earthquakes have disrupted vital infrastructure in the past. 
For these reasons, underproduction plagues the Coca Codo Sinclair dam. 
Financially, the dam was equally disastrous. Not only was Ecuador saddled with a high 
interest loan, the dam meant to provide the government with the funds to pay off that interest was 
borderline defunct. This was no issue for China, however, since the Ecuadorian government was 
still able to pay off the debt with discounted petroleum (a resource China desperately needs). 
Although estimates differ, Ecuador will essentially need to send 75% of its oil exports to pay off 
this debt, which is a massive toll on Ecuador’s economy.252 Moreover, since Ecuador is unable to 
pay off its debt to China, current President Moreno has turned back to the World Bank and IMF 
for financing, ironically putting Ecuador into the very situation Correa intended to use the dam to 
escape.253 Importantly, although the Coca Codo Sinclair is a useful focal point of China’s BRI in 
Ecuador, Chinese businesses have financed dozens of other hydroelectric projects in Ecuador, 
along with projects relating to electrical infrastructure and petroleum extraction. In this way, 
Ecuador has remained financially dependent, even though Correa attempted to use the BRI to 
escape that same dependence. 
If these problems were mostly evident during the dam’s construction, why was the dam 
built anyway? Initially, one may point to Ecuador’s desperate economic situation; without any 
other international creditors to turn to, China was Ecuador’s only option. Even if this is true, it 
does not explain the Ecuadorian government’s blatant neglect of worker safety and dam 
efficiency (or lack thereof). Instead, corruption explains why Ecuadorian officials turned a blind 
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eye as such a risky project was built haphazardly. First, in respect to the lower level officials in 
charge of the dam, almost every official in charge of the dam's production has been convicted of 
bribery or corruption charges. Some were even caught on tape accepting bribes.254 Much later 
and much more recently, higher officials have been convicted of corruption in relation to private 
investments like the dam, including Correa himself.255 This observation is important to note 
because it explains two components of the evolving relationship between China, the United 
States, and Latin America. First, although Latin American leaders like Correa may couch their 
campaigns in the rhetoric of nationalism and restoring the nation’s autonomy, personal ambitions 
can lead the leaders of a state to deviate from this purpose, ultimately undermining that nation’s 
pursuit of autonomous development. Second, although this may seem like a great boon for 
China, deals mired in corruption such as this one are the source of the BRI’s growing infamy.256  
As a result, by foregoing open and honest transactions, both Ecuadorian and Chinese 
leaders undermine their overarching goals. Ecuadorian leaders sacrifice their nation’s autonomy 
for personal gain, propagating corruption and increasing the state’s economic dependence on 
foreign companies and countries. Chinese leaders undercut their government’s claims to be non-
exploitative, to be unlike the United States. Projects like the Coca Codo Sinclair dam across the 
world have caused widespread issues for the BRI’s global reputation, jeopardizing the CCP’s 
goals of overcoming China’s structural hurdles within each axis of power. It is important to note 
that, to a certain extent, these issues are out of the Chinese government’s control. Many BRI 
projects in Latin America and around the world are led by private Chinese companies rather than 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) like Sinohydro, so the CCP does not have direct control over all 
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BRI projects, and the parameters that define what is an official BRI project are unclear. The CCP 
is hardly absolved of responsibility for BRI failures though, and the disastrous Coca Codo 
Sinclair dam was funded by the state-controlled Chinese Export-Import Bank and Sinohydro, 
which is a SOE. Moreover, even when projects are mishandled by private companies, it is hardly 
guaranteed that locals make a distinction between SOE’s and private companies. Thus, by 
prioritizing personal gains, Ecuadorian leaders sacrifice their nation’s autonomy. At the same 
time, Chinese leaders erode the BRI’s global reputation and, as a result, its ability to overcome 
structural hurdles within China’s axes of power by permitting the clumsy construction of projects 
like the Coca Codo Sinclair dam. 
In the end, this relationship has ultimately had severe political and humanitarian 
repercussions. As early as 2006, mass protests against Chinese projects broke out across 
Ecuador. The situation grew so dire in one province, Orellana, that Correa declared a state of 
emergency in 2007. This early movement led to various others, many ending in a violent clash 
between protesters and police/military units. These movements were mostly composed of rural 
workers and indigenous activists who identified the harsh environmental impact of Chinese 
mining, petroleum, and hydroelectric projects.257 It is important to note, however, that the 
violence in the direction of Chinese laborers has historic precedent in Latin America: Sinophobia 
has a long history in Latin America and surely played a part in these protests.258 In this way, the 
Correa administration’s mishandling of the BRI exacerbated Ecuador’s rural/urban political 
divide as well as racial divisions and Sinophobia. Unlike Argentina, however, this Sinophobia 
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was unable to stop most BRI projects, mostly because high levels of corruption encouraged 
Ecuadorian officials to push through this popular rejection of Chinese investment. 
Responding to Ecuador’s overall negative experience with the BRI, Ecuador’s current 
government has turned partially away from China and back towards the United States. Yet 
Ecuador maintains relations with China and the BRI, most notably in its expansion of the ECU-
911 surveillance system. Although most of China’s investments in Ecuador were related to 
economic infrastructure, China began assisting the Correa administration with the production of 
a massive surveillance network in 2011. According to Correa, this network was installed in order 
to combat Ecuador’s high murder and theft rates. Indeed, there have been reductions in murder 
rates across the country since the network came online, but it is unclear whether this reduction 
has come from the surveillance system. Moreover, there is ample evidence to suggest that Correa 
also used ECU-911 to intimidate potential political opponents and bolster the operations of the 
National Intelligence Secretariat (Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia, Senain), the state’s 
domestic intelligence agency.259 Once President Moreno took office in 2017, he emphasized his 
administration’s desire to leave much of Correa’s legacy in the past. ECU-911 seems to be an 
exception, however. Moreno has shown no willingness to reduce the reach of the surveillance 
network. In fact, he has broadened its scope.260 While there is no evidence to suggest Moreno is 
using this network maliciously as Correa had, the expansion of this network and potential 
addition of facial recognition technology in a nation with a history of censorship and political 
repression is still concerning. Thus, as with the construction of the Coca Codo Sinclair dam, 
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rather than assist the population of Ecuador, the expansion of Ecuador’s surveillance state 
increases the government’s power and ultimately benefits the state’s leaders more than anyone. 
Ecuador and the United States 
With these developments in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that Ecuador’s new president 
would turn back to the United States and familiar institutions in an attempt to revitalize 
Ecuador’s economy and usher in some level of political stability. This turn towards the United 
States is perhaps best characterized by Vice President Pence’s visit to Quito in June of 2018. 
There, Pence met with President Moreno to discuss how new relations would look between the 
Trump and Moreno administrations, clearly looking to find a less hostile president in Moreno 
than Correa. President Moreno did not disappoint. Indeed, this conference clarified the two main 
avenues through which Ecuador and the United States would cooperate: military technology and 
economic financing. 
To highlight some specifics, in a joint press statement to the public during this Quito 
meeting, Moreno trumpeted “completely positive and convinced that, through dialogue and joint 
work, we will make progress and we’ll strengthen that brotherhood” between Ecuador and the 
United States. In this way, Moreno publically confirmed his turn towards the United States. 
Since Moreno had been hand-picked by Correa as a successor, this was a potentially surprising 
development. Nevertheless, there are two important moments of this speech which clarify 
Moreno’s relationship with the United States, which is not necessarily a relationship of complete 
subordination. The first and most telling example of this is Moreno’s unsubtle critique of the 
humanitarian crisis caused by the Trump administration’s mass deportation and family 
separation policy. Here, Moreno addressed his nation’s “huge concern for the situation of the 
Latin American children [who] were separated from their parents” in the United States, a direct 
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jab at Trump’s most controversial immigration policy. Despite this determined stance on such a 
hot political issue, Moreno is comparatively more cooperative with the United States on most 
other issues. A second example from this joint press conference reflects this sentiment. 
Practically in reply to Pence’s assurance that “defeating criminal groups and drug traffickers will 
also require renewed cooperation between our law enforcement and our militaries,” President 
Moreno states that “Ecuador, Mr. Vice President, does not have cocaine crops whatsoever” and 
that he “would like to salute Vice President Pence to granting the cooperation of funds from the 
United States for that struggle against [drug trafficking].”261 In this way, Moreno clearly 
established that Ecuador and the United States would be cooperating militarily and economically 
for years to come. 
First, speaking to military expansion, U.S. military presence is in no way new in Ecuador. 
In 1999, Ecuador permitted the construction of a U. S. air base in order to survey the region for 
drug trafficking operations. This facility remained open until 2009 when President Correa 
refused to renew the facility, effectively closing it.262 To reinforce this jab at American military 
operations in Latin America, Correa suggested that Ecuador receive a military base in Miami, 
illustrating his typical passive-aggressive stance towards the United States.263 Going further, 
Correa actually pushed through a revision to the Ecuadorian Constitution that does not permit 
foreign troops within its borders in any capacity, eventually expelling U.S. personnel in 2014.264 
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Because of this precedent set by Correa, it seems unlikely (and unconstitutional) for the United 
States to have any type of military presence in Ecuador.  
However, as shown above, with the ascendancy of Moreno came the return of military 
collaborations between Ecuador and the United States. For instance, in 2018, Ecuador began to 
permit Lockheed P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft to operate along the Pacific coast. These 
aircraft, much like U.S. military personnel from 1999-2009, were sent to detect and reduce “drug 
trafficking, organized crime, human trafficking, illegal fishing, and contraband.”265 More 
recently, in 2019, Moreno has permitted the United States to base similar operations out of the 
Galápagos, which has brought immense controversy. Not only have there been various protests 
from Ecuadorians against this move to allow American aircraft to launch from a place of great 
national pride, Correa himself tweeted against Moreno’s move, replying to Defense Minister 
Oswaldo Jarrín: “Galápagos NO es un “portaaviones” para uso gringo,” which roughly translates 
to “The Galápagos are NOT an “aircraft carrier” for gringos to use.”266 This announcement fits 
well into the context of a meeting between Jarrín and Admiral Craig Faller, commander of the 
United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), in which both leaders confirmed a mutual 
desire to limit the same illegal activities listed above, especially narcotrafficking.267 In this way, 
despite mounting political costs, the Moreno administration has slowly begun to reintroduce U.S. 
military presence within its borders. 
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In addition, “illegal fishing” is of massive geopolitical importance within the context of 
the evolving relationship between Ecuador, China and the United States. Fish are one of 
Ecuador’s main exports, and Chinese vessels have been found fishing illegally off the coast of 
Ecuador as recently as 2017, when a Chinese-flagged ship was detained carrying illegal tons of 
shark meat.268 Illegal fishing has become big business for Chinese fishing companies and 
disputes over fishing rights constitute yet another way in which Latin America has become a 
battleground between China and the United States. Although Moreno and his administration 
couch their support in the rhetoric of drug war and security, U.S. officials like Admiral Faller are 
much more explicit about what takes precedence when it comes to U.S. involvement in Latin 
America. In a testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee in July 
2019, Faller said that Latin American domestic issues present challenges that “directly impact 
the security of this hemisphere, our neighborhood. Criminal organizations, narcotrafficking, 
illegal immigration, violent extremists, corruption… are principal among those challenges” 
(Emphasis added). Clearly, in the eyes of U.S. military leaders, retaining control over the 
situation in the western hemisphere is paramount to U.S. security. Indeed, Faller even invokes an 
image similar to that of the infamous “our backyard” expression, referring to Latin America as 
“our neighborhood.” Yet the opportunities and challenges of which Faller speaks are only 
partially about those he lists above. Instead, the America’s real concern is with other nations 
increasing their influence within the hemisphere He states that “most disturbing insight, the aha 
moment for [him], however, has been the degree to which the external state actors, China, 
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Russia, and Iran, have expanded their access, and influence right there in our neighborhood,” 
again invoking the “our neighborhood” image.269  
Thus, even though Moreno states that issues like narcotrafficking take priority in the 
United States’ military involvement in Ecuador, U.S. officials tell a different story. Instead, these 
officials focus on encroachment by China and other actors onto territory where they believe 
China does not belong. In this way, by turning back to the United States for military support in 
combating some of Ecuador’s most pressing issues, it seems as though Ecuador has only further 
immersed itself in the growing tension between China and the United States. Consequently, 
Moreno, like Correa, has partially signed away the fate of his state to the choices of an external 
actor. He merely chose the United States instead of China.  
Financially, the Moreno administration has similarly turned away from China and the 
Correa administration’s path. In his inaugural speech in 2017, Moreno made clear what his 
administration’s economic goals were by describing desired advancements in the nation’s 
bureaucracy and private sector. Hoping to bolster the nation’s economy through investment, 
tourism, and trade, Moreno stressed the importance of establishing a stable economic system for 
Ecuador.270 Indeed, he even addresses the problems of Ecuador’s dependency on primary goods, 
listing out the five chief primary goods of Ecuador—bananas, cacao, roses, tuna, and shrimp—as 
sources of national pride, but he also reiterates the need to establish a more diverse economy. 
This push for a diverse economy reflected Moreno’s desire to establish a less dependent 
Ecuador. Moreno also spokw at length about the financial and political dangers of corruption, 
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citing corruption as a major danger to stability and control within Ecuador. In this way, by 
pushing for a more stable economy and less corrupt political system, Moreno prioritized 
economic and political autonomy in his agenda.271 
Despite Moreno identifying this important structural hurdle in Ecuador’s economy, he 
never mentioned Ecuador’s largest economic hurdle: debt. This exclusion more likely comes 
from the political potency of these topics rather than the Moreno administration’s negligence. In 
fact, refinancing of foreign debt was at the top of Moreno’s agenda. After immense issues with 
Chinese financing, Moreno turned towards the United States, IMF, and World Bank in order to 
tackle Ecuador’s persistent economic turmoil. Moreno was relatively successful in this endeavor. 
First, after making extensive promises of economic restructuring, Moreno was able to win over a 
$4.2-billion loan from the IMF in March 2019. Specifically, this economic restructuring would 
include “boosting competitiveness and job creation; strengthening fiscal sustainability and the 
institutional foundations of Ecuador’s dollarization; protecting the poor and most vulnerable; and 
improving transparency and bolstering the fight against corruption.” To facilitate these reforms, 
the IMF would support the Ecuadorian government for three years.272 This has allowed the 
Moreno administration to step away from relying on risky Chinese loans and more on the IMF 
despite the Correa administration’s previous default.  
As per usual, these IMF loans came with strings attached, and the IMF pressured Ecuador 
to “reduce debt-to-GDP ratio through a combination of a wage bill realignment, a careful and 
gradual optimization of fuel subsidies, a reprioritization of capital and goods and services 
spending, and a tax reform.”273 The issue of fuel subsidies in particular highlights the Moreno 
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administration’s struggles with imposing IMF economic reforms. After President Moreno 
publically declared in October 2019 that his administration would be eliminating a decades-old 
fuel subsidy program, massive protests pushed the government to declare a state of emergency. 
In the ensuing conflict, many protesters were wounded and killed by police forces. Eventually, 
Moreno held a live, televised negotiation with indigenous leaders (who coordinated many of the 
mass protests) and walked back on his suspension of fuel subsidies. 274 This came after the 
Moreno administration’s heavy-handed repression of protesters, which brought international 
criticism and led the United Nations to assist in the negotiation process between indigenous 
leaders and Moreno’s cabinet. While it can be argued that Moreno’s austerity measures were not 
in accordance with the IMF’s recommendation of “gradual optimization”, his adherence to the 
austerity principles set by the IMF still exposed his government’s willingness to depend on the 
IMF and its programs. Since the IMF has had little success in saving Ecuador from its previous 
foreign debt crises, it is questionable whether this turn to the IMF will be less detrimental than 
Ecuador’s dependency on China.  
Beyond the IMF, Moreno has also successfully convinced the World Bank to assist in 
Ecuador’s economic restructuring. In April 2019, the World Bank approved a $350 million loan 
to Ecuador in order to combat poverty and improve the state’s rather weak social safety net. The 
ultimate goal of this program is to help reduce inequality, which is a massive issue in Ecuador, as 
it is in much of Latin America.275 Importantly, this reform demonstrated that Moreno was not 
completely deviating from Correa and turning entirely to the political right. Both Correa and 
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Moreno have prioritized reducing inequality in their economic agendas, and Correa was 
moderately successful in this sense (although this success involved increasing the nation’s 
foreign debt).276 However, later developments in 2019 have highlighted Moreno’s difficulties as 
he is caught between goals set by the IMF and the public's wishes. After Moreno announced the 
suspension of a fuel-subsidy program that had been in place for around 40 years, intense riots 
broke out across the country. This explosive reaction forced Moreno to declare a state of 
emergency. Ultimately, with the outbreak of COVID-19, the state of the fuel-subsidies remains 
in limbo, but, with the international economy suffering tremendously from the global pandemic, 
Ecuador’s economic situation remains precarious. 
In summary, this economic crisis has highlighted the difficult path that lay before Moreno 
in stabilizing the Ecuadorian economy. Although not officially confirmed to be a part of the 
IMF’s agenda, many critics believe the IMF pushed for the suspension of these fuel subsidies, 
which would help the government reach its goal of reducing the fiscal deficit from $3.6 billion to 
under $1 billion by 2020.277 Whether this a direct austerity measure suggested by the IMF, there 
have been immense political consequences for the Moreno government. Similarly, by allowing 
the United States to conduct military operations within Ecuador, Moreno has brought domestic 
criticism and shown his willingness to rely on the United States and Western financial 
institutions for military and economic support. Thus, despite invocations of Simon Bolivar and 
his dreams of a unified South America, by turning back to these external actors, Moreno, like 
Correa, obfuscates Ecuador’s path to a third way.278  
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Ecuador and ALBA-TCP 
Although both the Correa and Moreno administrations have struggled to find an 
alternative choice between China and the United States, Ecuadorian leaders have still shown a 
willingness and ability to pursue a third option, albeit with limitations. Beyond holding typical 
bilateral relations with neighboring nations, the Correa administration, in particular, pushed for 
Ecuador’s participation in an alternative institution that presented hopes of greater autonomy: the 
ALBA-TCP.  
The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' Trade Treaty (ALBA-
TCP), is an intergovernmental organization that seeks to foster greater economic and political 
cooperation between its members, which, outside of Ecuador and Venezuela, are mostly 
Caribbean island nations. Originally conceived by Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, ALBA-TCP 
was named “Our America’ to differentiate it from the other America, the expansionist one with 
imperialist appetites,” i.e. the United States.279 Originally just ALBA in 2004, Bolivian president 
Evo Morales proposed the addition of People’s Trade Treaty to further signify that this 
organization was a fairer, alternative option “to the US-promoted bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements.”280 In this way, by joining this ALBA-TCP in 2009, the Correa administration 
aligned itself with vehemently anti-U.S. states like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.281 More 
importantly, Ecuador joined a coalition that specifically invoked the legacy of Simon Bolivar, 
“the liberator” of Latin America from Europeans. Consequently, Correa and his administration 
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took part in a regional push for greater autonomy, one driven by the historic memory of 
European colonialism and American imperialism.  
The economic mission of ALBA-TCP is driven by two main ideas which differentiate it 
from Washington Consensus institutions. First, rather than focusing on external, exogenous 
growth policies that see technological advancement occurring independent of economic growth, 
ALBA-TCP encourages endogenous growth policies. These policies encourage investment in 
human capital, technology, and natural resources in order to guide directed, specific economic 
orientation towards desired markets. Second, ALBA-TCP focuses on the cooperative advantages 
created by states within their economic system rather than competitive advantages. These means 
that states organized under the ALBA-TCP regional bloc to not focus on competing with one 
another to drive innovation, which is what the IMF and similar institutions recommend. In some 
ways, this drive for comparative advantage is similar to nationalist-oriented economic policies 
like Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) that many Latin American countries turned to 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Those policies focused on promoting economic independence 
through replacing the economy’s dependency on primary goods with the establishment of an 
industrial base in an attempt to realign global economic hierarchies. Similarly, since a focus on 
comparative advantage has often left developing economies in a disadvantaged position in which 
they depend on primary goods, ALBA-TCP policies encourage members to think more 
cooperatively. Accordingly, by focusing on cooperative advantage, this regional bloc attempts to 
undermine economic hierarchies through shared growth and development.282  
As Correa stated himself in 2015, Latin American countries needed to upset the 
economically constructed “immoral world order” by joining together… 
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“Para construir la Patria Grande, que ya no sólo un sueño, sino una necesidad de 
supervivencia.”  
“To construct the Great Fatherland, which is not only a dream, but rather a necessity for 
survival.”283 
 
Here, Correa calls upon a powerful historical concept rooted in the writings of Simon Bolivar to 
express the necessity of Latin American cooperation to the survival of states within the region. 
Essentially, if ALBA-TCP countries come together, expand their membership to include the rest 
of Latin America, and cooperate economically, then they would be able to form a “Patria 
Grande” to rival European and American empires. Therefore, by supporting the ALBA-TCP, the 
Correa administration pushed for greater preservation of Ecuadorian and Latin American 
autonomy. 
 The ALBA-TCP has not been very successful in this endeavor, however, for a few 
reasons. First, because there are few requirements for entry into the organization, there are 
similarly very few standards for member nations to be held to. Accordingly, tangible economic 
adjustments in accordance with ALBA-TCP’s mission have been limited. In fact, in relation to 
economics, despite the high goals of ALBA-TCP and its minor achievements, it now appears the 
organization has done little but “collectively endorse [its] members’ claims to national 
sovereignty.”284 Secondly, the organization has recently been unable to select a leader, exposing 
the lack of coordination and general chaos that has enveloped the leadership of ALBA-TCP for 
the past four years. This has led several members to leave the organization, with Ecuador leaving 
in 2018. While this decision was also impacted by Maduro’s repressive policies in Venezuela 
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and the accession of Moreno to the presidency, Ecuador’s leaders ultimately reoriented 
themselves away from ALBA-TCP and towards the United States and pro-U.S. institutions.285  
Ultimately, although Ecuador’s participation in the ALBA-TCP was driven by a 
historically constructed desire for autonomy, ALBA-TCP membership did not produce that 
result. This is not to say Moreno’s decision to back out of the institution was a better push 
towards autonomy. Theoretically, Moreno could have stayed within the ALBA-TCP and pushed 
for reform from its less radical members and helped the organization construct clearer economic 
guidelines. Remaining with the ALBA-TCP, which has explicitly anti-U.S. origins, would have 
made Moreno’s turn to the United States difficult.  
Conclusion 
What does Ecuador’s struggle for autonomy tell us about the evolving relationship 
between China, the United States, and Latin America? First, it is clear that Ecuadorian leaders 
make choices guided by a historically constructed desire for autonomy. Correa pushed for greater 
sovereignty and autonomy through the rejection of American imperialism and by turning towards 
China and the ALBA-TCP as alternative avenues of economic and political support. As these 
avenues proved unsuccessful at preserving Ecuador’s autonomy, Moreno eventually would turn 
back to the United States and leave the ALBA-TCP, championing decreased economic 
dependency and political corruption. It is likely that Moreno left the ALBA-TCP under pressure 
from the United States considering the anti-American bent of that regional bloc, suggesting that 
Ecuador’s dependence on external actors has frustrated its pursuit for greater autonomy. 
The Argentine Republic 
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Many historical similarities exist between Ecuador and Argentina’s—dependence on 
primary goods, succession of military dictatorships, widespread corruption, foreign debt, etc. For 
this reason, Argentina has also found itself largely caught between BRI investments and IMF 
loans. However, while Argentina has also initiated various Chinese-directed infrastructure 
projects, as of now, none of those projects have played out as catastrophically as the Coca Codo 
Sinclair project. In addition, Chinese investment within Argentina has increased significantly in 
the past decade, but that investment is still dwarfed by American investments as of early 2019.286 
This means that, unlike Ecuador, Chinese investment has hardly had a massive impact on 
Argentina’s financial situation (or, at least, certainly not the way the IMF has) and Chinese 
infrastructure projects have not had the kind of disastrous results that Ecuador experienced. 
Nevertheless, Argentina, like Ecuador, has struggled to find historically desired autonomy in the 
evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America. This is because 
Argentina continues to run a damaging trade deficit with China and relies too heavily on the 
United States and IMF for loans to cover its massive debt. Meanwhile, even though Mercosur 
has been more successful for Argentina than the ALBA-TCP has been for Ecuador, efforts to 
strengthen regional trade through Mercosur have not done much to develop Argentina’s ability to 
pursue a third way. The following explores Argentina’s history prior to and relationship with the 
BRI in order to illustrate this struggle. 
Argentina Before the BRI 
 Argentina’s history is rife with years of political chaos, coups, and military governments. 
These turbulent events have had a lasting impact on Argentina’s modern political landscape, 
especially in relation to the deeply entrenched hostilities between political parties and the 
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public’s lack of trust in the government. Nonetheless, regardless of their location along the 
political spectrum, Argentine leaders have pushed for greater autonomy and economic growth. 
Sometimes this has involved cooperating with dominant powers, while other times it has 
involved conflict, if not outright war as in the Malvinas War. Regardless of their relations with 
Europe and the United States, autonomy has played a vital role in the choices of Argentine 
leaders, and this has both motivated and conditioned Argentina’s relations with China.  
At the start of the 19th century, Argentina, like many other Latin American nations, won 
its war of independence against Spain. Bloodshed and civil conflict, however, continued between 
competing political factions in Argentina until around the 1860s with the establishment of a 
strong central government. Shortly after, the expansion of railways and ports during the end of 
the 19th century contributed to Argentina’s economic growth by facilitating the transportation 
and sale of grain and beef throughout the country.287 The following decades were less forgiving 
economically, however. During the First World War, Argentina struggled to sell its grain and 
beef to European markets it depended heavily upon. Despite this economic turmoil, reforms to 
the Argentine political system during this same period pushed the nation towards democracy.288 
The Sáenz Peña Law of 1912, for instance, dramatically amended Argentina’s voting process by 
making the vote obligatory and secret. This reduced voter intimidation and corruption, leading to 
freer and fairer elections.289 Despite these changes, when the economy began to struggle once 
again, a handful of military and political leaders staged a successful coup in 1930, consolidated 
power, and initiated what is often referred to as the “Infamous Decade.” During this time, 
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significant opposition parties were excluded from elections and a combination of fraud, graft, 
and force kept the military government in power for over a decade.  
This era of corruption further entrenched existing governmental favoritism towards 
American and European companies. Many leaders offered special deals for American and 
European companies in an attempt to stabilize national trade and/or to reap personal rewards. 
These relationships were hardly new—British companies dominated railroads in Argentina for 
decades—but prominent treaties engendered great frustration among the Argentine public.290 A 
glaring example is the Roca-Runciman Treaty of 1933, which secured a market for Argentine 
beef in Britain. This treaty protected Argentine primary goods but, in return, Argentina agreed 
not to develop industries that may compete with British interests in Argentina.291 This treaty and 
similar developments led political leaders and protesters to advocate for greater Argentine 
autonomy, and the legitimacy of the military government came under increasing attack.  
After the government of the late 1930s began to descend into chaos, another military 
insurgency stepped up to overthrow the corrupt political regime in 1943. Still engrossed in the 
tumultuous international politics of the Second World War, this new regime struggled to escape 
mounting pressure set upon the economy by U.S. sanctions. Concurrently, Juan Domingo Perón, 
a military figure new to politics, quickly seized the opportunity presented by his bureaucratic 
relations with labor unions to garner favor among the public. Under immense pressure from 
Perón’s supporters, the military government eventually held open and fair elections in 1946, 
which Perón was able to win with ease. It is important to note that, seeing Perón and his allies as 
potential fascists and supporters of the Axis, U.S. diplomat to Argentina Spruille Braden openly 
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criticized Perón and denounced his candidacy. This did not undermine Perón, however. In fact, 
Branden merely provided Perón with rhetorical ammunition. Capitalizing on Argentine 
frustration with foreign interference in the economy and politics, Perón used the slogan “Braden 
or Perón” to indicate that he would champion Argentina’s autonomy, unlike his rivals, who were 
in the pocket of foreign companies.292  
Serving as Argentina’s leader from 1946-1955, Perón found himself caught within the 
geopolitical/ideological battle of the Cold War. However, Perón made it clear that his political 
ideology, aptly named Peronismo but also known as Justicialism, was neither capitalist nor 
communist. Instead of taking the side of the United States or Soviet Union, Perón advocated for 
a third way, suggesting that “capitalism has failed and so has communism,” so “another system 
must be sought.”293 Whether Peronismo was an ideologically cohesive third way is up for debate. 
Because of its complicated history, Peronismo has been called an ideology of the left and right, 
corporatism and fascism, and nationalism and populism. Perón’s government was highly 
involved in the economy and protectionist, but his policies did not fit neatly into any existing 
dichotomy.294 
Regardless, the rise of Perón and Peronismo was a real concern for officials in the United 
States, whose greatest fear was “that of a southern bloc dominated by Argentina.”295 This fear 
was not imaginary either, seeing as countries like Peru and Cuba began to turn towards 
Argentina for support in resisting “Yanqui Imperialism,” support which Perón readily 
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supplied.296 Thus, Perón was able to challenge U.S. authority over their “backyard” through 
strengthening ties with other Latin American nations. When combined with his ISI strategy that 
attempted to reduce Argentine dependency on the trade of primary goods, it is clear that Perón 
pushed for Argentine and, indeed, Latin American autonomy more than just rhetorically. 
However, Perón’s repressive policies and increasing tensions with the Catholic Church led to an 
explosive coup in 1955 that ended his presidency. Perón was forced into exile in Spain, and a 
new government took power.297  
The decades that followed were violent and chaotic. Multiple attempts to form a stable 
government failed. Labor unions clashed with police forces and private, paramilitary units, 
highlighting lingering divisions between supporters of Peronism, which had been outlawed after 
Perón’s exile, and its opponents. The new government attempted to peel away Perón’s policies, 
reducing the government’s involvement in Argentina’s economy. This step away from Perón’s 
policies led to restored relations with the United States and allowed the government to apply for 
IMF loans.298 A rapid succession of weak political leaders and military juntas dominated 
Argentina’s government until Perón was able to return to Argentina in 1973, but his return, 
tainted by the Ezeiza massacre, in which at least 13 people were killed and over 300 wounded in 
a violent clash between Peronist and anti-Peronist forces, showed that Perón brought little 
stability to the self-destructive political system.299    
When Perón died suddenly of a heart attack after less than a year back in Argentina, the 
violence that had existed for decades between leftist guerrillas like the Montoneros and rightest 
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death squads like the Triple A escalated rapidly. By 1976, military leaders once again stepped up 
and wrestled power from the presiding president, Perón’s second wife.300 Once in power, these 
conservative military leaders did not deescalate the violence that had ravaged Argentina’s 
political system. Instead, they institutionalized complex forms of repression and established an 
advanced network of state terrorism that would take the lives of an estimated 20,000 
Argentines.301 This “Dirty War” attempted to systematically quash remaining Peronist forces or 
critics of the government like famous journalist Rodolfo Walsh. The Argentine government 
executed men and women through firing squads, “death flights,” and public executions.302 
Children born to detained mothers were sent to new families while the mothers were 
“disappeared” or “transferred.”303Initially, this program of mass killings was conducted without 
foreign assistance. Later, the military leaders began coordinating with the United States under 
Operation Condor in the late 1970s, ultimately synthesizing French and U.S. counterinsurgency 
tactics to wage war on opponents to the military.304 This U.S. support would later be 
memorialized in public monuments and museums recognizing the horrors of the Dirty War, 
allowing the legacy of U.S. intervention in Argentina to linger in the nation’s historic memory.305  
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The fall of this harsh military regime only came after the catastrophic the War of the 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands.306 By 1980, the government faced massive unrest for a variety of 
reasons. Not only was the economy in dire straits as rampant inflation set in, but the numerous 
political opponents had begun to fiercely demand a transition to democracy.307 As military 
leaders under President Leopoldo Galtieri desperately sought ways to garner popular support 
from the regime, they found their apparent solution in a 150-year-old territorial dispute with the 
British. The center of the dispute was a small cluster of islands off of Argentina’s southeastern 
coast that had been controlled by Britain since 1833 and whose population identified almost 
entirely as British. Nevertheless, seeing the reclamation of the Malvinas (and other small islands 
like South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands) as an opportunity to gain support and flex the 
military junta’s commitment to preserving Argentine autonomy, Argentina invaded these islands 
in April 1982. Since there was immense support for the reclamation of the Malvinas by the 
Argentina public and served little strategic value to the British, the military assumed a swift 
capture of the islands would help shore up its dwindling political support.308 This exemplary 
display of “Wag the Dog” or “Diversionary War” ended badly for the Argentine government, 
however, when British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sent a massive naval force to reclaim 
the islands. After a bloody confrontation, Argentine forces surrendered in June, and the military 
junta capitulated to a transition to democracy shortly after.309 
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Despite the uncertainty that characterized the rest of the 20th century, the new democratic 
government was able to obtain a moderate level of political stability. Control of government 
oscillated between Argentina’s Radical party and a new branch of Peronists led by Carlos Saúl 
Menem, who championed neo-liberal reforms to Argentina’s shattered economy. Two notable 
reforms were the creation of Mercosur in 1995, a shared market organization in South America 
that helped Argentina open its markets, and the restructuring of Argentina’s currency so it was 
tied to the dollar.310 These reforms were able to stop runaway inflation, but increasing 
unemployment and continued dependence on grain sales kept Argentina’s economy from 
recovering from the disastrous decades under the military junta.311 When combined with unstable 
fiscal policy and mounting external pressures, Argentina’s economy collapsed in the late 1990s, 
leading to the 2001 “Argentinazo.”312 Argentinazo was an explosive popular revolt across 
Argentina that lasted roughly twelve days. During this time, the country cycled through five 
presidents and defaulted on its $95 billion debt, which is the largest default in history.313 
Argentinazo was the culmination of decades of mounting frustration among the Argentine public 
with corrupt government officials, unsuccessful IMF reforms, and general economic instability. 
An independent report by the IMF released in 2004 notes that, while weak political institutions 
and inconsistent domestic fiscal policy were largely responsible for this crisis, reforms pushed by 
the IMF prior to 2001 were, in fact, unsustainable and contributed to the crisis.314 Regardless of 
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the IMF’s actual level of responsibility, many Argentines would blame the IMF for the country’s 
default and lead campaigns of vehement opposition to the IMF in later years. 
This history of Argentina highlights key themes related to Argentine autonomy and sets 
the scene for the entry of Chinese investment in the 21st century. First, speaking to themes, 
Argentina has a mixed history in relation to European and American relations. While Argentine 
leaders have often relied on European countries for economic support, this has generally led to 
great criticisms from the public. This popular demand for greater independence from Europeans 
is best illustrated by the Malvinas War. Meanwhile, whether during the early Peronist years or in 
recent decades related to its participation in Argentina’s Dirty War, the United States has 
received significant negative attention as an interloper in Argentine politics. The IMF’s 
reputational issue in the 21st century has not helped the United States case either. This has 
especially affected Argentina’s position in the evolving relationship between China, the United 
States, and Latin America. As China increases its economic investment in and diplomatic ties 
with Argentina, this anti-United States/anti-IMF sentiment has guided Argentine leaders’ 
responses to the BRI.  
Argentina and China 
Although Argentina and China formally established relations in the 1970s, it was not 
until the early 2000s when the two nations established significant relations. The notable 
Argentine presidents during this period—Néstor Carlos Kirchner Jr. (2003-2007), Cristina 
Elisabeth Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015), and Mauricio Macri (2015-2019)—have each 
fostered unique and complicated relationships with Chinese investors, CCP officials, and BRI 
projects.315 The first of these two, President Néstor Kirchner and President Cristina Fernández, 
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were not only from the same Peronist party, they were married. This does not mean they had 
identical approaches to China, however. In fact, all three of these leaders struck a unique balance 
between working with China, the United States, and finding a third way in the South American 
common market, Mercosur. It is important to note that, when compared to Ecuador, there were 
greater challenges to Chinese investment in Argentina that impeded the progression of many 
infrastructure projects. Specifically, domestic political barriers and Sinophobia, while also 
present in Ecuador, have led Argentina to view numerous BRI projects with heightened scrutiny 
and, therefore, depend less on Chinese loans.    
A key turning point in Argentine-Chinese relations came in 2003, when President Néstor 
Kirchner initiated “a much more autonomous policy” that those of his neoliberal predecessors, 
“with traces of anti-Americanism, which defined a new shift in foreign policy.”316 Part of this 
shift involved seeking new sources of foreign markets and financial investment since, after the 
default of 2001, Argentina had little access to European or American markets and loans. 
Kirchner found this alternative in China in 2004. In a series of negotiations in which Kirchner 
first visited Beijing and later Chinese leader Hu Jintao visited Buenos Aires, Kirchner 
successfully strengthened Argentina’s access to Chinese consumer markets and opened up 
Argentina for $20 billion in Chinese investment to be distributed over the course of ten years.317  
Access to the Chinese consumer market was vital in assisting in the recovery of 
Argentina’s economy because of one crucial agricultural product: soybeans. Not only is 
Argentina one of the main producers of soybeans in the world, China’s massive population and 
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high demand for soybeans, combined with the unusually high price of soybeans in 2004, helped 
Argentina acquire cash that was desperately needed to combat the recession. Over the long term, 
this created a large trade imbalance—China only purchased cheap primary goods from Argentina 
while Argentina purchased  more expensive finished goods from China—but the short term gains 
were vital to economic stabilization during the crisis.318 In return, Argentina recognized China as 
a “market economy” (an important distinction in relation to China’s struggle to gain market 
economy status in the WTO) and reduced trade barriers to Chinese imports.319 Although this was 
in no way the beginning of economic relations between China and Argentina, the meeting 
between Hu and Kirchner marked a point of inflection in relations between the two countries.  
The following years would only lead to greater economic and political connections 
between China and Argentina. Once Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was elected to the 
presidency in 2007, she maintained and strengthened ties between China and Argentina through 
similar diplomatic meetings and negotiations. Even though President Fernández de Kirchner first 
visited Beijing, the most notable of these meetings came in 2014, when Chinese President Xi 
Jinping visited Buenos Aires to negotiated specific projects and loans with President Fernández 
de Kirchner. The most notable of these projects were two massive hydroelectric dams in 
Argentina’s Patagonia region, and Argentina gained access to $7.5 billion in loans for these dams 
and similar projects.320 Later in 2015, President Fernández de Kirchner would add the 
construction of a space station and the inclusion of China Central Television (CCTV) on 
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Argentina’s channel listings.321 This last point may seem insignificant compared to the massive 
infrastructure projects and complex financial deals secured between China and Argentina, but it 
is essential to recall that the BRI is more than just an economic program. Throughout these 
negotiations, Chinese and Argentine leaders developed and cultural relationships that ultimately 
impact one another’s foreign policy choices.  
In this way, Presidents Néstor Kirchner and President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
secured various funds for development in Argentina. While many of these investments came 
prior to the official announcement of the BRI, the projects Chinese lenders took interest in 
anticipated those of the BRI and currently fall under the BRI’s loose definition. Like Ecuador 
and other “on-route” BRI countries, most funds went to infrastructure projects, including but not 
limited to railways, dams, and projects related to the extraction of oil and gas.322 All of these 
developments, as well as important symbolic gestures made during these diplomatic visits, 
illustrate Argentina and China’s growing interconnectedness.323 It is important to note, however, 
that President Kirchner and President Fernández de Kirchner’s turn to China did not equate to 
complete capitulation to the desires of Chinese businessmen. As mentioned above, domestic 
political barriers and Sinophobia brought many challenges to BRI investment despite this 
growing interconnectedness.  
Speaking first to domestic political barriers, various projects in Argentina have been 
interrupted or even canceled due to domestic political resistance in Argentina. For instance, in 
2010, a Chinese agriculture company, the Heilongjiang Beidahuang Nongken (HBN), began 
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working with local leaders in Argentina’s Patagonia region. This company, one of China’s 
largest, was attempting to secure access to Argentina’s soy market through a deal with the 
province’s local government, but a law known as “Ley de Tierras,” or “Law of Lands” limited 
the amount of land that could be owned by foreign investors. When combined with outcry from 
environmental activists and a suspension issued to the deal by a superior court in the province, 
this project quickly faded out and was never complete.324 Similarly, in 2010, the Shaanxi Coal 
and Chemical Corp (SCC) pursued the construction of a methanol plant in Argentina’s southern-
most province, Tierra del Fuego. In exchange, the local government would insure SCC’s access 
to local sources of natural gas for 25 years. Like HBN, however, SCC was unable to overcome 
complex bureaucratic hurdles established by the local government, including a complicated 
bidding process and import restrictions. These challenges also eventually resulted in the 
cancellation of the project.325  
Sinophobia has also contributed to troubles for Chinese investors and has a long history 
in Latin America. In the late 19th and early 20th century, xenophobia directed at the Chinese was 
economic in origin, and Chinese workers were often scapegoated as the source of economic 
duress in Latin American communities.326 In Argentina specifically, long-standing historical 
narratives emphasize the white, European heritage of the nation. These narratives reflect 
Argentine society’s centuries-old marginalization of ethnic minorities. Today, even as Argentina 
works towards embracing multiculturalism, Asian ethnic minorities like the Chinese are often an 
afterthought, even in movements that are meant to combat xenophobia.327 This sentiment 
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continues despite deepening economic relations between China and Argentina, and is illustrated 
in Argentine news network’s coverage of events related to China and Chinese culture within 
Argentina.328 The epitome of this Sinophobia came from an offensive tweet sent by President 
Fernández de Kirchner during a visit to China. On her personal twitter in February of 2015, 
President Fernández de Kirchner mocked Chinese pronunciation of Spanish words like “arroz” 
(rice) in a blatant display of racism.329 Other officials in the Argentine government have gone 
beyond insensitive cultural comments. In 2013, Diego Guelar, Argentina’s ambassador to China, 
wrote a scholarly monograph titled “The Silent Invasion: The Chinese Landing in South 
America.” Not only does this book take an alarmist perspective on Chinese investment, it uses 
derogatory language in its title by referring to the Chinese as “invaders.”330 Clearly, Sinophobia 
is pervasive in Argentina, and it has had a tangible impact on Chinese projects in Argentina. For 
instance, while the HBN project faced heightened scrutiny under the “Ley de Tierras” and 
struggled to acquire 330,000 hectares of land, an Italian company nearby possessed 900,000 
 
328 Similar to other parts of the world, anti-Chinese sentiment often manifests in a general anti-Asian sentiment, 
since many of Korean descent, for example, are still labeled “chinos.” “La fascinación argentina por los ‘chinos’, los 
‘negros’ y los ‘gallegos,’” BBC News Mundo, accessed April 28, 2020, 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/09/150923_fooc_argentina_apodos_chino_negro_gallego_irm; Ariel C. 
Armony and Nicolás Velásquez, “Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Latin America: An Analysis of Online Discourse,” 
Journal of Chinese Political Science 20, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 319–46, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-015-
9365-z. 
329 This is not the only controversial tweet President Fernández has made about China either. The day after a 
demonstration related to the mysterious death of Ablerto Nissman, an official investigating both the 1994 and 
President Fernández’s relations with Iran, President Fernández tweeted “En el horóscopo chino soy serpiente. 
Cuando en la cena, en China, le comente al Presidente Xi Jinping y su esposa…” which translates to “in the Chinese 
horoscope, I am a snake. During dinner, in China, President Xi Jinping and his wife commented on this…” The 
cryptic timing and nature of this tweet has reinforced popular Argentine belief that Nissman was murderd by the 
government, while simultaneously illustrating President Fernández’s willingness to publically make fun of Chinese 
culture. Dexter Filkins, “A Deadly Conspiracy in Buenos Aires?,” The New Yorker, accessed April 30, 2020, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/20/death-of-a-prosecutor; Robert Mackey, “Argentina’s President 
Mocks Chinese Accents During Visit to China,” The New York Times, February 4, 2015, sec. World, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/world/americas/argentinas-president-mocks-chinese-accents-during-visit-to-
china.html. 
330 Diego Guelar, La invasión silenciosa: El desembarco chino en América del Sur (Penguin Random House Grupo 
Editorial Argentina, 2013). 
Bullock 142 
hectares unchallenged.331 In a time in which Sinophobia and general anti-Asian racism is on the 
rise across the world due to the COVID-19 crisis, it is difficult to imagine this challenge 
diminishing for Chinese companies any time soon.   
Thus, even though at the national level both Presidents Kirchner and President Fernández 
de Kirchner advocated for closer relations with China, neither actively ensured that local barriers 
to Chinese investment were dissolved or even reduced. In fact, the “Ley de Tierras” was 
promulgated under President Fernández de Kirchner, so there is evidence to suggest that these 
leaders actually restricted Chinese access to Argentine markets despite these warmer relations.332 
This is a marked difference from Ecuadorian leaders like Correa, who did little to ensure 
Ecuador’s autonomy was preserved in dealing with China. Of course, it is important to note that, 
as shown above, Argentine pushes for autonomy was uneven and entrenched in Sinophobia. 
Nevertheless, this desire for autonomy potentially shielded the Argentine economy from 
exploitation at the levels that Ecuador experienced. 
This is not to say that Argentina was walled off from significant Chinese investment and 
trade. As mentioned above, Argentina received massive Chinese investments and China quickly 
became Argentina’s second largest trading partner, surpassing the United States and trailing only 
Brazil by 2008. That status remains today and has served to benefit both China and Argentina in 
unexpected ways. For instance, after African Swine Fever decimated China’s pig population and 
pork supply in 2019, Argentina was able to secure a substantial, multi-million ton pork deal.333 
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Furthermore, lucrative Chinese investments have led to the progression and completion of 
significant infrastructure projects in Argentina despite the challenges mentioned above. Most of 
these projects began development during President Fernández de Kirchner’s term but progressed 
into her successor, President Macri’s, term. To complicate matters further, although President 
Macri initially attempted to distance himself from Chinese investments, mounting pressure from 
the Chinese government (specifically through the reduction of soy purchases) changed Macri’s 
stance by 2017. This means that President Macri ended up supporting the very infrastructure 
projects that he had originally planned to dismiss.334 Analyzing three different types of projects 
highlights both the complicated nature of the BRI in Latin America and Argentine leaders 
struggle to maintain autonomy while navigating financial crises. 
First, Argentina’s renovation of the Belgrano Cargas Freight railway system between 
2004 and 2019 highlights the benefits of mutual cooperation between China and Argentina that 
the BRI offers. Prior to 2004, Argentina’s national railway system was highly underdeveloped, 
dangerous, and economically inefficient. Despite these issues, the potential of developing the 
railway system was enormous, since establishing a better freighting system would facilitate 
Argentina’s agricultural production and sale.335 Recognizing the potential benefits of such an 
investment, Hu Jintao and Néstor Kirchner included the repair of the railway system in their 
2004 memorandum of understanding. Yet it was not until 2010 when President Fernández de 
Kirchner secured a $10 billion loan from China that tangible plans for the railway’s development 
formed, and these plans have carried on during President Macri’s tenure. In 2019, the Belgrano 
Cargas Freight railway system had been vastly improved, reducing the cost of freighting within 
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Argentina and (importantly) facilitating China’s access to markets in Latin America. It is also 
important to note that since most of these railways already existed and are merely being 
improved, Chinese investment has minimal impact on the environment and required no new land 
contracts.336 It is likely that these circumstances contributed to the absence of the barriers that the 
HBN and SCC projects faced, which explains why this project was eventually completed  in 
2019. Ultimately, the expansion of this railway system is an example of Chinese companies 
making successful and meaningful investments in Argentina that benefit the Argentine economy.   
Second, strategic and technological projects like the creation of the Neuquén Province 
space station mark the controversy that surrounds certain BRI projects and, more importantly, 
show that just because a project is built with little regulation does not mean that Argentina 
cannot regain oversight over the project. Originally negotiated in 2012, the Neuquén Province 
space station was essentially a bargaining chip used by President Fernández de Kirchner to 
secure a currency swap with the Chinese government. The subsequent construction of the project 
was conducted with substantial secrecy and little Argentine oversight.337 The base itself houses a 
satellite meant to facilitate China’s ambitions of landing on the far side of the moon, which was 
accomplished in 2019. Despite this proclaimed intent, international and local observers have 
speculated that the station has nefarious military purposes. These accusations range anywhere 
from U.S. Admiral Faller’s suggestion that “the degree of military activity at [the Neuquén 
Province space station] is extremely concerning to the security of the United States” to local 
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radio station managers noting that “people are afraid” of the base and believe it has military 
purposes.338  
Regardless of the merit behind any of these claims, this heightened attention ultimately 
leads to tighter Argentine control over the project. Indeed, Argentine senators put forth 
legislation in 2019 that would provide Argentina with greater oversight over the facility.339 Once 
again, domestic political concerns have challenged BRI projects. Similarly, it is likely that 
Sinophobia contributed to the heightened scrutiny of this project, especially considering the fact 
that the United States was approved to construct an “Emergency Operations Center” in the same 
province with significantly less outcry.340 In both cases, protection of Argentine autonomy was at 
the heart of local concerns, a sentiment best captured by a quote from a Neuquén lawyer 
interviewed about the station: “Surrendering sovereignty in your own country is shameful.”341 
Although these challenges are essentially identical to the ones that prevented the completion of 
the HBN and SCC projects, their retroactive nature ensured that the project was completed and 
subsequently brought under greater scrutiny. This allowed Argentina to secure a desperately 
needed currency swap and minimize any infringement upon Argentine autonomy the base may 
cause. The Neuquén space station example demonstrates that Argentina can benefit from BRI 
negotiations and minimize infringements on its autonomy, even when the project brings no 
immediate benefit to the Argentine economy and instead mainly benefits China.342 
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Lastly, impending projects related to producing sustainable energy underscore the real 
risk Argentina runs of falling into the same trappings as Ecuador. Specifically, massive energy-
related projects like could still turn out like the Coca Codo Sinclair dam if Argentina does not 
maintain rigorous standards for Chinese investments. A key example of the potential risks 
Argentina runs with BRI infrastructure projects is captured by the controversial Atucha III 
nuclear power plant that has been in limbo for several years. The original agreement between 
China and Argentina to begin developing nuclear energy sources in the province of Córdoba 
came in 2015. Like many of the BRI projects in Argentina, the Atucha III nuclear power plant 
was initially negotiated under President Fernández but subsequently renegotiated under President 
Macri. While President Fernández de Kirchner had been fairly lenient in defining the loose 
parameters of the project, President Macri was far more hesitant to sign on to the project, 
questioning the viability of nuclear energy as a cost-effective resource. Nevertheless, after the 
onset of another financial crisis in Argentina (from which the nation has yet to recover), 
President Macri capitulated and reached a $10 billion agreement approving the construction of 
Atucha III. This occurred despite activist resistance, and, although the global COVID-19 
pandemic has left this project suspended indefinitely, the project was otherwise slated to enter 
into operation in 2021.343 Since Argentina’s current President Alberto Fernández has been 
generally supportive of strengthening ties with China, it is likely that the project will be 
completed following the pandemic.344  
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It is crucial to note how this project is similar and different to the projects that led to 
Ecuador’s greater dependence on China and, consequently, diminished autonomy. Unlike the 
Belgrano Cargas Freight and Neuquén projects, Atucha III, much like the Sinclair dam, raises 
significant risks for the environment in Argentina. Moreover, if Atucha III were to underperform 
as the Sinclair dam did, it would become increasingly difficult for Argentina to pay back its debt 
to China, landing it in a debt trap similar to Ecuador. In addition, while there have certainly been 
tragic incidents related to the Sinclair dam, the potential of a nuclear meltdown and the general 
dangers of radiation involved with nuclear material makes the humanitarian risk of such a project 
far more significant. This concern has been reflected in certain regions in Argentina (the 
province of Rio Negro made nuclear energy within the province completely illegal), but not in a 
way that has impacted Atucha III.345 While these are speculations, the comparatively lower 
levels of scrutiny applied to this project raises questions about the viability of high risk projects 
in Argentina. As the Argentine pursues similar high stakes energy projects like The Condor Cliff 
and La Barrancosa dams and summarily dismisses the glaring environmental risks of such 
projects, it is increasingly apparent that Argentina runs the risk of replicating Ecuador’s 
experience with the BRI. 
In summary, the relative success of the BRI infrastructure projects described above marks 
a key difference between Argentina and Ecuador. Ecuador had high levels of corruption and a 
desperate economic situation, leading to less scrutinized projects, increased predatory practices, 
and a reduction in Ecuador’s autonomy. Meanwhile, although the economic situation in the early 
2000s was similarly dismal and corruption is still present, Argentina’s numerous domestic 
political barriers and high levels of Sinophobia slowed BRI construction. This meant higher 
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scrutiny, less predatory practices, and less Chinese infringement on Argentine autonomy. It is 
important to note the qualifier “less,” since Argentina has still developed a large trade imbalance 
with China, grown dependent on its foreign market, and remains susceptible to future BRI 
related exploitation. Regardless, while Argentina has better managed to avoid Chinese 
exploitation, it has struggled significantly to meaningfully alter its relationship with the United 
States and IMF. 
Argentina and The United States 
As with Chinese-Argentine relations, Argentina has found more success in navigating its 
relationship with the United States than Ecuador over the past two decades. The key difference 
between Ecuador and Argentina in this respect is Argentina’s ability to challenge the U.S. 
military’s relatively exclusive rights to operate in the Southern Cone by strengthening military 
ties with China. This military relationship is markedly different from Moreno’s allowance of 
U.S. military operations within Ecuador. Argentina has also found small economic victories by 
exploiting tensions between China and the United States during the so-called “trade war.” 
Nevertheless, much like Ecuador, financial instability in Argentina has forced the government to 
rely heavily on the IMF and abide by Washington Consensus reforms. Since some of this 
financial stability was caused by U.S. financial developments like the raising of U.S. interest 
rates, it is clear that Argentina still struggles to find economic autonomy free of the influence the 
U.S. or the financial institutions U.S. the U.S. champions like the IMF.  
In 2007, President Néstor Kirchner spoke to the United Nations General Assembly about 
a variety of issues facing Argentina and the global community, with Argentine sovereignty 
playing a key role throughout. The best examples of this emphasis on sovereignty came from his 
very bold comments on the continued British occupation of the Malvinas. Before the General 
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Assembly, Kirchner noted that “My country has always said it is prepared to resume negotiations 
regarding [Argentina’s] sovereignty… it is incomprehensible for us that the United Kingdom 
refuses to negotiate this matter.” These bold assertions of Argentine sovereignty were 
accompanied by more nuanced criticisms of actors who infringe upon international autonomy. 
Specifically, President Kirchner criticized Bush’s war on terrorism. After mentioning the UN’s 
rejection of the invasion of Iraq and the disasters that occurred there, President Kirchner argued 
that “action against terrorism must be sustained and multilateral” (Emphasis added). In this way, 
President Kirchner questioned Washington’s unilateral actions and boldly challenged its 
interventionist practices. President Kirchner also questioned the IMF, insisting that “there are 
other ways to ensure development and integration. We cannot apply one model for all systems. 
Every country has the right to choose its own path… we believe that the international monetary 
architecture needs to be changed, in particular that of the IMF.”346 In this short speech, President 
Kirchner articulated Argentine leadership’s strong desire to protect their autonomy, avoid 
economic exploitation, and, ultimately, push back against U.S. hegemony. Although in 
subsequent years Argentina would find some success in pursuing these objectives, various 
obstacles still trouble Argentina’s struggle to find autonomy in the face of U.S. influence. 
Economically, the IMF serves as one of these hurdles to Argentine leadership. Although 
the IMF is not an official U.S. institution in any way, the GDP-based voting system within the 
IMF guarantees that no loan can be created without U.S. approval. This essentially means that 
when Argentina is at the mercy of the IMF, it is likewise at the mercy of the United States. This 
is important to note because, as covered briefly above, Argentina has a long history with the IMF 
that is not particularly positive. Starting a few years prior to the crisis in 2001, the IMF began to 
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work with Argentina to restructure its economy. This restructuring was unable to stave off the 
on-set of the 200l recession, leading many Argentines to question the utility of the IMF. In fact, 
many blamed the IMF as a cause of the crisis, and the IMF has had a strained reputation in 
Argentina since 2001. This issue resurfaced in 2018 after President Macri turned to the IMF in 
an attempt to curtail rising inflation, unemployment, and slow economic growth.347  
In the face of this desperate economic situation, which was largely caused by extensive 
spending programs of President Fernández de Kirchner, President Macri lobbied the IMF for 
financial relief, even relying on personal ties with U.S. President Donald Trump in order to 
secure the U.S. essential support. In fact, President Macri went on to specifically thank President 
Trump for his assistance with the IMF during President Trump’s visit to Buenos Aires. However, 
in a somewhat comical and infamous moment, Trump remarked that his translation ear piece had 
not been functioning. For this reason, he replied to very little of what Macri actually said, but 
instead spoke at length of the two leaders’ personal relationship, suggesting that they had 
“known each other a long while” and that they were “going to be talking about lots of good 
things for Argentina, for the United States, including trade, including military purchases, and 
other things.” After thanking President Trump for assistance with the IMF, Marci continued to 
note the important partnerships between the United States and Argentina—battling drug-
trafficking and supporting U.S. investments—signifying that U.S. aid with the IMF would not go 
unrewarded.348 Since Macri had begun his presidency with the intent to avoid negotiations with 
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the IMF, this moment exposed the growing dependence that Argentina has on the United States 
and IMF due to its fragile economy.349  
This growing dependence (i.e. sacrifice of autonomy) has not resolved Argentina’s 
economic troubles. After receiving a massive bailout of $57 billion, it initially seemed as though 
Macri had secured a crucial lifeline that would allow his administration’s policy of gradual 
liberalism to regain control of Argentina’s economic situation. This turned out not to be the case, 
however, and inflation persisted at above 50% into 2019, pushing the economy into further 
disarray. As in 2001, the public was outraged. In response to Macri’s first announcement that he 
was turning to the IMF for aid, thousands of protesters took to the streets in Buenos Aires to 
condemn the Macri government. For these protesters, the IMF was the root of the collapse in 
2001 and depending on it again would cause another.350 Although, as in 2001, the roots of 
Argentina’s economic problems did not stem from the IMF, this second failure has been seen as 
a misstep on the part of the IMF and an overall embarrassment for the institution. More 
importantly, this crisis reinforced many Argentines' perception of the IMF as an enemy of the 
nation and a threat to national autonomy.351 
As of 2020, even though Argentina has paid back $44 billion of its debt to the IMF, 
Argentina’s newest President, Alberto Ángel Fernández, faces the possibility of another 
sovereign default on Argentina’s overwhelming debt.352 President Alberto Fernández, a Peronist 
elected at the end of 2019, has shown signs that he will respond to this crisis with similar policies 
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as Néstor Kirchner did in 2001 in a hope to recreate Kirchner’s success. Most importantly, 
President Alberto Fernández has shown a willingness to turn to China as an alternative to the 
United States and IMF, as the Kirchners had done in years prior.353 It is far too early to tell how 
he will respond to Argentina’s crisis, especially with chaos caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. 
However, it is important to note the similarities that exist between Argentina and Ecuador in 
their relations with the IMF. After both failed to achieve economic stability independent of the 
IMF, each state had to turn back towards the IMF in order to secure vital loans and bailouts. Not 
only did these loans fail to bring stability to either economy, but each state’s dependence on the 
IMF led to increased pandering to the interests of the United States. Thus, because the United 
States controls such a vital vote share in the IMF, when Ecuador and Argentina turned to the 
IMF for support, they simultaneously turned to the United States. 
Of course, Argentina has maintained strong economic ties with the United States for 
decades and has had considerably greater U.S. investment than Chinese investment despite 
growing BRI projects within Argentina. In 2018, total U.S. foreign direct investment in 
Argentina was $15.2 billion.354 Meanwhile, over the course of ten years, 2008-2018, Chinese 
foreign direct investment in Argentina was only 12.5 billion dollars, less than one year of U.S. 
investment.355 Moreover, Argentina signed multiple economic agreements with the United States 
in 2016 during Macri’s presidency like the “Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.” This 
document established a United States-Argentina Council on Trade and reaffirmed Argentine 
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trade relations with the United States.356 The continuation of such trade relations is crucial to 
note because, although China is now Argentina’s second greatest trading partner, the United 
States ranks closely at third.357 Thus, while Argentina has certainly turned more to China for 
trade and investment in recent years, this in no way means that the United States has fallen into 
obscurity. Instead, the United States, whether through the IMF of bilateral relations, remains an 
influential actor in relation to Argentina’s economic stability.  
Where Argentina has struggled to escape U.S. economic influence, it has found much 
greater success in challenging U.S. military control in the Southern Cone. This has often 
unnerved United States military personnel and brought direct criticism from high ranking 
members, such as SOUTHCOM commander Admiral Faller. Two developments in particular 
have elicited concern from U.S. officials: a 2015 agreement between President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner and President Xi Jinping to purchase Chinese weaponry and establish the 
aforementioned space station in Patagonia. These developments have in not dramatically cut 
U.S. military capabilities in any meaningful way, especially considering the fact that the 2015 
agreement never was implemented. However, U.S. response to China’s military presence in 
Argentina demonstrates the powerful concern U.S. officials have for any increase of China’s 
military in Latin America. By pursuing these developments despite this response, Argentine 
leaders have shown their willingness to challenge U.S. hemispheric authority and advocate for 
their own autonomy. 
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In respect to the sale of arms, President Fernández de Kirchner and President Xi made a 
series of non-legally binding agreements that encouraged greater coordination between Chinese 
and Argentine military forces. Importantly, this coordination included the incorporation of 
Chinese technology and weaponry, which far out-classed Argentina’s antiquated military 
equipment, into various branches of Argentina’s military. This included but was not limited to 14 
to 20 FC-1 fourth-generation fighter jets, five P-18N corvettes (small-class warships) to establish 
the Argentine Navy’s “Malvinas-class” offshore patrol mission, and 100 or more amphibious 
armored personnel carriers. While the transfer of these technologies and weaponry never 
occurred, the agreements expose two important points in relation to the evolving relationship 
between China, the United States, and Latin America. First, the issue of sovereignty and 
autonomy is not merely a rhetorical issue for countries in Latin America, and Argentina’s 
determination to someday reclaim the Malvinas is a key example of how far certain states are 
willing to go in order to push away European and American influence.  
Second, the U.S. response to these agreements is telling. A U.S.- China Economic and 
Security Review Commission report released shortly after the agreement, despite recognizing 
that “none of these agreements entail actual legal contracts,” warned that Argentina’s purchase of 
these weapons could contribute to the “constriction of U.S. military sales” in Latin America, the 
“potential creation of a security hazard,” the undermining of Argentine domestic stability and 
governance, and a “temporary intensification of [the] Falklands dispute.” To be clear, the tone of 
this independent report was in no way alarmist. In fact, the author ultimately suggests that these 
developments “present no direct security threat to the United States.”358 Nevertheless, the 
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government’s explicit recognition of these transfers as Argentina and China against U.S. interests 
shows American concern even for unlikely weapons purchases. 
In relation to the establishment of a space station in Patagonia, while the U.S. response to 
this action was already mentioned above, it is essential to note the deep concerns this station 
created for U.S. officials. In a report to Congress in 2019, the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission argued that the space station “could be used [by China] to collect 
intelligence on U.S. and other foreign satellites, missile launches, and drone movements” and 
“interfere with or compromise communications, electronic networks, and electromagnetic 
systems in the Western Hemisphere.”359 Other comments on the facility have been less technical 
in nature, instead condemning China’s intentions outright. For example, White House National 
Security Council spokesman Garrett Marquis stated that “the Patagonia ground station, agreed to 
in secret by a corrupt and financially vulnerable government a decade ago, is another example of 
opaque and predatory Chinese dealings that undermine the sovereignty of host nations.”360 This 
transparent duress shows that Argentina’s rejections of U.S. military authority are meaningful 
and deeply troubling to American foreign policy makers.  
In summation, Argentina, like Ecuador, remains highly dependent on the IMF and United 
States for economic support, especially in the past five years. Unlike Ecuador, however, 
Argentina has found success at challenging U.S. military authority in Latin America by 
negotiating arms deals with China and allowing China to build a space station in Patagonia. This 
is distinct from Ecuador’s experience considering Moreno’s administration has allowed the 
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United States to perform routine exercises within Ecuador’s borders. Ultimately, economic 
instability has ensured that both Ecuador and Argentina remain dependent on the IMF and 
United States, but Argentina’s ability to maintain beneficial relations with China has allowed 
Argentina to find more success in navigating the evolving relationship between China, the 
United States, and Latin America. 
Argentina and Mercosur 
As Argentina has done relatively well navigating this relationship, it has been better able 
to preserve its autonomy and pursue an alternative to choosing between China and the United 
States. Specifically, Argentina has been able to strategically position itself through its 
membership in the regional trade bloc known as Mercosur, or Southern Common Market. Today, 
this bloc, founded in 1991, represents a shared $3.4 trillion GDP between Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay.361 The original agreement, the Treaty of Asuncion, affirmed these four 
nations’ intent to establish a common market in the Southern Cone that facilitated economic 
development by reducing barriers to migration, investments, and trade.362 Similar to the 
European Union, Mercosur has a central decision-making body, the Common Market Council, 
that functions as a forum for coordinating regional economic priorities. By establishing 
Mercosur, these states intended to bolster regional cooperation and empower member states’ 
economic leverage in the world.  
Despite these professed goals, Mercosur states have struggled to cooperate since its 
creation, and individual economic crises have thrown the organization into disarray in the past. 
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For example, in 2001, Argentina’s economic crisis forced the government to grapple with 
currency destabilization and turn to Brazil for aid. Although Brazil was able to maintain trade 
with Argentina, subsequent disputes between the nations of the terms of trade in response to the 
crisis exposed Mercosur’s weak negotiating system.363 Later in 2011, Argentina began to raise 
barriers to imports as part of a protectionist shift, further undermining Mercosur’s free trade 
objectives and resulting in a significant reduction in trade between Argentina and its Mercosur 
partners in 2012. Questions surrounding membership also began to strain Mercosur’s members. 
Specifically, the bloc began to create more issues for itself by suspending Paraguay and, during 
Paraguay’s suspension, adding Venezuela to the group. Venezuela quickly became an issue 
because it showed no evidence of a willingness to actually adopt Mercosur’s shared external 
tariff, although its admission facilitated the sale of oil from Venezuela to Argentina and Brazil.364 
Overall, Mercosur has presented lofty goals that it struggled to follow for decades, and internal 
disputes, rather than external Chinese or American pressures, have served to undercut the 
regional bloc’s mission.  
Nevertheless, far from a failure, Mercosur has recently shown promise to help Argentina 
and other full member nations to increase economic growth. Mercosur’s recent agreement with 
the EU, for instance, has shown the importance of the regional trade bloc for improving 
Argentina’s economic standing. This deal, made in the summer of 2019, had stalled for decades 
over disagreements relating to agricultural tariffs, but, ironically, President Trump’s trade war 
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with China stimulated free market movements in places like Latin America.365 This helped the 
region reach this monumental deal and secure access to one another’s markets.366 For Argentina 
specifically, gaining the ability to sell beef and grain to Europe comes at a pivotal time. Now that 
China and the United States have reached an initial agreement regarding the trade war, Latin 
American countries like Argentina will see decreased business in China as trade normalizes with 
the United States, especially in relation to agriculture.367 This development is vital to note, since, 
by distributing its economic relations throughout the world, Mercosur enables its member 
nations like Argentina to escape dangerous dependence on markets in places like China, which, 
as the cooling of the trade war shows, can quickly become less reliable. 
In this way, despite Mercosur’s inconsistent implementation of free trade policies and 
internal conflict, the regional bloc serves as a serious option for Argentina and its other member 
nations to advocate for greater autonomy and develop Latin America’s economies through 
integration. This marks a key way in which Argentina’s positioning in the evolving relationship 
between, China, the United States, and Latin America differs from Ecuador. Although Argentina, 
like Ecuador, is far from exercising largely unrestricted autonomy in the 21st century, 
Argentina’s ability to navigate competition between China and the United States without 
completely folding under foreign pressures has allowed Argentina to retain a moderate 
negotiating power and better chances at pursuing greater autonomy through regional bloc’s like 
Mercosur.  
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Conclusion 
Ecuador serves as an example of a vulnerable Latin American country in this evolving 
relation for the various reasons discussed above. Although driven by the same historic desire as 
in Argentina, China’s relationship with Ecuador has been far more exploitive than in Argentina. 
This is for two main reasons. First, Chinese relations with Ecuador and the rest of Latin America 
picked up during Ecuador’s default and economic crisis, giving Ecuador great need and few 
alternatives for international financing. Although Argentina experienced a similar crisis, the 
situation had relatively stabilized by the time major Chinese investments began to pour into the 
country around 2005. This meant that Argentina established less dependence on China and was 
in a better position to negotiate the terms of BRI agreements. Second, political corruption 
enabled Ecuadorian leaders to allow Chinese officials and businesses to exploit their economy 
and natural resources. As these leaders lined their pockets, BRI projects were completed under 
little scrutiny and, operating at reduced productivity, offered limited benefits to Ecuador’s 
economy. Meanwhile, in Argentina, although political corruption is a major part Argentina’s 
political system, domestic legal barriers and Sinophobia led to higher levels of scrutiny of BRI 
projects and, consequently, more beneficial projects for Argentina. 
Eventually, economic desperation led Moreno’s government to turn back to the United 
States, sacrificing autonomy to the U.S. and IMF in hopes of gaining control in the future. Here, 
Argentina and Ecuador are very similar in their continued dependence on the United States and 
IMF, but Argentina has been able to maintain more significant relations with China and reject 
U.S. authority in Latin America than Ecuador. While Ecuador’s heavy dependence on China 
translated into heavy dependence on the United States, Argentina’s more moderate dependence 
on China has led to more moderate dependence on the United States. A notable exception to this 
Bullock 160 
trend is Argentina’s dependence on IMF, which, as in Ecuador, continues to push for austerity 
reforms in Argentina.   
As Ecuador found itself caught in a challenging position between China and the United 
States, its growing dependence on these states made Ecuador’s pursuit of a third way through the 
ALBA-TCP unsustainable. Trade with China ensured that Ecuador’s economy retained its 
primary-goods export model, meaning that Ecuador would have struggled to make ALBA-TCP 
economic reforms if attempted. Subsequent dependence on the United States ensured that 
President Moreno was in no strategic position to challenge American authority, and Ecuador 
likely left the ALBA-TCP to maintain relations with the United States. Meanwhile, as discussed 
below, Argentina has been able to continue developing its own regional economic bloc under 
Mercosur. Although Mercosur’s success has also been relatively limited, Argentina’s continued 
participation in this regional bloc demonstrates its comparatively greater capability to pursue 
autonomy in the evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America. 
Whether Ecuador will eventually be able to alter its dependent position in this relationship is 
unclear, but, for now, Ecuador continues to struggle to achieve historically desired autonomy. 
After comparing Ecuador’s and Argentina’s experiences with the BRI, it is now clear 
that, while there are many similarities between these two cases, a few key distinctions help 
explain why Ecuador has had less success than Argentina in navigating this evolving 
relationship. Both Ecuadorian and Argentine leaders make choices guided by a historically 
constructed desire for autonomy. However, expressions and interpretations of this desire 
manifest differently in each country, and, importantly, the personal aspirations of leaders in 
Ecuador led to significant failures related to BRI projects. Other external factors also contributed 
to Ecuador’s difficult relations with China, namely its lack of access to alternative forms of 
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finance. Conversely, internal pressures within Argentina led leaders to approach BRI projects 
with greater scrutiny. Domestic political barriers and Sinophobia impeded the BRI’s 
implementation within Argentina, but this hesitant acceptance of Chinese financing 
paradoxically strengthened Argentina’s ties with China without creating extreme dependence.  
As Ecuador’s economy struggled under the weight of foreign debt and Moreno turned 
back to the United States, Argentina likewise renewed its dependence on the IMF. Yet Argentina 
maintained the United States at an arm's length, unlike Ecuador. Ultimately, Ecuador’s growing 
dependence on the U.S. led Moreno to leave the ALBA-TCP, severing ties with an organization 
rooted (at least rhetorically) in a shared historic desire for greater autonomy. Contrary to that 
experience, Argentina was able to maintain membership in Mercosur and even participate in 
critical deals that allow the Argentine economy to brace for China’s potential turn away from 
Argentine agriculture.  
These important differences between Ecuador and Argentina inform our understanding of 
the evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America. More 
importantly, this analysis deconstructs the metaphorical representation of Latin American states 
as caught between two impossible choices, between Scylla & Charybdis. Alternatively, as 
President Moreno put it: “when two elephants fight, the ones who lose are the insects who are of 
course being crushed by the elephants in the attempt to evade them.”368 This wrongheaded 
interpretation of the evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America 
neglects the very real agency Latin American states like Ecuador and Argentina have in 
navigating this relationship. As seen in Argentina, even in the face of a desperate economic crisis 
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and historic dependence on foreign markets, playing China and the United States against one 
another and finding alternatives through Mercosur allowed Argentine leaders to prevent 
Argentina’s capitulation to these powers. In Ecuador, on the other hand, political corruption and 
over-dependence on foreign capital made it so Ecuador’s leaders have struggled to see their 
situation as anything other than a choice between China and the United States. 
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Conclusion 
While I was studying abroad at La Universidad de Salvador in Buenos Aires, my 
“Geopolitica” professor made an interesting assertion about the evolving relationship between 
China, the United States, and Latin America. Roughly, he said:  
“All nations participate in the great game of power, but they see the game differently. 
Latin American countries like Argentina? Che, we are playing checkers. We don’t see many 
moves ahead, and we barely plan for what will happen next year. The United States? They are 
playing chess. They see a few moves ahead, and they plan for what will happen in the next 8-10 
years. China? China is playing Go. They see many moves ahead, and they plan for what will 
happen in the next 100 years.” 
 
This metaphor, to me, was so interesting not because of my professor’s intended 
meaning, but because of the subtle assumption that lay underneath this metaphor. My professor 
was using the metaphor in the context of comparing institutionalized foreign policy makers in 
Latin America, the United States, and China. His intention was to show us how political 
fluctuation makes it more difficult for a state to maintain consistent, farsighted foreign policy 
objects. Underneath this meaning, however, lay the assumption that each state makes about 
international relations. That is, they see “a great game of power” in which there is a clear 
opponent. This view of international relations is pervasive and problematic. It assumes that there 
is no choice in international relations for cooperation, when, in reality, that choice is ever-
present.   
An Evolving Relationship: The Belt and Road Initiative 
This research has explored the complicated, evolving relationship between China, the 
United States, and Latin America by analyzing their relationship with one another and the BRI. 
In doing so, it has shown that China’s rapid rise as a formidable geopolitical power, the United 
States’ mixed response to that rise, and Latin American states’ struggle to avoid exploitation and 
benefit from this evolving relationship are all guided by central historic ideas. National 
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humiliation, American exceptionalism, and the struggle for autonomy have shaped and continue 
to affect the interests of these states, creating a broad spectrum of choice within which each actor 
pursues its goals. Furthermore, this research has illustrated how and why these core historic ideas 
have led many actors within this relationship to favor conflict over cooperation.  
In China, the overwhelming need to assuage national humiliation has led the rising power 
to engage in expansionist policies that pose a direct challenge to U.S. global dominance. This 
need has also led Chinese leaders and companies to expand relations with Latin American 
countries like Ecuador and Argentina, sometimes putting narrow self-interest over mutually 
beneficial ties. President Xi’s lion metaphor points to the ambivalence inherent in China’s rise. 
While China’s BRI may increase trade and foreign investment and improve living conditions for 
citizens in participating countries, it may also increase debt and dependence and bring 
environmental, social, and corruption risks. 
In the United States, the inferiority complex created by American exceptionalism has 
driven its leaders to view any move made by China as a hostile attack against core American 
values, whether across the Pacific or in its own, self-proclaimed, “backyard.” Aggressive 
intervention/interference in the politics of Ecuador and Argentina by the United States in the 
name of promoting democracy and capitalism have escalated the conflict between China and the 
United States, and U.S. actions abroad have likewise confounded opportunities for meaningful 
cooperation between China, the United States, and Latin America. This conflict-oriented policy 
is not an inevitable conclusion of the “Thucydides Trap,” as the historical analogy would 
suggest. Instead, it is the outgrowth of American exceptionalism, a historical self-
conceptualization that has pushed American foreign policy makers towards pursing conflict-
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oriented “solutions.” In essence, Vice President Mike Pence’s “they will fail” mentality dictates 
American foreign policy, whether in the South China Sea or in the Western Hemisphere.369 
  Lastly, Latin American states’ historical struggle for autonomy has guided various 
leaders to attempt to play these great powers against one another. In Ecuador, Correa, seeing the 
United States as a fundamental threat to Ecuador’s autonomy, turned to China for financial relief. 
Shortly after, Moreno, under the enormous pressure of Chinese loans and failed infrastructure 
projects, turned back to the United States in order to attempt to gain control over the economy. 
Eventually, Ecuador’s pursuit of an alternative to these great powers tapered off, and Ecuador 
left the ALBA-TCP. Meanwhile, in Argentina, leaders were successfully able to benefit from the 
BRI and maintain relations with the United States while still cultivating Mercosur. Nevertheless, 
while the situation was comparatively less dire, Sinophobia and anti-Americanism greatly 
influenced policy makers in Argentina, and the risk that Argentina may succumb to a fate similar 
to Ecuador is real. Ecuador’s leaders struggled because they saw autonomy as a choice between 
Scylla and Charybdis, while saw Argentine leaders saw a more complicated choice, one with a 
viable third way. Regardless, both states viewed this evolving relationship with “some 
suspicion,” as Eduardo Hughes Galeano suggested. Where this suspicion was insufficient, each 
nation suffered, losing some of the very autonomy they desperately sought.370 
Clearly, national humiliation, American exceptionalism, and the struggle for autonomy 
have shaped and continue to affect the interests of these states. Understanding the role these 
collective historic memories play in each state’s foreign policy explains why states make the 
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choices they do. Ultimately, this research demonstrates that historically constructed ideas and 
interests shape the complicated, evolving relationship between China, the United States, and 
Latin America.  
The Persistence of Realism 
Furthermore, this research has illustrated how and why these collective historic ideas 
have led many actors within this relationship to favor conflict over cooperation. In all three 
cases, foreign policy makers have demonstrated an understanding of international relations 
rooted in distrust and antagonism. This is because, for all these actors, Realism persists as the 
dominant understanding as how to achieve the state’s interests. There are three primary reasons 
for this dominance of Realism. First, Realism is simply the oldest, most widely accepted school 
of thought in International relations since the 5th century B.C.E. Even today, Realist thinkers 
from ancient times are evoked in modern international relations. The two most glaring examples 
are Sun Tzu, author of the Art of War, and Thucydides, author of The History of the 
Peloponnesian War, both of whom are regularly called upon by generals and politicians alike.371 
These ancient understandings of Realism are then layered with more contemporary examples, 
ranging anywhere from Bismarck to Putin.372 When compared to Liberal Institutionalism, which 
emerged with United States President Woodrow Wilson at the start of the 20th century, and 
Constructivism, which only really became popularized by Alexander Wendt in the 1990s, it is 
unsurprising that Realism’s long history gives it a cutting edge in interpreting international 
relations.  
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Second, Realism conforms to many masculine tendencies. Since foreign policy making is 
overwhelmingly dominated by men, it is even less surprising that Realism is the dominant view 
among Chinese, America, and Latin American foreign policy makers. As Feminist international 
relations theorist J. Ann Tickner, a distinguished scholar at American University, writes 
“strength, power, autonomy, independence, and rationality” are all characteristics typically 
associated with men as well as Realism. Furthermore, Tickner argues that “hegemonic 
masculinity,” which is “a type of culturally dominant masculinity that... is a socially constructed 
cultural ideal,” ultimately “sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political 
and social order.” This hegemonic masculinity, while prevalent in all societies, is most apparent 
“in the realm of international politics, where the characteristics associated with hegemonic 
masculinity are projected onto the behavior of states whose success as international actors is 
measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy,” i.e. 
through Realist, masculine terms.373 Clearly, gender disparities in the foreign policy making 
institutions similarly reinforces the persistence of Realism. 
Third, the historically-constructed ideas of China, the United States, and Latin American 
countries are all predicated upon a level of insecurity and distrust. China seeks to restore its 
historic legacy, America seeks to preserve its historic legacy, and Latin American states seek to 
shed their historic legacy. In each case, the states involved fear the actions of the others. The 
opening quotes at the beginning of this paper reflect this sentiment well. Xi Jinping attempts to 
assure the world it need not fear (or impede) China’s rise, subtly reflecting his concerns that 
other states will attempt to suppress China’s rise. Less subtly, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence 
vehemently accuses China of challenging the United States, asserting America’s commitment to 
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maintain U.S. hegemony across the Pacific. Lastly, Eduardo Hughes Galeano suggests that no 
power can be trusted, highlighting Latin American distrust of intervening global powers like 
China and the United States. These states and their leaders view other powers as hostile and 
malicious, resulting in a conflict-oriented understanding of the world. Although this conflict-
oriented understanding does not preclude all alternative interpretations of international relations, 
it overwhelmingly leans towards a Realist perspective. Accordingly, these states continue to act 
as though international anarchy defines international relations, treat cooperation with suspicion 
and hesitation, and, ultimately, emulate Realist principles.  
Realism persists in these states because of its legacy, the overwhelming masculine 
imbalance within foreign policy, and each state’s historic insecurities. Because the foreign policy 
makers involved in this evolving relationship have adopted the lens which expects conflict—
Realism—they paradoxically increase the chances of conflict through aggression. 
Correspondingly, China and the United States vie for military, economic, political, and cultural 
power while Latin American countries attempt to capitalize on this shifting relationship without 
losing autonomy. The BRI intensifies this conflict, manifesting as a point of contention rather 
than cooperation.  
Constructivism and the BRI 
Galeano’s quote, unlike that of President Xi or Vice President Pence, holds great nuance. 
By suggesting that the great powers of the world be held in suspicion, Galeano highlights the 
need of Latin American countries to recognize uncertainty. Many great powers will seek to take 
advantage of Latin America, but some, when scrutinized, can nevertheless bring rewards. By 
recognizing that conflict is not inevitable and that there are opportunities for cooperation even in 
deals made with great powers, Galeano avoids Realism’s destructive self-fulfillment. Yet by 
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recognizing the likelihood of conflict in international relations and recommending suspicion, he 
likewise dispels the overoptimistic perspective of Liberal Institutionalists. In this way, Galeano’s 
quote reflects a Constructivist perspective, which most accurately depicts this evolving 
relationship and its connection with the BRI. Conflict is not inevitable, and neither is 
cooperation. States have a choice. Thus, despite the claims of my professor, it perhaps seems as 
though Latin Americans have the clearest perspective of international relations.   
As this research has demonstrated, the popular understanding of international relations 
and history, that conflict is inevitable and states must act accordingly, is self-defeating for all 
involved: there are no winners. As China and the United States jockey for global dominance and 
Latin American countries are continuously drawn into the conflict, international peace is 
jeopardized, social justice within all of these states is undermined, and the environment is 
ravaged potentially beyond repair. These are issues exacerbated by conflict that could be 
resolved through cooperation. The advent of the global COVID-19 pandemic has only 
highlighted this need for cooperation in a world in which crises, and hopefully solutions, 
transcend borders. These solutions only emerge, however, when we choose to cooperate and 
overcome historically constructed antagonisms. 
Like Galeano, another scholar once recognized the importance of choice. Although he is 
often labeled a champion of Realism, closer readings of Henry Kissinger’s earlier works suggest 
that he too recognized the reality of choice. In his unpublished senior thesis, Kissinger 
challenged Immanuel Kant’s understanding of the impact that history’s inevitable end, 
“perpetual peace,” had on an individual’s freedom. He wrote: 
“Whatever one’s conception about the necessity of events, at the moment of their 
performance their inevitability could offer no guide to action… However we may explain 
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actions in retrospect, their accomplishment occurred with the inner conviction of 
choice.”374 
Kissinger suggests that regardless of individuals’ understanding of history, that understanding 
provides them no obvious answer to how to address a situation. Thus, individuals are always 
making a choice. In international relations, this situation is no different. Each actor in the 
evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America makes a choice 
between conflict and cooperation. They make these choices based on their understanding of 
whether their core interests clash or coincide. To Kissinger, “foreign policy can seek to merge 
competing core interests—and that is the means of turning confrontation into cooperation,” 
meaning by reconceptualizing these interests, and, correspondingly, deep seated historic ideas.375 
Importantly, these actors are not monolithic, homogenous entities, but complex networks of 
individuals, each with uneven, fluctuating influence on a state’s foreign policy choices. These 
complicated networks make the actions of states difficult to understand, and their choices nearly 
impossible to predict. 
Re-conceptualizing Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 
Yet geopolitics, international relations theory, and history are used to predict the choices 
of states every day. History especially is treated as the key to predicting and explaining the 
actions of a state. In every case, although these fields may provide guidance, they merely help us 
cope with the only true inevitability in the world: uncertainty. As demonstrated throughout this 
research, we use metaphors and historical analogies in an attempt to understand the world as it is, 
was, and will be. However, in doing so, we distort our understanding of the world with 
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imaginary representations and stretched comparisons. The nature of language itself, ever 
encompassing yet ever limited, makes it impossible for us to ever truly articulate what is 
happening in the world. Empiricism in all fields—geopolitics, history, international relations, 
and science—is an illusion.376 There are no tangible truths, even in history, only that which we 
believe.  
Kissinger speaks to this point as well—“what ‘really’ happened is often less important 
than what is thought to have happened”—but still recognizes why history is important. By using 
history not as an analog to the present, but, as done in this research, as a way to understand how 
“the memory of states” impact their “interpretation of the present in light of the past,” we can 
dissect states’ complicated decision-making processes without relying on skewed 
comparisons.377 Essentially, this research recognizes that history as it “really” happened is less 
useful for determining how a state will act than how a state believes it happened. When this type 
of history, one that recognizes the historic memory of states, is applied to geopolitics and 
international relations without distorting metaphors or convoluted analogies, we can begin to 
understand how our historically constructed ideas and interests shape our choices, and, therefore, 
history.  
The global struggle between China, the United States, and Latin America, characterized 
by conflict-oriented decision-making processes, is self-defeating for all involved: there are no 
winners. As China and the United States jockey for global dominance and Latin American 
countries are continuously drawn into the conflict, international peace is jeopardized, social 
justice within all of these states is undermined, and the environment is ravaged potentially 
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beyond repair. The ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic has only clarified the dangers of taking 
hostile positions during a time when significant cooperation is necessary to address the crisis. As 
this research has demonstrated, however, that conflict is not inevitable. Although arduous, it is 
possible for states to pursue historical re-conceptualization and challenge dominant, conflict-
oriented historical narratives that are widely accepted across the country. Through nationwide 
reflection and re-evaluation of dominant historical narratives, all states within this evolving 
relationship could cultivate collective historic memories that facilitate cooperation rather than 
conflict. Such a powerful reorientation would require serious shifts in the teaching of history. 
Moreover, if we are to avoid the dangers of a self-fulfilling Realist world, we must reconsider 
our understanding of geopolitics, international relations, and history. 
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